LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 



Chap. L. Copyright No. 

^ShelLJ 



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; 



SELECTIONS 



FROM 



EPICTETUS 



GEORGE LONG'S TRANSLATION 




ABRIDGED BY 






EDWIN GINN 












- 








"li^^^^' 


• 




i%\o'^~ 


BOSTON, U.S.A. 






PUBLISHED BY GINN & 


COMPANY 


1896 


^ 








COPYRIGHT, 1896 

By GINN & COMPANY 



ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



/z-dz//o 




PREFACE. 



It has been the aim of the editor to give in a 
small compass some of the choice sayings of this 
great man, from whom Marcus Aurelius drew much 
of his inspiration. Well would it be for our chil^ 
dren, in this age of haste and nervous tension, to 
have these calm old philosophers for companions 
and to form a habit early in life of saving a portion 
of each day for the study of good literature; to 
dwell upon the lives of great men, and learn, if they 
can, the sources of their greatness. They all tell 
us that good habits lie at the foundation. What 
we do to-day will become easier to-morrow, and 
repeating the same thing only a few times forges 
a chain hard to be broken. We all remember in 
our childhood how hard it was the first time even 
on a steep hill to drag the sled down through the 
soft driven snow. The second time it was easier, 
and after a little while it would glide very swiftly 



IV PREFACE. 

to the foot of the hill. Life's great plain seems 
very broad, level, and soft to young eyes, and they 
are careless of the tracks they are making. The 
broad plain narrows, the slopes grow steep, and 
too soon we find the stray tracks have become 
well-beaten roads which we follow with little 
thought whither they lead. 

How important, then, that the young have the 
best models placed before them, and learn what 
the wisest of men in all ages have regarded as most 
desirable. While the great majority will prefer to 
learn from their own experience, some may save 
themselves many bitter trials by adopting the 
counsels of others. True, our lot has fallen in 
different times. We have many advantages the 
past ages had not. We may travel rapidly, acquire 
knowledge and wealth quickly, and surround our- 
selves with luxuries, the past could not have. With- 
out attempting to value the advantages to the human 
race from the application of electricity and steam to 
modes of travel, manufacture, etc., there seem to 
be many disadvantages from the effects of which we 



PREFACE. V 

are suffering. We are overvaluing, perhaps, the 
advantages of circumnavigating the whole globe in 
a manner so rapid that we can see or enjoy little in 
passing. We have in mind as the main thing 
traveling over the ground. In the rapidity with 
which we are able to accumulate wealth and manu- 
facture articles of use, we perhaps forget the desir- 
able limit, and to the end of our days we keep on 
accumulating. The great majority of mankind are 
not satisfied until their nervous energy is exhausted 
and they are unable to enjoy the results of their 
accumulations. They have been working on these 
lines so constantly and developing their powers in 
this one direction to such an extent that they are 
not able to work in other lines or secure enjoyment 
in broader fields of activity. These very energies 
that we have called to our aid are still, to many of 
us, our greatest misfortunes, for they cause us all to 
move and think with such a degree of haste that we 
neither act nor speak at our best. To do that 
requires deliberation. Better would it be for this 
age if it moved slowly and studied more on the 



VI PREFACE. 

way, accumulated less and enjoyed the result of 
its labors as it went along. 

Would it not be well under these circumstances 
that we should study the great principles under- 
lying all activity and character, so well stated by 

this great philosopher? 

Edw^in Ginn. 

Boston, January, 1896. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Introduction i 

The Philosophy of Epictetus 5 

Arrian to Lucius Gellius, with wishes for his happiness . . 19 
Of the things which are in our power, and not in our power . 20 
How a man on every occasion can maintain his proper char- 
acter 22 

How a man should proceed from the principle of God being 

the Father of all Men to the rest 24 

Of progress or improvement 25 

Of providence 29 

How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may proceed 

to the consequences 33 

Against those who eagerly seek preferment at Rome . . 34 

Of natural affection 36 

Of contentment 37 

How everything may be done acceptably to the gods . . 42 

What philosophy promises 42 

That we ought not to be angr>' with the errors (faults) of 

others 44 

How we should behave to tyrants ...... 47 

Against those who wish to be admired 50 

How we should struggle with circumstances . . . -51 

On the same 53 

In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids we 

should provide against them 55 

That we ought not to be angry- with men ; and what are the 

small and the great things among men . . . -56 

On constancy (or firmness) 60 

That confidence (courage) is not inconsistent with caution . 65 

Of tranquillity (freedom from perturbation) .... 69 
To those who recommend persons to philosophers . . -71 



Vlll CONTEXTS. 



PAGE 

Against a person who had once been detected in adulter^' . . 72 

How magnanimity is consistent with care ..... 72 

Of indifference 74 

How we ought to use divination ....... 76 

What is the nature of the good "j"] 

That when we cannot fulfill that which the character of a man 

promises, we assume the character of a philosopher . . So 

How we may discover the duties of life from names ... 82 

Of disputation or discussion 85 

Of anxiety (soUcitude) 86 

To or against those who obstinately persist in what they have 

determined 89 

That we do not strive to use our opinions about good and evil . 92 

How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases . , 95 

How we should struggle against appearances .... 99 

Of inconsistency . . .103 

Of friendship .......... 105 

On the power of speaking no 

To (or against) a person who was one of those who were not 

valued (esteemed) by him . . • . . . .116 

What is the property of error 120 

Of finery in dress 121 

In what a man ought to be exercised who has made proficiency; 

and that we neglect the chief things 127 

What is the matter on which a good man should be employed, 

and in what we ought chiefly to practice ourselves . .129 
Against a person who showed his partisanship in an unseemly 

way in a theater 133 

Against those who on account of sickness go away home . .134 

Miscellaneous 136 

To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a suit . 138 

In what manner we ought to bear sickness 140 

What solitude is, and what kind of a person a solitary man is , 142 
Certain miscellaneous matters . . . . . . -144 

That we ought to proceed with circumspection to everjiihing . 145 
That we ought with caution to enter into familiar intercourse 

with men 146 

On providence 148 

That we ought not to be disturbed by any news .... 149 
WTiat is the condition of a common kind of man and of a 

philosopher 150 



CONTENTS. IX 

PAGE 

Against those who readily come to the profession of sophists, 150 

About cynism . . . . , 154 

To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation , 159 
That we ought not to be moved by a desire of those things 

which are not in our power 163 

To those who fall off (desist) from their purpose . . .170 

Of familiar intimacy 181 

What things we should exchange for other things . . .183 
To those who are desirous of passing life in tranquillity . 184 

Against the quarrelsome and ferocious 190 

Against those who lament over being pitied . . . -197 

On freedom from fear 201 

Against those who hastily rush into the philosophic dress . 204 
To a person who had been chained to a character of shame- 

lessness 207 

What things we ought to despise and what things Vve ought 

to value 210 

About purity (cleanliness) 213 

On attention . . . . . . , . . '215 

Against or to those who readily tell their own affairs . .216 

The Encheiridion, or Manual 220 



EPICTETUS 



T /"ERY little is known of the life of Epictetus. 
^ It is said that he was a native of Hierapolis 
in Phrygia. The date of his birth is unknown. 
The only recorded fact of his early life is that he 
was a slave in Rome, that he was weak in body 
and lame from an early age, and his master was 
Epaphroditus, a profligate freedman of the emperor 
Nero. 

It may be supposed that the young slave showed 
intelligence, for his master sent or permitted him 
to attend the lectures of C. Musonius Rufus, an 
eminent Stoic philosopher. It may seem strange 
that such a master should have wished to have his 
slave made into a philosopher. Garnier says : 
"Epictetus, born at Hierapolis of Phr^'-gia of poor 
parents, was indebted apparently for the advantages 
of a good education to the w^him, which was 
common at the end of the Republic and under the 
first emperors, among the great of Rome to reckon 
among their numerous slaves Grammarians, Poets, 
Rhetoricians, and Philosophers, in the same way as 
rich financiers in these later ages have been led to 
form at a great cost rich and numerous libraries. 
This supposition is the only one which can explain 



2 EPICTETUS. 

to US, how a wi etched child, born as poor as Irus, 
had received a good education, and how a rigid 
Stoic was the slave of Epaphroditus, one of the 
officers of the Imperial guard. For we cannot 
suspect that it was through predilection for the 
Stoic doctrine and for his own use, that the con- 
fidant and the minister of the debaucheries of 
Nero would have desired to possess such a slave." 

After the expulsion of the philosophers from 
Rome by Domitian, a. d. 89, Epictetus retired to 
Nicopolis in Epirus, a city built by Augustus to 
commemorate the victory at Actium. He opened 
a school or lecture room at Nicopolis, where he 
taught till he was an old man. The time of his 
death is unknown. He was never married. When 
he was finding fault with Demonax and advising 
him to take a wife and beget children, for this also, 
as Epictetus said, was a philosopher's duty, to 
leave in place of himself another in the Universe, 
Demonax refuted the doctrine by answering, Give 
me then, Epictetus, one of your own daughters. 
Simplicius says that Epictetus lived alone a long 
time. At last he took a woman into his house as a 
nurse for a child, w^hich one of his friends was 
going to expose on account of his poverty, but he 
took the child and brought it up. 

Epictetus wrote nothing ; and all that we have 
under his name, was written by an affectionate 
pupil, Arrian, afterwards the historian of Alexander 
the Great, who, as he tells us, took down in writing 
the philosopher's discourses. 



EPICTETUS. 3 

It is supposed they were spoken extempore, and 
so one thing after another would come into the 
thoughts of the speaker. The meaning is some- 
times obscure through the omission of some words 
which are necessary to indicate the connection of 
the thoughts. The reader then will find that he 
cannot always understand Epictetus, if he does not 
read him very carefully, and some passages more 
than once. 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICTETUS. 



r^ MUSONIUS RUFUS, a Roman Stoic, ac- 
^^* quired great reputation as a teacher at Rome 
under the emperor Nero. He urged young men 
especially to the study of philosophy, and even 
women, because without philosophy no person can 
be virtuous and do his duty. He asks, what 
hinders the scholar from working with his teacher 
and at the same time learning from him something 
about moderation and justice and endurance ? His 
belief in the power of phMosophy over men's minds 
was strong, and he was convinced that it was a 
perfect cure for the corruption of mankind. 

In his teaching about the Gods he follows the 
general Stoic practice of maintaining the popular 
religion. He taught that nothing was unknown to 
the Gods : as Socrates taught that the Gods knew 
everything, what was said, what was done, and 
what men thought. He considered the souls of 
men to be akin to the Gods ; but as they were 
mingled with the body, the soul must partake of 
the impurities of the body. The intelligent prin- 
ciple is free from all necessity (compulsion) and 
self-sufficient. 



O EPICTETUS. 

The old Stoics considered virtue to be the 
property only of the wise man ; and they even 
doubted whether such a man could be found. But 
Rufus said that it was not impossible for such a 
man to exist, for we cannot conceive such virtues 
as a wise man possesses otherwise than from the 
examples of human nature itself and by meeting 
with men such as those who are named divine and 
godlike. 

The knowledge and the teaching of what is good, 
he says, should come first ; but Rufus did not 
believe that the knowledge of the Good was strong 
enough without practice (discipline) to lead to 
moral conduct, and consequently he believed that 
practice has greater efficacy than teaching. He 
makes two kinds of exercise, first, the exercise of 
the soul in thinking, in reflecting, and in stamping 
on the mind sound rules of life ; and second, in the 
enduring of bodily labowB or pains, in which act of 
endurance the soul and the body act together. 

"The sum of his several rules of life," says 
Ritter, "may be thus briefly expressed: in his 
opinion a life according to Nature results in a social, 
philanthropic and contented state of mind, joined 
to the most simple satisfaction of our necessary 
wants. We see his social and philanthropic dis- 
position in this that he opposes all selfishness, that 
he views marriage, not only as the sole right and 
natural satisfaction of the sexual feelings, but also 
as the foundation of family, of a state, and of the 
continuation of the human race." 



PHILOSOPHY. 7 

Epictetus was a pupil of this noble Roman 
teacher, whose name occurs several times in the 
Discourses. Ritter conjectures that Epictetus also 
heard Euphrates, whom he highly commends. It 
has been justly said that, though Epictetus is named 
a Stoic, and that his principles are Stoical, he is 
not purely a Stoic. He learned from other teachers 
as well as the Stoic. He quotes the teaching and 
example of Socrates continually, and the example 
of Diogenes the Cynic, both of whom he mentions 
more frequently than Zeno, the founder of the 
Stoic philosophy. He also valued Plato, who 
accepted from Socrates many of his principles, and 
developed and expanded them. So Epictetus 
learned that the beginning of philosophy is man's 
knowledge of himself, and the acknowledgment of 
his own ignorance and weakness. He teaches that 
the examination of names, the understanding of the 
notion, of the conception of a thing, is the begin- 
ning of education : he consistently teaches that we 
ought to pity those who do wrong, for they err in 
ignorance; and, as Plato says, every mind is 
deprived of truth unwillingly. 

The foundation of the Ethic of Epictetus is the 
doctrine which the Stoic Cleanthes proclaimed in 
his hymn to Zeus (God), "From thee our race 
comes." Epictetus speaks of Gods, whom we must 
venerate and make offerings to ; and of God, from 
whom we all are sprung in an especial manner. 
"God is the father both of men and of Gods." 
This great descent ought to teach us to have no 



8 EPICTETUS. 

ignoble or mean thoughts about ourselves. He 
says, " Since these two things are mingled in the 
generation of man, body in common with the 
animals, and reason and intelligence in common 
with the Gods, many incline to this kinship, which 
is miserable and mortal ; and some few to that 
which is divine and happy." 

It is enough for animals to do what their nature 
leads them to do without understanding why they 
do it. But it is not enough for us, to whom God 
has given also the intellectual faculty ; for unless 
we act conformably to the nature and constitution 
of each thing, we shall never attain our true end. 
God has introduced man into the world to be a 
spectator of God and his works ; and not only a 
spectator of them, but an interpreter. For this 
reason, he says, "it is shameful for man to begin 
and to end where irrational animals do ; but rather 
he ought to begin where they begin, and to end 
where nature ends in us ; and nature ends in con- 
templation and understanding, and in a way of life 
conformable to nature." 

The teaching of Epictetus, briefly expressed, is, 
that man ought to be thankful to God for all things, 
and always content with that which happens, for 
what God chooses is better than what man can 
choose. 

The good and the bad are in man's will, and in 
nothing external. The rational power therefore 
leads us to acknowledge as good only that which is 
conformable to reason, and to recognize as bad that 



PHILOSOPHY. 9 

which is not conformable to reason. The matter 
on which the good man labors is his rational 
faculty : that is the business of the philosopher, 
A man who wishes to be what he is by nature, 
by his constitution, adapted for becoming, must 
"struggle against appearances." This is not an 
easy thing, but it is the only way of obtaining true 
freedom, tranquillity of mind, and the dominion 
over the movements of the soul, in a word, happi- 
ness, which is the true end and purpose of man's 
existence on earth. Every man carries in him his 
own enemy, whom he must carefully watch. There 
is danger that appearances, which powerfully resist 
reason, will carry you away : if you are conquered 
twice, or even once, there is danger that a habit of 
yielding to them will be formed. " Generally, then, 
if you would make anything a habit, do it : if you 
would not make it a habit, do not do it ; but accus- 
tom yourself to do something else in place of 
it." As to pleasure Epictetus says : " If you have 
received the impression of any pleasure, guard 
yourself against being carried away by it ; but let 
the thing wait for you, and allow yourself a certain 
delay on your own part. Then think of both times, 
of the time when you will enjoy the pleasure, and 
of the time after the enjoyment of the pleasure, 
when you will repent and reproach yourself. And 
set against these things how you will rejoice, if you 
have abstained from the pleasure, and how you will 
commend yourself. But if it seem to you season- 
able to undertake (do) the thing, take care that the 



lO EPICTETUS. 

charm of it, and the pleasure, and the attraction of 
it shall not conquer you, and set on the other side 
the consideration how much better it is to be con- 
scious that you have gained this victory." 

Hence the rule that a man must be careful and 
cautious in everything which is in the power of the 
will ; but on the contrary, with respect to externals 
which are not in a 'man's power, he must be bold. 
" Confidence (courage) then ought to be employed 
against death, and caution against the fear of death : 
but now we do the contrary, and employ against 
death the attempt to escape ; and to our opinion 
about it we employ carelessness, rashness and 
indifference." For the purification of the soul and 
enabling it to employ its powers a man must root 
out of himself two things, arrogance (pride) and 
distrust. " Arrogance is the opinion that you want 
nothing (are deficient in nothing) ; but distrust is the 
opinion that you cannot be happy when so many 
circumstances surround you." 

Epictetus urges the fact of a man assenting to 
or not assenting to a thing as a proof that man 
possesses something which is naturally free. He 
says : "Who is able to compel you to assent to that 
which appears false ? No man. And who can 
compel you not to assent to that which appears 
true ? No man. By this then you see that there is 
something in you naturally free. But to desire or 
to be averse from, or to move towards an object or 
to move from it, or to prepare yourself, or to pro- 
pose to do anything, which of you can do this. 



PHILOSOPHY. I I 

unless he has received an impression of the appear- 
ance of that which is profitable or a duty ? No man. 
You have then in these things also something which 
is not hindered and is freCo Wretched men, work 
out this, take care of this, seek for good here." 

Here the philosopher teaches that a man's 
opinion or his belief cannot be compelled by 
another, though we may conclude from what we see 
and hear and is done in the world, that a large part 
of mankind do not know this fact. A man cannot 
even think or believe as he chooses himself : if a 
thing is capable of demonstration, and if he under- 
stands demonstration, he must believe what is 
demonstrated. If the thing is a matter of probable 
evidence, he will follow that which seems the more 
probable, if he has any capacity for thinking. I 
say ' any capacity ' for thinking, because the intel- 
lectual power in the minds of a great number of 
persons is very weak ; and in all of us often very 
weak compared with the power of the necessities of 
our nature, of our desires, of our passions, in fact 
of all that is in this wonderful creature man, which 
is not pure reason or pure understanding or what- 
ever name we give to the powers named intellectual. 

This body is not man's own, but it is clay finely 
tempered ; and God has also given to man a small 
portion of himself, in a word, the faculty of using 
the appearances of things, of which faculty Epic- 
tetus says, " if you will take care of this faculty and 
consider it your only possession, you will never be 
hindered, never meet with impediments, you will 



12 EPICTETUS. 

not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter 
any person." He says that God " has placed me 
with myself, and has put my wdll in obedience to 
myself alone, and has given me rules for the right 
use of it." 

Though Epictetus contends that man has power 
over his will, he well knew how weak this power 
sometimes is. An appearance, he says, is pre- 
sented, and straightway I act according to it ; and, 
what is the name of those who follow every appear- 
ance ? They are called madmen. — Such are a 
large part of mankind ; and it is true, that many 
persons have no Will at all. They are deceived by 
appearances, perplexed, tossed about like a ship 
which has lost the helm : they have no steady, 
fixed, and rational purpose. Their perseverance or 
obstinacy is often nothing more than a persever- 
ance in an irrational purpose. It is often so strong 
and so steady that the man himself and others too 
may view it as a strong will ; and it is a strong will, 
if you choose, but it is a will in a wrong direction. 
"The nature of the Good is a certain Will : the 
nature of the Bad is a certain kind of ^^'ill." 

Those who have been fortunate in their parents 
and in their education, who have acquired good 
habits, and are not greatly disturbed by the affects 
and the passions, may pass through life calmly and 
with little danger, even when the powers of the will 
are very weak, and hardly ever exercised. Life 
with them is fortunately a series of habits, generally 
good, or at least not bad. This is the condition of 



PHILOSOPHY. 1 3 

many men and women. They are good or seem to 
be good, because they are not tried above their 
power ; but if a temptation should suddenly surprise 
them when they are not prepared for it, they are 
conquered and they fall. Even a man, who has 
trained himself to the exercise of his rational facul- 
ties and has for a long time passed a blameless life, 
may in a moment when his vigilance is relaxed, 
when he is off his guard, be defeated by the enemy 
whom he always carries about with him. 

The difference between a man who has within 
him the principles of reason and him who has not, 
appears from a story told by Gellius : — We were 
sailing, he says, from Cassiopa to Brundisium when 
a violent storm came on. In the ship there was a 
Stoic philosopher, a man of good repute. He who 
told the story says that he kept his eyes on the 
philosopher to see how he behaved under the 
circumstances. The philosopher did not weep and 
bewail like the rest, but his complexion and appar- 
ent perturbation did not much differ from those of 
the other passengers. When the danger was over, 
a wealthy Greek from Asia went up to the Stoic, 
and in an insulting manner said. How is this, 
philosopher ? when we were in danger, you were 
afraid and grew pale ; but I was neither afraid nor 
was I pale. The philosopher after a little hesita- 
tion said. If I seemed to be a little afraid in so 
violent a tempest, you are not worthy to hear the 
reason of it. However, he told the man a story 
about Aristippus, who on a like occasion was ques- 



14 EPICTETUS. 

tioned by a man like this Greek; and so the 
philosopher got rid of the impertinent fellow. 
When they arrived at Brundisium, the narrator 
asked the philosopher for an explanation of his 
fear which the philosopher readily gave. He took 
out of his bag a work of Epictetus, the fifth book 
of his discourses in which was the following pas- 
sage : The affects of the mind (visa animi), by 
which a man's mind is struck by the first appear- 
ance of a thing which approaches, are not things 
which belong to the will nor in our power, but by a 
peculiar force they intrude themselves on men. 
But the assents (the assents of the judgment), by 
which the same affects (visa animi) are known and 
determined, are from the will and are in the power 
of men to make. For this reason when some 
frightful sound in the heavens or from a fall, or 
some sudden news of danger comes, or anything 
of the same kind happens, it is unavoidable that 
even the mind of the wise man must be moved 
somewhat and confounded, and that he must grow 
pale, not through an opinion which he has first 
conceived of any danger (or evil), but by certain 
rapid and inconsiderate emotions which anticipate 
(prevent) the exercise of the mind and the reason. 
In a short time, however, the wise man does not 
allow these emotions (visa animi) to remain, but he 
rejects them, and he sees nothing terrible in them. 
But this is the difference between the fool and the 
wise man : the fool, as the things at the first im- 
pulse appeared to be dangerous, such he thinks 



PHILOSOPHY. 1 5 

them to be ; but the wise man, when he has been 
moved for a short time, recovers the former state 
and vigor of his mind which he always had 
with reference to such appearances, that they are 
not objects of fear, but only terrify by a false 
show.^ 

This explanation may be applied to all the events, 
to all the thoughts and to all the emotions which 
disturb the mind and the reason, whatever be their 
cause or nature. If a man's mind has been long 
under proper discipline, after reflection he is able 
to recover from this disorder and to resume his 
former state. If he has not been under proper 
discipline when his powers of reason are thus 
assailed, he may dp anything however foolish or 
bad. A sound exercise of the faculty of the Will 
therefore requires discipline, in order that it may 
be corrected and maintained. A man must exercise 
his will and improve it by labor so as to make it 
conformable to nature and free. This exercise of 
the will and the improvement of it are a labor that 
never ends. A man should begin it as soon as he 
can. If the question is asked, how a man must 
begin who has never been trained by a parent or 
teacher to observe carefully his own conduct, to 
reflect, to determine, and then to act, I cannot tell. 
Perhaps a mere accident, some trifle which many 
persons would not notice, may be the beginning of 
a total change in a man's life, as in the case of 

1 This is the general sense of the passage. The translation 
is not easy. 



l6 EPICTETUS. 

Polemon, who was a dissolute youth, and as he was 
by chance passing the lecture room of Xenocrates, 
he and his drunken companions burst into the 
room. Polemon was so affected by the words of 
the excellent teacher that he came out a different 
man, and at last succeeded Xenocrates in the 
school of the Academy. Folly and bad habits then 
may by reflection be altered into wisdom and a 
good course of life. If such a thing happens, and 
undoubtedly it has happened, it may be said that 
the origin of the change is not in a man's will, but 
in something external. Granted : a thing external 
has presented an appearance to a man. but the 
effect of the appearance would not be the same in 
all men, as we presume that it was not the same, 
as the story is told, in Polemon and his companions. 
One man in this case had a temper or disposition 
and a capacity to use his mental power and to 
profit by the words of Xenocrates. It may be said 
that this temper or disposition and capacity are not 
in the power of a man's Will ; and this is true. But 
that matter is nothing to- us. Men have various 
capacities, and, as Epictetus would say, they are 
the gift of God, who distributes them as he pleases. 
One man has the power of using an appearance in 
a way which is good for himself, and another has 
not. We can say no more. In whatever way then 
a man has been led to exercise his will towards a 
good end, he must practice the exercise of his will 
for such an end ; he must make a habit of it, which 
habit will acquire strength ; and he may then have 



PHILOSOPHY. 17 

a reasonable hope that he will not often fail in his 
good purpose. 

It is impossible for man's nature to be altogether 
pure ; but reason endeavors to make human nature 
love purity. " The first then and highest purity is 
that which is in the soul ; and we may say the 
same of impurity. But you could not discover the 
impurity of the soul as you could discover that of 
the body : but as to the soul, what else could you 
find in it than that which makes it filthy in respect 
to the acts which are her own ? Now the acts of 
the soul are movement towards an object or move- 
ment from it, desire, aversion, preparation, design 
(purpose), assent. What then is it which in these 
acts makes the soul filthy and impure? Nothing 
else than her own bad judgments. Consequently 
the impurity of the soul is the soul's bad opinions ; 
and the purification of the soul is the planting in it 
of proper opinions ; and the soul is pure which has 
proper opinions, for the soul alone in her own acts 
is free from perturbation and pollution." 

Epictetus says that man is not " flesh nor bones 
nor sinews, but he is that which makes use of these 
parts of the body and governs them and follows 
(understands) the appearances of things." If then 
Epictetus had any distinct notion of the soul, and 
he is a man whose notions are generally distinct, I 
think that his opinion of man's body and of man's 
soul are, that a man's body is not the man, but the 
body is that "finely tempered clay" in which the 
man dwells, and without the body he could not 



1 8 EPICTETUS. 

live this earthly life : and his notion of the soul is 
that which is stated above. As to the mode and 
nature of this connection between the body and the 
soul, I can only suppose that he would have dis- 
claimed all knowledge of it, as he does of the 
nature of perception ; and I do not suppose that 
any philosopher or theologian would venture to say 
what this connection of soul and body is. In the 
life then which man lives on the earth I think that 
the opinions of Epictetus are the same or nearly 
the same as those of Swedenborg ; but after the 
event, which comes to all men, and which we name 
Death, the opinions are very different. 

The philosopher, who appears to have no belief 
in a future existence, as it is generally understood, 
teaches that we ought to live such a life in all our 
thoughts and in all our acts as a Christian would 
teach. He says, "Then in the place of all other 
delights substitute this, that of being conscious that 
you are obeying God, that not in word, but in deed 
you are performing the acts of a wise and good 
man." He looks for no reward for doing what he 
ought to do. The virtuous man has his reward in 
his own acts. If he lives conformably to nature, he 
will do what is best in this short life, and will obtain 
all the happiness which he can obtain in no other 
way. 



\ 



ARRIAN'S 
DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS. 



ARRIAN TO LUCIUS GELLIUS, WITH WISHES FOR HIS 
HAPPINESS. 

T NEITHER wrote these Discourses of Epictetus 
■^ in the way in which a man might write such things ; 
nor did I make them public myself, inasmuch as I 
declare that I did not even write them. But what- 
ever I heard him say, the same I attempted to write 
down in his own words as nearly as possible, for 
the purpose of preserving them as memorials to 
myself afterwards of the thoughts and the free- 
dom of speech of Epictetus. Accordingly, the Dis- 
courses are naturally such as a man would address 
without preparation to another, not such as a man 
would write with the view of others reading them. 
Now, being such, I do not know how they fell into 
the hands of the public, without either my consent 
or my knowledge. But it concerns me little if I 
shall be considered incompetent to write ; and it 
concerns Epictetus not at all if any man shall 
despise his words ; for at the time when he uttered 
them, it was plain that he had no other purpose 
than to move the minds of his hearers to the best 



20 EPICTETUS. 

things. If, indeed, these Discourses shall produce 
this effect, they will have, I think, the result which 
the words of philosophers ought to have. But if 
they shall not, let those who read them know that, 
when Epictetus delivered them, the hearer could 
not avoid being affected in the way that Epictetus 
wished him to be. But if the Discourses them- 
selves, as they are written, do not effect this result, 
it may be that the fault is mine, or, it may be, that 
the thing is unavoidable. 
Farewell ! 

OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE IN OUR POWER, AND 
NOT IN OUR POWER. 

Of all the faculties (except that which I shall 
soon mention), you will find not one which is 
capable of contemplating itself, and, consequently, 
not capable either of approving or disapproving. 
How far does the grammatic art possess the con- 
templating power ? As far as forming a judgment 
about what is written and spoken. And how far 
music } As far as judging about melody. Does 
either of them then contemplate itself? By no 
means. But when you must write something to 
your friend, grammar will tell you what words you 
should write ; but whether you should write or not, 
grammar will not tell you. And so it is with music 
as to musical sounds ; but whether you should sing 
at the present time and play on the lute, or do 
neither, music will not tell you. What faculty then 



DISCOURSES. 21 

will tell you ? That which contemplates both itself 
and all other things. And what is this faculty? 
The rational faculty ; for this is the only faculty 
that we have received which examines itself, what 
it is, and what power it has, and what is the value 
of this gift, and examines all other faculties ; for 
what else is there which tells us that golden things 
are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves ? 
Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judg- 
ing of appearances. What else judges of music, 
grammar and the other faculties, proves their uses, 
and points out the occasions for using them ? Noth- 
ing else. 

As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of 
all and supreme over all is the only thing which the 
gods have placed in our power, the right use of 
appearances ; but all other things they have not 
placed in our power. Was it because they did not 
choose ? I indeed think that, if they had been able, 
they would have put these other things also in our 
power, but they certainly could not. For as we 
exist on the earth, and are bound to such a body 
and to such companions, how was it possible for us 
not to be hindered as to these things by externals ? 

But what says Zeus ? Epictetus, if it were pos- 
sible, I would have made both your little body 
and your little property free and not exposed to 
hindrance. But now be not ignorant of this : this 
body is not yours, but it is clay finely tempered. 
And since I was not able to do for you what I have 
mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us, 



22 EPICTETUS. 

this faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding 
it, and the faculty of desire and aversion, and, in 
a word, the faculty of using the appearances of 
things ; and if you will take care of this faculty and 
consider it your only possession, you will never be 
hindered, never meet with impediments ; you will 
not lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter 
any person. 

Well, do these seem to you small matters ? I 
hope not. Be content with them then and pray to 
the gods. But now when it is in our power to look 
after one thing, and to attach ourselves to it, we 
prefer to look after many things, and to be bound 
to many things, to the body and to property, and to 
brother and to friend, and to child and to slave. 
Since then we are bound to many things, we are 
depressed by them and dragged down. For this 
reason, when the weather is hot fit for sailing, we 
sit down and torment ourselves, and continually 
look out to see what wind is blowing. 

HOW A MAN ON EVERY OCCASION CAN MAINTAIN 
HIS PROPER CHARACTER. 

If I do not take a part in the tragic acting, I 
shall have my head struck off. Go then and take 
a part, but I will not. Why } Because you con- 
sider yourself to be only one thread of those which 
are in the tunic. Well then it was fitting for you 
to. take care how you should be like the rest of 
men, just as the thread has no design to be any- 



DISCOURSES. 23 

thing superior to the other threads. But I wish to 
be purple, that small part which is bright, and 
makes all the rest appear graceful and beautiful. 
Why then do you tell me to make myself like the 
many ? and if I do, how shall I still be purple ? 

Prisons Helvidius also saw this, and acted con- 
formably. For when Vespasian sent and commanded 
him not to go into the senate, he replied, " It is in 
your power not to allow me to be a member of the 
senate, but so long as I am, I must go in." Well, 
go in then, says the emperor, but say nothing. Do 
not ask my opinion, and I will be silent. But I 
must ask your opinion. And I must say what I 
think right. But if you do, I shall put you to 
death. When then did I tell you that I am 
immortal .? You will do your part, and I will do 
mine : it is your part to kill ; it is mine to die, 
but not in fear : yours to banish me ; mine to 
depart without sorrow. 

What good then did Prisons do, who was only a 
single person } And what good does the purple do 
for the toga ? Why, what else than this, that it is 
conspicuous in the toga as a purple, and is dis- 
played also as a fine example to all other things ? 

Only consider at what price you sell your own 
will ; if for no other reason, at least for this, that 
you sell it not for a small sum. But that which is 
great and superior perhaps belongs to Socrates and 
such as are like him. Why then, if we are naturally 
such, are not a very great number of us like him ? 
Is it true then that all horses become swift, that all 



24 EPICTETUS. 

dogs are skilled in tracking footprints ? What then, 
since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, 
take no pains ? I hope not. Epictetus is not 
superior to Socrates ; but if he is not inferior, this 
is enough for me ; for I shall never be a Milo, and 
yet I do not neglect my body ; nor shall I be a 
Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property ; 
nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything 
because we despair of reaching the highest degree. 

HOW A MAN SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE PRIN- 
CIPLE OF GOD BEING THE FATHER OF ALL 
MEN TO THE REST. 

If a man should be able to assent to this doctrine 
as he ought, that we are all sprung from God in an 
especial manner, and that God is the father both of 
men and of gods, I suppose that he would never 
have any ignoble or mean thoughts about himself. 
But if Caesar (the emperor) should adopt you, no 
one could endure your arrogance ; and if you know 
that you are the son of Zeus, will you not be elated? 
Yet we do not so ; but since these two things are 
mingled in the generation of man, body in common 
with the animals, and reason and intelligence in 
common with the gods, many incline to this kinship, 
which is miserable and mortal ; and some few to 
that which is divine and happy. Since then it is of 
necessity that every man uses everything according 
to the opinion which he has about it, those, the 
few, who think that they are formed for fidelity and 



DISCOURSES. 25 

modesty and a sure use of appearances have no 
mean or ignoble thoughts about themselves ; but 
with the many it is quite the contrary. For they 
say, What am I ? A poor, miserable man, with my 
wretched bit of flesh. Wretched, indeed ; but you 
possess something better than your bit of flesh. 
Why then do you neglect that which is better, and 
why do you attach yourself to this ? 

Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us 
inclining to it become like wolves, faithless and 
treacherous and mischievous ; some become like 
lions, savage and bestial and untamed ; but the 
greater part of us become foxes, and other worse 
animals. For what else is a slanderer and a malig- 
nant man than a fox, or some other more wretched 
and meaner animal ? See then and take care that 
you do not become some one of these miserable 
things. 

OF PROGRESS OR IMPROVEMENT. 

He who is making progress, having learned from 
philosophers that desire means the desire of good 
things, and aversion means aversion from bad 
things ; having learned too that happiness and 
tranquillity are not attainable by man otherwise 
than by not failing to obtain what he desires, and 
not falling into that which he would avoid ; such a 
man takes from himself desire altogether and defers 
it, but he employs his aversion only on things which 
are dependent on his will. For if he attempts to 



26 EPICTETUS. 

avoid anything independent of his will, he knows 
that sometimes he will fall in with something which 
he wishes to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now 
if virtue promises good fortune and tranquillity and 
happiness, certainly also the progress towards virtue 
is progress towards each of these things. For it is 
always true that to whatever point the perfecting of 
anything leads us, progress is an approach towards 
this point. 

How then do we admit that virtue is such as I 
have said, and yet seek progress in other things 
and make a display of it .'' What is the product of 
virtue? Tranquillity. Who then makes improve- 
ment ? Is it he who has read many books of 
Chrysippus ? -^ But does virtue consist in having 
understood Chrysippus ? If this is so, progress is 
clearly nothing else than knowing a great deal of 
Chrysippus. But now we admit that virtue pro- 
duces one thing, and we declare that approaching 
near to it is another thing, namely, progress or 
improvement. Such a person, says one, is already 
able to read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, 
you are making great progress. What kind of 
progress ? But why do you mock the man ? Why 
do you draw him away from the perception of his 
own misfortunes ? Will you not show him the 
effect of virtue that he may learn where to look 
for improvement? Seek it there, wretch, where 
your work lies. And where is your work? In 

^ Chrysippus was born in Cilicia about B.C. 280, and going 
to Athens he became a pupil of the Stoic Cleanthes. 



DISCOURSES. 27 

desire and in aversion, that you may not be dis- 
appointed in your desire, and that you may not fall 
into that which you would avoid ; in your pursuit 
and avoiding, that you commit no error ; in assent 
and suspension of assent, that you be not deceived. 
The first things, and the most necessary, are those 
which I have named. But if with trembling and 
lamentation you seek not to fall into that which 
you avoid, tell me how you are improving. 

Where then is progress ? If any of you, with- 
drawing himself from externals, turns to his own 
will to exercise it and to improve it by labor, so as 
to make it conformable to nature, elevated, free, 
unrestrained, unimpeded, faithful, modest ; and if 
he has learned that he who desires or avoids the 
things which are not in his power can neither be 
faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change 
with them and be tossed about with them as in a 
tempest, and of necessity must subject himself to 
others who have the power to procure or prevent 
what he desires or would avoid ; finally, when he 
rises in the morning, if he observes and keeps these 
rules, bathes as a man of fidelity, eats as a modest 
man ; in like manner, if in every matter that occurs 
he works out his chief principles as the runner does 
with reference to running, and the trainer of the 
voice with reference to the voice - — this is the man 
who truly makes progress, and this is the man who 
has not traveled in vain. But if he has strained 
his efforts to the practice of reading books, and 
labors only at this, and has traveled for this, I tell 



28 EPICTETUS. 

him to return home immediately, and not to neglect 
his affairs there ; for this for which he has traveled 
is nothing. But the other thing is something, to 
study how a man can rid his life of lamentation 
and groaning, and saying, Woe to me, and wretched 
that I am, and to rid it also of misfortune and dis- 
appointment, and to learn what death is, and exile, 
and prison, and poison, that he may be able to say 
when he is in fetters. Dear Crito, if it is the will of 
the gods that it be so, let it be so ; and not to say. 
Wretched am I, an old man ; have I kept my gray 
hairs for this? Who is it that speaks thus? Do 
you think that I shall name some man of no repute 
and of low condition ? Does not Priam say this ? 
Does not Oedipus say this ? Nay, all kings say it ! 
For what else is tragedy than the perturbations of 
men who value externals exhibited in this kind of 
poetry ? But if a man must learn by fiction that no 
external things which are independent of the will 
concern us, for my part I should like this fiction, by 
the aid of which I should live happily and undis- 
turbed. But you must consider for yourselves what 
you wish. 

What then does Chrysippus teach us ? The 
reply is, to know that these things are not false, 
from which happiness comes and tranquillity arises. 
Take my books, and you will learn how true and 
conformable to nature are the things which make 
me free from perturbations. O great good fortune ! 
O the great benefactor who points out the way ! 
To Triptolemus all men have erected temples and 



DISCOURSES. 29 

altars, because he gave us food by cultivation ; but 
to him who discovered truth and brought it to light 
and communicated it to all, not the truth which 
shows us how to live, but how to live well, who of 
you for this reason has built an altar, or a temple, 
or has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for 
this ? Because the gods have given the vine, or 
wheat, we sacrifice to them : but because they have 
produced in the human mind that fruit by which 
they designed to show us the truth which relates to 
happiness, shall we not thank God for this ? 

OF PROVIDENCE. 

From everything which is or happens in the 
world, it is easy to praise Providence, if a man 
possesses these two qualities, the faculty of seeing 
what belongs and happens to all persons and things, 
and a grateful disposition. If he does not possess 
these two qualities, one man will not see the use of 
things which are and which happen ; another will 
not be thankful for them, even if he does know 
them. If God had made colors, but had not made 
the faculty of seeing them, what would have been 
their use ? None at all. On the other hand, if He 
had made the faculty of vision, but had not made 
objects such as to fall under the faculty, what in 
that case also would have been the use of it? 
None at all. Well, suppose that He had made 
both, but had not made light ? In that case, also, 
they would have been of no use. Who is it, then, 
who has fitted this to that and that to this ? 



30 EPICTETUS. 

Where the constitutions of living beings are dif- 
ferent, there also the acts and the ends are different. 
In those animals, then, whose constitution is adapted 
only to use, use alone is enough : but in an animal 
(man), which has also the power of understanding 
the use, unless there be the due exercise of the 
understanding, he will never attain his proper end. 
God has introduced man to be a spectator of God 
and of His works ; and not only a spectator of them, 
but an interpreter. For this reason it is shameful 
for man to begin and to end where irrational animals 
do ; but rather he ought to begin where they begin, 
and to end where nature ends in us ; and nature 
ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a 
way of life conformable to nature. Take care, then, 
not to die without having been spectators of these 
things. 

But you take a journey to Olympia to see the 
work of Phidias, and all of you think it a misfort- 
une to die without having seen such things. But 
when there is no need to take a journey, and where 
a man is, there he has the works (of God) before 
him, will you not desire to see and understand 
them ? Will you not perceive either what you are, 
or what you were born for, or what this is for which 
you have received the faculty of sight? But you 
may say, there are some things disagreeable and 
troublesome in life. And are there none at Olym- 
pia ? Are you not scorched ? Are you not pressed 
by a crowd ? Are you not without comfortable 
means of bathing? Are you not wet when it rains? 



DISCOURSES. 31 

Have you not abundance of noise, clamor, and 
other disagreeable things? But I suppose that 
setting all these things off against the magnificence 
of the spectacle, you bear and endure. Well, then, 
and have you not received faculties by which you 
will be able to bear all that happens ? Have you 
not received greatness of soul.? Have you not 
received manliness.? Have you not received en- 
durance ? And why do I trouble myself about 
anything that can happen if I possess greatness of 
soul .? What shall distract my mind or disturb me, 
or appear painful ? Shall I not use the power for 
the purposes for which I received it, and shall I 
grieve and lament over what happens ? 

What do you think that Hercules would have 
been if there had not been such a lion, and hydra, 
and stag, and boar, and certain unjust and bestial 
men, whom Hercules used to drive away and clear 
out ? And what would he have been doing if there 
had been nothing of the kind ? Is it not plain that 
he would have wrapped himself up and have slept ? 
In the first place, then, he would not have been a 
Hercules, when he was dreaming away all his life 
in such luxury and ease ; and even if he had been 
one, what would have been the use of him.? and 
what the use of his arms, and of the strength of the 
other parts of his body, and his endurance and 
noble spirit, if such circumstances and occasions 
had not roused and exercised him .? Well, then, 
must a man provide for himself such means of 
exercise, and seek to introduce a lion from some 



32 EPICTETUS. 

place into his country, and a boar, and a hydra? 
This would be folly &,nd madness : but as they did 
exist, and were found, they were useful for showing 
what Hercules was and for exercising him. Come, 
then, do you also, having observed these things, look 
to the faculties which you have, and when you have 
looked at them, say: Bring now, O Zeus, any diffi- 
culty that thou pleasest, for I have means given to 
me by thee and powers for honoring myself through 
the things which happen. You do not so : but you 
sit still, trembling for fear that some things will 
happen, and weeping, and lamenting, and groaning 
for what does happen : and then you blame the 
gods. For what is the consequence of such mean- 
ness of spirit but impiety.? And yet God has not 
only given us these faculties, by which we shall be 
able to bear everything that happens without being 
depressed or broken by it ; but, like a good king 
and a true father, He has given us these faculties 
free from hindrance, subject to no compulsion, 
unimpeded, and has put them entirely in our own 
power, without even having reserved to Himself 
any power of hindering or impeding. You, who 
have received these powers free and as your own, 
use them not : you do not even see what you 
have received, and from whom ; some of you being 
blinded to the giver, and not even acknowledging 
your benefactor, and others, through meanness of 
spirit, betaking yourselves to fault-finding and mak- 
ing charges against God. Yet I will show to you 
that you have powers and means for greatness 



DISCOURSES. 33 

of soul and manliness : but what powers you have 
for finding fault and making accusations, do you 
show me. 



HOW FROM THE FACT THAT WE ARE AKIN TO GOD 
A MAN MAY PROCEED TO THE CONSEQUENCES. 

How did Socrates behave with respect to these 
matters ? Why, in what other way than a man 
ought to do who was convinced that he was a kins- 
man of the gods ? " If you say to me now," said 
Socrates to his judges, "we will acquit you on the 
condition that you no longer discourse in the way 
in which you have hitherto discoursed, nor trouble 
either our young or our old men, I shall answer, 
you make yourselves ridiculous by thinking that, if 
one of our commanders has appointed me to a cer- 
tain post, it is my duty to keep and maintain it, 
and to resolve to die a thousand times rather than 
desert it ; but if God has put us in any place and 
way of life, we ought to desert it." Socrates speaks 
like a man who is really a kinsman of the gods. 
But we think about ourselves, as if we were only 
stomachs, and intestines, and shameful parts ; we 
fear, we desire ; we flatter those who are able to 
help us in these matters, and we fear them also. 

A man asked me to write to Rome about him, a 
man who, as most people thought, had been unfor- 
tunate, for formerly he was a man of rank and rich, 
but had been stripped of all, and was living here. 
I wrote on his behalf in a submissive manner ; but 



34 EPICTETUS. 

when he had read the letter, he gave it back to me 
and said, " I wished for your help, not your pity : 
no evil has happened to me." 

Thus also Musonius Rufus, in order to try me, 
used to say : This and this will befall you from 
your master ; and when I replied that these were 
things which happen in the ordinary course of 
human affairs, Why then, said he, should I ask 
him for anything when I can obtain it from you ? 
For, in fact, what a man has from himself, it is 
superfluous and foolish to receive from another? 
Shall I then, who am able to receive from myself 
greatness of soul and a generous spirit, receive 
from you land and money or a magisterial office ? 
I hope not : I will not be so ignorant about my own 
possessions. But when a man is cowardly and 
mean, what else must be done for him than to 
write letters as you would about a corpse. Please 
to grant us the body of a certain person and a 
sextarius of poor blood. For such a person is, in 
fact, a carcass and a sextarius (a certain quantity) 
of blood, and nothing more. But if he were any- 
thing more, he would know that one man is not 
miserable through the means of another. 

AGAINST THOSE WHO EAGERLY SEEK PREFERMENT 
AT ROME. 

I am acquainted with a man older than myself, 
who is now superintendent of corn at Rome, and 1 
remember the time when he came here on his way 



DISCOURSES. 35 

back from exile, and what he said as he related the 
events of his farmer life, and how he declared that 
with respect to the future after his return he would 
look after nothing else than passing the rest of his 
life in quiet and tranquillity. For how little of life, 
he said, remains for me. I replied, you will not do 
it, but as soon as you smell Rome, you will forget 
all that you have said ; and if admission is allowed 
even into the imperial palace, you will gladly thrust 
yourself in and thank God. If you find me, 
Epictetus, he answered, setting even one foot 
within the palace, think what you please. Well, 
what then did he do ? Before he entered the city, 
he was met by letters from Caesar, and as soon as 
he received them, he forgot all, and ever after has 
added one piece of business to another. I wish 
that I were now by his side to remind him of w^hat 
he said when he was passing this way, and to tell 
him how much better a seer I am than he is. 

Well then do I say that man is an animal made 
for doing nothing ? Certainly not. But why are 
we not active ? (We are active.) For example, as 
to myself, as soon as day comes, in a few words I 
remind myself of what I must read over to my 
pupils ; then forthwith I say to myself. But what is 
it to me how a certain person shall read? the first 
thing for me is to sleep. And indeed what resem- 
blance is there between what other persons do and 
what we do? If you observe what they do, you 
will understand. And what else do they do all day 
long than make up accounts, inquire among them- 



36 EPICTETUS. 

selves, give and take advice about some small 
quantity of grain, a bit of land, and such kind of 
profits ? Is it then the same thing to receive a 
petition and to read in it : I entreat you to permit 
me to export a small quantity of corn ; and one to 
this effect : '^ I entreat you to learn from Chrysippus 
what is the administration of the world, and what 
place in it the rational animal holds ; consider also 
who you are, and what is the nature of your good 
and bad." 

OF NATURAL AFFECTION. 

When he was visited by one of the magistrates, 
Epictetus inquired of him about several particulars, 
and asked if he had children and a wife. The man 
replied that he had ; and Epictetus inquired further, 
how he felt under the circumstances. Miserable, 
the man said. Then Epictetus asked. In what 
respect, for men do not marry and beget children 
in order to be wretched, but rather to be happy. 
But I, the man replied, am so wretched about my 
children that lately, when my little daughter was 
sick and was supposed to be in danger, I could not 
endure to stay with her, but I left home till a 
person sent me news that she had recovered. Well 
then, said Epictetus, do you think that you acted 
right ? I acted naturally, the man replied. But 
convince me of this that you acted naturally, and I 
will convince you that everything which takes place 
according to nature takes place rightly. This is 



DISCOURSES. 37 

the case, said the man, with all or at least most 
fathers. I do not deny that : but the matter about 
which we are inquiring is whether such behavior is 
right. 

Agreed. Well then to leave your sick child and 
to go away is not reasonable, and I suppose that 
you will not say that it is ; but it remains for us to 
inquire if it is consistent with affection. Yes, let 
us consider. Did you then, since you had an 
affectionate disposition to your child, do right when 
you ran off and left her ; and has the mother no 
affection for the child ? Certainly, she has. Ought 
then the mother also to have left her, or ought she 
not ? Come then, if you were sick, would you wish 
your relations to be so affectionate, and all the rest, 
children and wife, as to leave you alone and 
deserted ? But if this is so, it results that' your 
behavior was not at all an affectionate act. 



. OF CONTENTMENT. 

With respect to gods, there are some who say 
that a divine being does not exist : others say that 
it exists, but is inactive and careless, and takes no 
forethought about anything ; a third class say that 
such a being exists and exercises forethought, but 
only about great things and heavenly things, and 
about nothing on the earth ; a fourth class say that 
a divine being exercises forethought both about 
things on the earth and heavenly things, but in a 
general way only, and not about things severally. 



38 EPICTETUS. 

There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and 
Socrates belong, who say : " I move not without 
thy knowledge." 

Before all things then it is necessary to inquire 
about each of these opinions, whether it is affirmed 
truly or not truly. For if there are no gods, how is 
our proper end to follow them } And if they exist, 
but take no care of anything, in this case also how 
will it be right to follow them ? But if indeed they 
do exist and look after things, still if there is noth- 
ing communicated from them to men, nor in fact to 
myself, how even so is it right (to follow them) ? 
The wise and good man then after considering all 
these things, submits his own mind to him who 
administers the whole, as good citizens do to the 
law of the state. He who is receiving instructions 
ought to come to be instructed with this intention. 
How shall I follow the gods in all things, how shall 
I be contented with the divine administration, and 
how can I become free ? For he is free to whom 
everything happens according to his will, and whom 
no man can hinder. What, then, is freedom mad- 
ness ? Certainly not : for madness and freedom do 
not consist. But, you say, I would have every- 
thing result just as I like, and in whatever way I 
like. You are mad, you are beside yourself. Do 
you not know that freedom is a noble and valuable 
thing ? But for me inconsiderately to wish for 
things to happen as I inconsiderately like, this 
appears to be not only not noble, but even most 
base. For how do we proceed in the matter of 



DISCOURSES. • 39 

writing ? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as 
I choose ? No, but I am taught to clioose to write 
it as it ought to be written. And how with respect 
to music ? In the same manner. And what 
universally in every art or science ? Just the same. 
If it were not so, it would be of no value to know 
anything, if knowledge were adapted to every man's 
whim. Is it then in this alone, in this which is the 
greatest and the chief thing, I mean freedom, that 
I am permitted to will inconsiderately? By no 
means ; but to be instructed is this, to learn to 
wish that everything may happen as it does. And 
how do things happen ? As the disposer has dis- 
posed them ? And he has appointed summer and 
winter, and abundance and scarcity, and virtue and 
vice, and all such opposites for the harmony of the 
whole ; and to each of us he has given a body, and 
parts of the body, and possessions, and companions. 
Remembering then this disposition of things, we 
ought to go to be instructed, not that we may 
change the constitution of things, — for we have 
not the power to do it, nor is it better that we 
should have the power, — but in order that, as 
the things around us are what they are and by 
nature exist, we may maintain our minds in harmony 
with the things which happen. For can we escape 
from men ? and how is it possible ? And if we 
associate with them, can we change them ? Who 
gives us the power ? What then remains, or what 
method is discovered of holding commerce with 
them ? Is there such a method by which they shall 



40 . EPICTETUS. 

do what seems fit to them, and we not the less shall 
be in a mood which' is conformable to nature ? 
But you are unwilling to endure and are discon- 
tented ; and if you are alone, you call it solitude ; 
and if you are with men, you call them knaves and 
robbers ; and you find fault with your own parents 
and children, and brothers and neighbors. But 
you ought when you are alone to call this condition 
by the name of tranquillity and freedom, and to 
think yourself like to the gods ; and when you are 
with many, you ought not to call it crowd, nor 
trouble, nor uneasiness, but festival and assembly, 
and so accept all contentedly. 

What then is the punishment of those who do 
not accept ? It is to be what they are. Is any 
person dissatisfied with being alone ? let him be 
alone. Is a man dissatisfied with his parents ? let 
him be a bad son, and lament. Is he dissatisfied 
with his children ? let him be a bad father. Cast 
him into prison. What prison ? Where he is 
already, for he is there against his will ; and where 
a man is against his will, there he is in prison. So 
Socrates was not in prison, for he was there will- 
ingly — Must my leg then be lamed ? Wretch, do 
you then on account of one poor leg find fault with 
the world ? Will you not willingly surrender it for 
the whole ? Will you not withdraw from it ? Will 
you not gladly part with it to him who gave it ? 
And will you be vexed and discontented with the 
things established by Zeus, which he with the 
Moirae (fates) who were present and spinning the 



DISCOURSES. 41 

thread of your generation, defined and put in order ? 
Know you not how small a part you are compared 
with the whole ? I mean with respect to the body, 
for as to intelligence you are not inferior to the 
gods nor less ; for the magnitude of intelligence is 
not measured by length nor yet by height, but by 
thoughts. 

Now if you did not know for what purpose you 
possess the faculty of vision, you would be unfortu- 
nate and wretched if you closed your eyes when 
colors were brought before them ; but in that you 
possess greatness of soul and nobility of spirit for 
every event that may happen, and you know not 
that you possess them, are you not more unfortu- 
nate and wretched ? Things are brought .close to 
you which are proportionate to the power which you 
possess, but you turn away this power most particu- 
larly at the very time when you ought to maintain it 
open and discerning. Do you not rather thank the 
gods that they have allowed you to be above these 
things which they have not placed in your power, 
and have made you accountable only for those which 
are in your power ? As to your parents, the gods 
have left you free from responsibility ; and so with 
respect to your brothers, and your body, and pos- 
sessions, and death and life. For what then have 
they made you responsible ? For that which alone 
is in your power, the proper use of appearances. 
Why then do you draw on yourself the things for 
which you are not responsible.'' It is, indeed, a 
giving of trouble to yourself. 



42 EPICTETUS. 

HOW EVERYTHIXG MAY BE DONE ACCEPTABLY TO 
THE GODS. 

When some one asked, how may a man eat 
acceptably to the gods, he answered : If he can eat 
justly and contentedly, and with equanimity, and 
temperately and orderly, will it not be also accept- 
ably to the gods ? But when you have asked for 
warm water and the slave has not heard, or if he did 
hear has brought only tepid water, or he is not even 
found to be in the house, then not to be vexed or to 
burst with passion, is not this acceptable to the 
gods ? — How then shall a man endure such persons 
as this slave ? Slave yourself, will you not bear 
with your own brother, who has Zeus for his pro- 
genitor, and is like a son from the same seeds and 
of the same descent from above ? But if you have 
been put in any such higher place, will you immedi- 
ately make yourself a tyrant ? Will you not remem- 
ber who you are, and whom you rule ? that they are 
kinsmen, that they are brethren by nature, that they 
are the offspring of Zeus ? — But I have purchased 
them, and they have not purchased me. Do you 
see in what direction you are looking, that it is 
towards the earth, towards the pit, that it is towards 
these wretched laws of dead men ? but towards the 
laws of the gods you are not looking. 

WHAT PHILOSOPHY PROMISES. 

When a man was consulting him how he should 
persuade his brother to cease being angry with him, 



DISCOURSES. 43 

Epictetus replied, Philosophy does not propose to 
secure for a man any external thing. If it did (or, 
if it were not, as I say), philosophy would be allow- 
ing something which is not within its province. For 
as the carpenter's material is wood, and that of the 
statuary is copper, so the matter of the art of living 
is each man's life. — What then is my brother's } — 
That again belongs to his own art ; but with respect 
to yours, it is one of the external things, like a piece 
of land, like health, like reputation. But Philosophy 
promises none of these. In every circumstance I 
will maintain, she says, the governing part conform- 
able to nature. Whose governing part ? His in 
whom I am, she says. 

How then shall my brother cease to be angry 
with me ? Bring him to me and I will tell him. 
But I have nothing to say to you about his anger. 

When the man, who was consulting him, said, I 
seek to know this. How, even if niy brother is not 
reconciled to me, shall I maintain myself in a state 
conformable to nature ? Nothing great, said Epic- 
tetus, is produced suddenly, since not even the 
grape or the fig is. If you say to me now that you 
want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires 
time : let it flower first, then put forth fruit, and 
then ripen. Is then the fruit of a fig-tree not per- 
fected suddenly and in one hour, and would you 
possess the fruit of a man's mind in so short a 
time and so easily? Do not expect it, even if I 
tell you. 



44 EPICTETUS. 



THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH THE 
ERRORS (faults) OF OTHERS. 

What do you mean by thieves and robbers ? They 
are mistaken about good and evil. Ought we then 
to be angry with them, or to pity them ? But show 
them their error, and you will see how they desist 
from their errors. If they do not see their errors, 
they have nothing superior to their present opinion. 

Ought not then this robber and this adulterer to 
be destroyed ? By no means say so, but speak 
rather in this way: This man who has been mistaken 
and deceived about the most important things, and 
blinded, not in the faculty of vision which distin- 
guishes white and black, but in the faculty which 
distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy 
him ? If you speak thus, you will see how inhuman 
this is which you say, and that it is just as if you 
would say. Ought we not to destroy this blind and 
deaf man ? But if the greatest harm is the priva- 
tion of the greatest things, and the greatest thing 
in every man is the will or choice such as it ought 
to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are 
you also angry with him ? Man, you ought not to 
be aifected contrary to nature by the bad things of 
another. Pity him rather : drop this readiness to 
be offended and to hate, and these words which the 
many utter: "these accursed and odious fellows." 
How have you been made so wise at once ? and 
how are you so peevish ? Why then are we angry ? 



DISCOURSES. 45 

Is it because we value so much the things of which 
these men rob us ? Do not admire your clothes, 
and then you will not be angry with the thief. Do 
not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will 
not be angry with the adulterer. Learn that a thief 
and an adulterer have no place in the things which 
are yours, but in those which belong to others and 
which are not in your power. If you dismiss these 
things and consider them as nothing, with whom 
are you still angry ? But so long as you value these 
things, be angry with yourself rather than with the 
thief and the adulterer. Consider the matter thus : 
you have fine clothes ; your neighbor has not : you 
have a window ; you wish to air the clothes. The 
thief does not know wherein man's good consists, 
but he thinks that it consists in having fine clothes, 
the very thing which you also think. Must he not 
then come and take them away ? When you show a 
cake to greedy persons, and swallow it all yourself, 
do you expect them not to snatch it from you ? Do 
not provoke them : do not have a window : do not 
air your clothes. I also lately had an iron lamp 
placed by the side of my household gods : hearing 
a noise at the door, I ran down, and found that the 
lamp had been carried off. I reflected that he who 
had taken the lamp had done nothing strange. 
What then ? To-morrow, I said, you will find an 
earthen lamp : for a man only loses that which he 
has. I have lost my garment. The reason is that 
you had a garment. I have pain in my head. 
Have you any pain in your horns ? Why then are 



46 EPICTETUS. 

you troubled ? for we only lose those things, we 
have only pains about those things, which we 
possess. 

But the tyrant will chain — what ? the leg. He 
will take away — what } the neck. What then will 
he not chain and not take away ? the will. This is 
why the ancients taught the maxim, Know thyself. 
Therefore we ought to exercise ourselves in small 
things, and beginning with them to proceed to the 
greater. I have pain in the head. Do not say, 
alas ! I have pain in the ear. Do not say, alas ! 
And I do not say, that you are not allowed to groan, 
but do not groan inwardly ; and if your slave is slow 
in bringing a bandage, do not cry out and torment 
yourself, and say, "Everybody hates me": for who 
would not hate such a man ? For the future, rely- 
ing on these opinions, walk about upright, free; not 
trusting to the size of your body, as an athlete, for 
a man ought not to be invincible in the way that an 
ass is. 

Who then is the invincible ? It is he whom none 
of the things disturb which are independent of the 
will. Then examining one circumstance after 
another I observe, as in the case of an athlete ; he 
has come off victorious in the first contest : well 
then, as to the second ? and what if there should be 
great heat ? and what, if it should be at Olympia ? 
And the same I say in this case : if you should 
throw money in his way, he will despise it. Well, 
suppose you put a young girl in his way, what then ? 
and what, if it is in the dark ? what if it should be 



DISCOURSES. 47 

a little reputation, or abuse ; and what if it should 
be praise ; and what if it should be death ? He is 
able to overcome all. What then if it be in heat, 
and what if it is in the rain, and what if he be in a 
melancholy (mad) mood, and what if he be asleep ? 
He will still conquer. This is my invincible athlete. 

HOW WE SHOULD BEHAVE TO TYRANTS. 

If a man possesses any superiority, or thinks that 
he does, when he does not, such a man, if he is 
uninstructed, will of necessity be puffed up through 
it. For instance, the tyrant says, " I am master of 
all ! " And what can you do for me ? Can you 
give me desire which shall have no hindrance ? How 
can you ? Have you the infallible power of avoid- 
ing what you would avoid .'* Have you the power 
of moving towards an object without error ? And 
how do you possess this power ? Come, when you 
are in a ship, do you trust to yourself or to the 
helmsman ? And when you are in a chariot, to 
whom do you trust but to the driver .? And how is 
it in all other arts ? Just the same. In what then 
lies your power ? All men pay respect to me. Well, 
I also pay respect to my platter, and I wash it and 
wipe it ; and for the sake of my oil flask, I drive a 
peg into the wall. Well then, are these things 
superior to me ? No, but they supply some of my 
wants, and for this reason I take care of them. 
Well, do I not attend to my ass ? Do I not wash 
his feet ? Do I not clean him ? Do you not know 



48 EPICTETUS. 

that every man has regard to himself, and to you 
just the same as he has regard to his ass ? For 
who has regard to you as a man ? Show me. Who 
wishes to become hke you ? Who imitates you, as 
he imitates Socrates ? — But I can cut off your head. 
— You say right. I had forgotten that I must have 
regard to you, as I would to a fever and the bile, 
and raise an altar to you, as there is at Rome an 
altar to fever. 

What is it then that disturbs and terrifies the 
multitude ? is it the tyrant and his guards ? [By 
no means.] I hope that it is not so. It is not 
possible that what is by nature free can be disturbed 
by anything else, or hindered by any other thing 
than by itself. But it is a man's own opinions 
which disturb him : for when the tyrant says to a 
man,*" I will chain your leg," he who values his leg 
says, " Do not ; have pity " : but he who values his 
own will says, " If it appears more advantageous to 
you, chain it." Do you not care } I do not care. 
I will show you that I am master. You cannot do 
that. Zeus has set me free : do you think that he 
intended to allow his own son to be enslaved ? But 
you are master of my carcass : take it. — So when 
you approach me, you have no regard to me ? No, 
but I have regard to myself ; and if you wish me to 
say that I have regard to you also, I tell you that I 
have the same regard to you that I have to my 
pipkin. 

This is not a perverse self-regard, for the animal 
is constituted so as to do all things for itself. For 



DISCOURSES. 49 

even the sun does all things for itself ; nay, even 
Zeus himself. But when he chooses to be the Giver 
of rain and the Giver of fruits, and the Father of 
gods and men, you see that he cannot obtain these 
functions and these names, if he is not useful to 
man ; and, universally, he has made the nature of 
the rational animal such that it cannot obtain any 
one of its own proper interests, if it does not con- 
tribute something to the common interest. In this 
manner and sense it is not unsociable for a man to 
do everything for the sake of himself. For what 
do you expect? that a man should neglect himself 
and his own interest ? And how in that case can 
there be one and the same principle in all animals, 
the principle of attachment (regard) to themselves ? 

What then ? when absurd notions about things 
independent of our will, as if they were good and 
(or) bad, lie at the bottom of our opinions, we must 
of necessity pay regard to tyrants ; for I wish that 
men would pay regard to tyrants only, and not also 
to the bedchamber men. 

Epaphroditus had a shoemaker whom he sold 
because he was good for nothing. This fellow by 
some good luck was bought by one of Caesar's men, 
and became Caesar's shoemaker. You should have 
seen what respect Epaphroditus paid to him: " How 
does the good Felicion do, I pray ? " Then, if any 
of us asked, "What is master (Epaphroditus) doing? " 
the answer was, " He is consulting about something 
with Felicion." Had he not sold the man as good 
for nothing ? Who then made him wise all at once ? 



50 EPICTETUS. 

This is an instance of valuing something else than 
the things which depend on the will. 

Has a man been exalted to the tribuneship ? All 
who meet him offer their congratulations : one kisses 
his eyes, another the neck, and the slaves kiss his 
hands. He goes to his house, he finds torches 
lighted. He ascends the Capitol : he offers a 
sacrifice on the occasion. Now who ever sacrificed 
for having had good desires ? for having acted con- 
formably to nature .'' For in fact we thank the gods 
for those things in which we place our good. 

A person was talking to me to-day about the 
priesthood of Augustus. I say to him : " Man, let 
the thing alone : you will spend much for no pur- 
pose." But he replies, " Those who draw up agree- 
ments will write my name." Do you then stand by 
those who read them, and say to such persons, " It 
is I whose name is written there " ? And if you can 
now be present on all such occasions, what will you 
do when you are dead ? My name will remain. — 
Write it on a stone, and it will remain. But come, 
what remembrance of you will there be beyond 
Nicopolis ? — But I shall wear a crown of gold. — 
If you desire a crown at all, take a crown of roses 
and put it on, for it will be more elegant in appear- 
ance (and relatively will perpetuate your fame as 
long). 

AGAINST THOSE WHO WISH TO BE ADMIRED. 

When a man holds his proper station in life, he 
does not gape after things beyond it. Man, what do 



DISCOURSES. 5 1 

you wish to happen to you? I am satisfied if I 
desire and avoid conformably to nature, if I employ 
movements towards and from an object as I am by 
nature formed to do, and purpose and design and 
assent. Why then do you strut before us as if you 
had swallowed a spit? My wish has always been 
that those who meet me should admire me, and 
those who follow me should exclaim, O the great 
philosopher. Who are they by whom you wish to 
be admired? Are they not those of whom you are 
used to say, that they are mad ? Well then, do you 
wish to be admired by madmen? 

HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE WITH CIRCUMSTANCES. 

It is circumstances (difficulties) which show what 
men are. Therefore when a difficulty falls upon 
you, remember that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, 
has matched you with a rough young man. For 
what purpose ? you may say. Why that you may 
become an Olympic conqueror ; but it is not 
accomplished without sweat. In my opinion no 
man has had a more profitable difficulty than you 
have had, if you choose to make use of it as an 
athlete would deal with a young antagonist. We 
are now sending a scout to Rome ; ^ but no man 

1 In the time of Domitian philosophers were banished 
from Rome and Italy, and at that time Epictetus went from 
Rome to Nicopolis in Epirus, where *he opened a school. We 
may suppose that Epictetus is here speaking of some person 
who had gone from Nicopolis to Rome to inquire about the 
state of affairs there under the cruel tyrant Domitian. 
(Schweighaeuser.) 



52 EPICTETUS. 

sends a cowardly scout, who, if he only hears a 
noise and sees a shadow anpvhere, comes running 
back in terror and reports that the enemy is close 
at hand. So now if you should come and tell us, 
Fearful is the state of affairs at Rome, terrible is 
death, terrible is exile ; terrible is calumny ; terrible 
is poverty; fly, my friends; the enemy is near — 
we shall answer, Be gone, prophesy for yourself ; 
we have committed only one fault, that we sent 
such a scout. 

Diogenes, who was sent as a scout before you, 
made a different report to us. He says that death 
is no evil, for neither is it base : he says that fame 
(reputation) is the noise of madmen. And what has 
this spy said about pain, about pleasure, and about 
poverty.? He says that to be naked is better than 
any purple robe, and to sleep on the bare ground 
is the softest bed; and he gives as a proof of each 
thing that he affirms his own courage, his tran- 
quillity, his freedom, and the healthy appearance 
and compactness of his body. There is no enemy 
near, he says ; all is peace. How so, Diogenes ? 
See, he replies, if I am struck, if I have been 
wounded, if I have fled from any man. This is 
what a scout ought to be. But you come to us and 
tell us one thing after another. Will you not go 
back, and you will see clearer when you have laid 
aside fear ? 

But a certain person will not leave to me the 
succession to his estate. What then, had I for- 
£:otten that not one of these thin2:s was mine ? How 



DISCOURSES. 53 

then do we call them mine ? Just as we call the 
bed in the inn. If then the innkeeper at his death 
leaves you his beds, all well ; but if he leaves them 
to. another, he will have them, and you will seek 
another bed. If then you shall not find one, you 
will sleep on the ground : only sleep with a good 
will and snore, and remember that tragedies have 
their place among the rich and kings and tyrants, 
but no poor man fills a part in a tragedy, except as 
one of the Chorus. 

ON THE SAME. 

If these things are true, and if we are not silly, 
and are not acting hypocritically, when we say that 
the good of man is in the will, and the evil too, and 
that everything else does not concern us, why are 
we still disturbed, why are we still afraid.'' The 
things about which we have been busied are in no 
man's power : and the things which are in the 
power of others, we care not for. What kind of 
trouble have we still ? 

But give me directions. Why should I give you 
directions ? has not Zeus given you directions ? 
Has he not given to you what is your own free 
from hindrance and free from impediment, and 
what is not your own subject to hindrance and 
.impediment? What directions then, what kind of 
orders did you bring when you came from him.? 
Keep by every means what is your own ; do not 
desire what belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity) 



54 EPICTETUS. 

is your own, virtuous shame is your own ; who then 
can take these things from you? who else than 
yourself will hinder you from using them ? But 
how do you act ? when you seek what is not your 
own, you lose that which is your own. 

If I set my admiration on the poor body, I have 
given myself up to be a slave: if on my little 
possessions, I also make myself a slave : for I 
immediately make it plain with what I may be 
caught ; as if the snake draws in his head, I tell 
you to strike that part of him which he guards ; 
and do you be assured that whatever part you 
choose to guard, that part your master will attack. 
Remembering this, whom will you still flatter or 
fear? 

But I should like to sit where the Senators sit. 
• — Do you see that you are putting yourself in 
straits, you are squeezing yourself. — How then 
shall I see well in any other way in the amphi- 
theatre ? Man, do not be a spectator at all ; and 
you will not be squeezed. Why do you give 
yourself trouble? Or wait a little, and when the 
spectacle is over, seat yourself in the place reserved 
for the Senators and sun yourself. For remember 
this general truth, that it is we who squeeze our- 
selves, who put ourselves in straits ; that is, our 
opinions squeeze us and put us in straits. For 
what is it to be reviled ? Stand by a stone and 
revile it ; and what will you gain ? If then a man 
listens like a stone, what profit is there to the 
reviler? But if the reviler has as a stepping-stone 



DISCOURSES. • 55 

(or ladder) the weakness of him who is reviled, 
then he accomplishes something. — Strip him. — • 
What do you mean by him? Lay hold of his 
garment, strip it off. I have insulted you. Much 
good may it do you. 

IN HOW MANY WAYS APPEARANCES EXIST, AND 
WHAT AIDS WE SHOULD PROVIDE AGAINST THEM. 

If it is habit which annoys us, we must try to 
seek aid against habit. What aid then can we 
find against habit ? The contrary habit. You hear 
the ignorant say: "That unfortunate person is 
dead: his father and mother are overpowered with 
sorrow ; ^ he was cut off by an untimely death and 
in a foreign land." 

When death appears an evil, we ought to have 
this rule in readiness, that it is fit to avoid evil 
things, and that death is a necessary thing. I will 
go and I am resolved either to behave bravely 
myself or to give to another the opportunity of 
doing so ; if I cannot succeed in doing anything 
myself, I will not grudge another the doing of some- 
thing noble. — Suppose that it is above our power 
to act thus ; is it not in our power to reason thus ? 
Tell me where I can escape death : discover for me 
the country, show me the men to whom I must go, 

1 dirdiXeTo does not mean that the father is dead, and that 
the mother is dead. They survive and lament. Compare 
Euripides, Alcestis, v. 825: 

dTrui\6ixe(rda Trai'res, ov Keivrj fi6v. 



56 EPICTETUS. 

whom death does not visit. Discover to me a 
charm against death. If I have not one, what do 
you wish me to do ? I cannot escape from death. 
Shall I not escape from the fear of death, but shall 
I die lamenting and trembling ? For the origin of 
perturbation is this, to wish for something, and that 
this should not happen. Therefore if I am able 
to change externals according to my wish, I change 
them ; but if I can not, I am ready to tear out the 
eyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of 
% man is not to endure to be deprived of the good, 
and not to endure the falling into the evil. Then 
at last, when I am neither able to change circum- 
stances nor to tear out the eyes of him who hinders 
me, I sit down and groan, and abuse whom I can. 

THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH MEN ; AND 

WHAT ARE THE SMALL AND THE GREAT 

THINGS AMONG MEN. 

What is the cause of assenting to anything? 
The fact that it appears to be true. It is not 
possible then to assent to that which appears not 
to be true. Why.? Because this is the nature of 
the understanding, to incline to the true, to be 
dissatisfied with the false, and in matters uncertain 
to withhold assent. What is the proof of this? 
Imagine (persuade yourself), if you can, that it is 
now night. It is not possible. Take away your 
persuasion that it is day. It is not possible. Per- 
suade yourself or take away your persuasion that 



DISCOURSES. 57 

the stars are even in number. It is impossible. 
When then any man assents to that which is false, 
be assured that he did not intend to assent to it as 
false, for every soul is unwillingly deprived of the 
truth, as Plato says ; but the falsity seemed to him 
to be true. Well, in acts what have we of the like 
kind as we have here truth or falsehood ? We have 
the fit and the not fit (duty and not duty), the 
profitable and the unprofitable, that which is suita- 
ble to a person and that which is not, and whatever 
is like these. Can then a man think that a thing 
is useful to him and not choose it .? He cannot. 
How says Medea ? — 

" 'Tis true I know what evil I shall do, 
But passion overpowers the better counsel." 

She thought that to indulge her passion and take 
vengeance on her husband was more profitable than 
to spare her children. It was so ; but she was 
deceived. Show her plainly that she is deceived, 
and she will not do it ; but so long as you do not 
show it, what can she follow except that which 
appears to herself (her opinion) ? Nothing else. 
Why then are you angry with the unhappy woman 
that she has been bewildered about the most im- 
portant things, and is become a viper instead of a 
human creature ? And why not, if it is possible, 
rather pity, as we pity the blind and the lame, so 
those who are blinded and maimed in the faculties 
which are supreme ? 



58 . EPICTETUS. 

Whoever then clearly remembers this, that to 
man the measure of every act is the appearance 
(the opinion), — whether the thing appears good or 
bad ; if good, he is free from blame ; if bad, him- 
self suffers the penalty, for it is impossible that he 
who is deceived can be one person, and he who 
suffers, another person — whoever remembers this 
will not be angry with any man, will not be vexed 
at any man, will not revile or blame any man, nor 
hate nor quarrel with any man. 

So then all these great and dreadful deeds have 
this origin in the appearance (opinion) ? Yes, this 
origin and no other. The Iliad is nothing else 
than appearance and the use of appearances. It 
appeared to Alexander to carry off the wife of 
Menelaus : it appeared to Helene to follow him. 
If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it 
was a gain to be deprived of such a wife, what 
would have happened ? Not only would the Iliad 
have been lost, but the Odyssey also. On so small 
a matter then did such great things depend ? But 
what do you mean by such great things ? Wars 
and civil commotions and the destruction of many 
men and cities. And what great matter is this ? 
Is it nothing? — But what great matter is the 
death of many oxen, and many sheep, and many 
nests of swallows or storks being burnt or destroyed ? 
Are these things then like those ? Very like. Bodies 
of men are destroyed, and the bodies of oxen and 
sheep ; the dwellings of men are burnt, and the 
nests of storks. What is there in this great or 



DISCOURSES. 59 

dreadful ? Or show me what is the difference be- 
tween a man's house and a stork's nest, as far as 
each is a dwelHng ; except that man builds his little 
houses of beams and tiles and bricks, and the stork 
builds them of sticks and mud. Are a stork and a 
man then like things ? What say you ? — In body 
they are very much alike. 

Does a man then differ in no respect from a 
stork ? Don't suppose that I say so ; but there is 
no difference in these matters (which I have men- 
tioned). In what then is the difference ? Seek 
and you will find that there is a difference in 
another matter. See whether it is not in a man the 
understanding of what he does, see if it is not in 
social community, in fidelity, in modesty, in stead- 
fastness, in intelligence. Where then is the great 
good and evil in men ? It is where the difference is. 
If the difference is preserved and remains fenced 
round, and neither modesty is destroyed, nor 
fidelity, nor intelligence, then the man also is pre- 
served ; but if any of these things is destroyed and 
stormed like a city, then the man too perishes ; 
and in this consist the great things. Alexander, 
you say, sustained great damage then when the 
Hellenes invaded and when they ravaged Troy, 
and when his brothers perished. By no means ; 
for no man is damaged by an action which is not 
his own ; but what happened at that time was only 
the destruction of storks' nests : now the ruin of 
Alexander was when he lost the character of mod- 
esty, fidelity, regard to hospitality and to decency. 



6o • EPICTETUS. 

When was Achilles ruined ? Was it when Patroclus 
died ? Not so. But it happened when he began 
to be angry, when he wept for a girl, when he 
forgot that he was at Troy not to get mistresses, 
but to fight. These things are the ruin of men, 
this is being besieged, this is the destruction of 
cities, when right opinions are destroyed, when 
they are corrupted. 

ON CONSTANCY (OR FIRMNESS). 

The being (nature) of the Good is a certain Will ; 
the being of the Bad is a certain kind of Will. 
What then are externals ? Materials for the 
Will, about which the will being conversant shall 
obtain its own good or evil. How shall it obtain 
the good.-* If it does not admire (overvalue) the 
materials ; for the opinions about the materials, if 
the opinions are right, make the will good : but 
perverse and distorted opinions make the will bad. 
God has fixed this law, and says, " If you would 
have anything good, receive it from yourself." 
You say, No, but I will have it from another. — Do 
not so : but receive it from yourself. Therefore 
when the tyrant threatens and calls me, I say, 
Whom do you threaten ? If he says, I will put you 
in chains, I say, You threaten my hands and my 
feet. If he says, I will cut off your head, I reply. 
You threaten my head. If he says, I will throw 
you into prison, I say, You threaten the whole of 
this poor body. If he threatens me with banish- 



DISCOURSES. 6 1 

ment, I say the same. Does he then not threaten 
you at all ? If I feel that all these things do not 
concern me, he does not threaten me at all ; but if 
I fear any of them, it is I whom he threatens. 
Whom then do I fear ? the master of what ? The 
master of things which are in my own power.? 
There is no such master. Do I fear the master of 
things which are not in my power ? And what are 
these things to me ? 

Do you philosophers then teach us to despise 
kings ? I hope not. Who among us teaches to 
claim against them the power over things which 
they possess ? Take my poor body, take my prop- 
erty, take my reputation, take those w^ho are about 
me. If I advise any persons to claim these things, 
they may truly accuse me. — Yes, but I intend to 
command your opinions also. — And who has given 
you this power ? How can you conquer the opinion 
of another man? By applying terror to it, he 
replies, I will conquer it. Do you not know that 
opinion conquers itself, and is not conquered by 
another ? But nothing else can conquer Will except 
the Will itself. For this reason too the law of God 
is most powerful and most just, w^hich is this : Let 
the stronger always be superior to the weaker. Ten 
are stronger than one. For what ? For putting in 
chains, for killing, for dragging whither they choose, 
for taking away w^hat a man has. The ten therefore 
conquer the one in this in which they are stronger. 
In what then are the ten weaker? If the one 
possesses right opinions and the others do not. 



62 EPICTETUS. 

Well then, can the ten conquer in this matter? 
How is it possible ? If we were placed in the 
scales, must not the heavier draw down the scale 
in which it is ? 

How strange then that Socrates should have 
been so treated by the Athenians. Slave, why do 
you say Socrates ? Speak of the thing as it is : 
how strange that the poor body of Socrates should 
have been carried off and dragged to prison by 
stronger men, and that any one should have given 
hemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it 
should breathe out the life. Do these things seem 
strange, do they seem unjust, do you on account of 
these things blame God ? Had Socrates then no 
equivalent for these things ? Where then for him 
was the nature of good ? Whom shall we listen to, 
you or him ? And what does Socrates say ? Anytus 
and Melitus -^ can kill me, but they cannot hurt me : 
and further, he says, " If it so pleases God, so let 
it be." 

But show me that he who has the inferior princi- 
ples overpowers him who is superior in principles. 
You will never show this, nor come near showing it ; 
for this is the law of nature and of God that the 
superior shall always overpower the inferior. In 
what ? In that in which it is superior. One body 
is stronger than another : many are stronger than 
one : the thief is stronger than he who is not a thief. 
This is the reason why I also lost my lamp, because 
in wakefulness the thief was superior to me. But the 

1 The two chief prosecutors of Socrates. 



DISCOURSES. 63 

man bought the lamp at this price : for a lamp he 
became a thief, a faithless fellow, and like a wild 
beast. This seemed to him a good bargain. Be it 
so. But a man has seized me by the cloak, and is 
drawing me to the public place : then others bawl 
out. Philosopher, what has been the use of your 
opinions ? see you are dragged to prison, you are 
going to be beheaded. And what system of phi- 
losophy could I have made so that, if a stronger 
man should have laid hold of my cloak, I should 
not be dragged off ; that if ten men should have 
laid hold of me and cast me into prison, I should 
not be cast in ? 

Will you not leave the small arguments about 
these matters to others, to lazy fellows, that they 
may sit in a corner and receive their sorry pay, or 
grumble that no one gives them anything ; and 
will you not come forward and make use of what 
you have learned ? For it is not these small argu- 
ments that are wanted now : the writings of the 
Stoics are full of them. What then is the thing 
which is wanted ? A man who shall apply them, 
one who by his acts shall bear testimony to his 
words. Assume, I entreat you, this character, that 
we may 'no longer use in the schools the examples 
of the ancients, but may have some example of our 
own. 

To whom then does the contemplation of these 
matters (philosophical inquiries) belong? To him 
who has leisure, for man is an animal that loves 
contemplation. But it is shameful to contemplate 



64 EPICTETUS. 

these things as runaway slaves do : we should sit, 
as in a theatre, free from distraction, and listen at 
one time to the tragic actor, at another time to the 
lute-player ; and not do as slaves do. As soon as 
the slave has taken his station he praises the actor 
and at the same time looks round : then if any one 
calls out his master's name, the slave is immedi- 
ately frightened and disturbed. It is shameful for 
philosophers thus to contemplate the works of 
nature. For what is a master ? Man is not the 
master of man ; but death is, and life and pleasure 
and pain ; for if he comes without these things, 
bring Caesar to me and you will see how firm I am. 
But when he shall come with these things, thunder- 
ing and lightning, and when I am afraid of them, 
what do I do then except to recognize my master 
like the runaway slave.'' But so long as I have any 
respite from these terrors, as a runaway slave stands 
in the theatre, so do I : I bathe, I drink, I sing ; 
but all this I do with terror and uneasiness. But if 
I shall release myself from my masters, that is from 
those things by means of which masters are formid- 
able, what further trouble have I, what master have 
I still.? 

What then, ought we to publish these things to 
all men ? No, but we ought to accommodate our- 
selves to the ignorant and to say : "This man recom- 
mends to me that which he thinks good for himself : 
I excuse him." For Socrates also excused the 
jailor, who had the charge of him in prison and was 
weeping when Socrates was going to drink the 



DISCOURSES. 65 

poison, and said, How generously he laments over 
us. Does he then say to the jailor that for this 
reason we have sent away the women ? No, but he 
says it to his friends who were able to hear (under- 
stand) it ; and he treats the jailor as a child. 

THAT CONFIDENCE (COURAGE) IS NOT INCONSISTENT 
WITH CAUTION. 

If the bad consists in a bad exercise of the will, 
caution ought only to be used where things are 
dependent on the will. But if things independent 
of the will and not in our power are nothing to us, 
with respect to these we must employ confidence ; 
and thus we shall both be cautious and confident, 
and indeed confident because of our caution. For 
by employing caution towards things which are 
really bad, it will result that we shall have con- 
fidence with respect to things which are not so. 

We are then in the condition of deer ; ^ when they 
flee from the huntsmen's feathers in fright, whither 
do they turn and in what do they seek refuge as 
safe ? They turn to the nets, and thus they perish 
by confounding things, which are objects of fear 
with things that they ought not to fear. Thus we 
also act : in what cases do we fear ? In things 
which are independent of the will. In what cases 
on the contrary do we behave with confidence, as 

1 It was the fashion of hunters to frighten deer by display- 
ing feathers of various colors on ropes or strings and thus 
frightening them towards the nets. 



66 EPICTETUS. 

if there were no danger ? In things dependent on 
the will. To be deceived then, or to act rashly, or 
shamelessly, or with base desire to seek something, 
does not concern us at all, if we only hit the mark 
in things which are independent of our will. But 
where there is death, or exile, or pain, or infamy, 
there we attempt to run away, there we are struck 
with terror. Therefore as we may expect it to 
happen with those who err in the greatest matters, 
we convert natural confidence (that is, according to 
nature) into audacity, desperation, rashness, shame- 
lessness ; and we convert natural caution and 
modesty into cowardice and meanness, which are 
full of fear and confusion. For if a man should 
transfer caution to those things in which the will 
may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will 
immediately by willing to be cautious have also the 
power of avoiding what he chooses : but if he 
transfer it to the things which are not in his power 
and will, and attempt to avoid the things which are 
in the power of others, he will of necessity fear, he 
will be unstable, he will be disturbed. For death or 
pain is not formidable, but the fear of pain or death. 
For this reason we commend the poet who said 

Not death is evil, but a shameful death. 

Confidence (courage) then ought to be employed 
against death, and caution against the fear of 
death. But now we do the contrary, and employ 
against death the attempt to escape ; and to our 
opinion about it we employ carelessness, rashness, 



DISCOURSES. ^'j 

and indifference. These things Socrates properly 
used to call tragic masks ; for as to children masks 
appear terrible and fearful from inexperience, we 
also are affected in like manner by events (the 
things which happen in life) for no other reason 
than children are by masks. What is a child ? 
Want of knowledge. For when a child knows 
these things, he is in no way inferior to us. W^hat 
is death ? A tragic mask. Turn it and examine it. 
See, it does not bite. The poor body must be 
separated from the spirit either now or later as it 
was separated from it before. Why then are you 
troubled, if it be separated now ? for if it is not 
separated now, it will be separated afterwards. 
Why? That the period of the universe may be 
completed, for it has need of the present, and of 
the future, and of the past. What is pain ? A 
mask. Turn it and examine it. The poor flesh is 
moved roughly, then on the contrary smoothly. 

What then is the fruit of these opinions ? It is 
that which ought to be the most noble and the most 
becoming to those who are really educated, release 
from perturbation, release from fear, freedom. For 
in these matters we must not believe the many, 
who say that free persons only ought to be educated, 
but we should rather believe the philosophers who 
say that the educated only are free. How is this ? 
In this manner. Is freedom anything else than the 
power of living as we choose } Nothing else. 
Tell me then, ye men, do you wish to live in error ? 
We do not. No one then who lives in error is free. 



68 EPICTETUS. 

Do you wish to live in fear ? Do you wish to live 
in sorrow ? Do you wish to live in perturbation ? 
By no means. No one then who is in a state of 
fear, or sorrow, or perturbation is free ; but whoever 
is delivered from sorrows, and fears, and perturba- 
tions, he is at the same time delivered from servi- 
tude. How then can we continue to believe you, 
most dear legislators, when you say. We only allow 
free persons to be educated .'' For philosophers say 
we allow none to be free except the educated ; that 
is, God does not allow it. When then a man has 
turned round before the praetor his own slave, has 
he done nothing .'' He has done something. What ? 
He has turned round his own slave before the 
praetor. Has he done nothing more ? Yes : he is 
also bound to pay for him the tax called the 
twentieth. Well then, is not the man who has gone 
through this ceremony become free ? No more 
than he is become free from perturbations. Have 
you who are able to turn round (free) others no 
master ? is not money your master, or a girl, or a 
boy, or some tyrant, or some friend of the tyrant .? 
why do you tremble then when you are going off to 
any trial (danger) of this kind ? It is for this 
reason that I often say, study and hold in readiness 
these principles by which you may determine what 
those things are with reference to which you ought 
to have confidence (courage), and those things with 
reference to which you ought to be cautious : 
courageous in that which does not depend on your 
will ; cautious in that which does depend on it. 



DISCOURSES. . 69 



OF TRANQUILLITY (FREEDOM FROM PERTURBATION). 

Consider, you who are going into court, what you 
wish to maintain and what you wish to succeed in. 
For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to 
nature, you have every security, every facility, you 
have no troubles. For if you wish to maintain what 
is in your own power and is naturally free, and if 
you are content with these, what else do you care 
for ? For who is the master of such things ? Who 
can take them away ? If you choose to be modest 
and faithful, who shall not allow you to be so ? If 
you choose not to be restrained or compelled, who 
shall compel you to desire what you think that you 
ought not to desire ? who shall compel you to avoid 
what you do not think fit to avoid ? But what do 
you say? The judge will determine against you 
something that appears formidable ; but that you 
should also suffer in trying to avoid it, how can he 
do that? When then the pursuit of objects and 
the avoiding of thern are in your power, what else 
do you care for? Let this be your preface, this 
your narrative, this your confirmation, this your 
victory, this your peroration, this your applause (or 
the approbation which you will receive). 

Therefore Socrates said to one who was remind- 
ing him to prepare for his trial, Do you not think 
then that I have been preparing for it all my life ? 
By what kind of preparation ? I have maintained 
that which was in my own power. How then ? I 



/O EPICTETUS. 

have never done anything unjust either in my 
private or in my public life. 

But if you wish to maintain externals also, your 
poor body, your little property and your little esti- 
mation, I advise you to make from this moment all 
possible preparation, and then consider both the 
nature of your judge and your adversary. If it is 
necessary to embrace his knees, embrace his knees ; 
if to weep, weep ; if to groan, groan. For when 
you have subjected to externals what is your own, 
then be a slave and do not resist, and do not some- 
times choose to be a slave, and sometimes not 
choose, but with all your mind be one or the other, 
either free or a slave, either instructed or unin- 
structed, either a well-bred cock or a mean one, 
either endure to be beaten until you die or yield at 
once ; and let it not happen to you to receive many 
stripes and then to yield. But if these things are 
base, determine immediately. 

Do you think that, if Socrates had wished to pre- 
serve externals, he would have come forward and 
said : Anytus and Melitus can certainly kill me, but 
to harm me they are not able ? Was he so foolish 
as not to see that this way leads not to the preser- 
vation of life and fortune, but to another end ? 
What is the reason then that he takes no account 
of his adversaries, and even irritates them ? Just in 
the same way my friend Heraclitus, who had a little 
suit in Rhodes about a bit of land, and had proved 
to the judges that his case was just, said when he 
had come to the peroration of his speech, I will 



DISCOURSES. 71 

neither .entreat you nor do I care what judgment 
you will give, and it is you rather than I who are on 
your trial. And thus he ended the business. What 
need was there of this ? Only do not entreat ; but 
do not also say, ' I do not entreat ' ; unless there is 
a fit occasion to irritate purposely the judges, as 
was the case with Socrates. And you, if you are 
preparing such a peroration, why do you wait,, why 
do you obey the order to submit to trial ? For if 
you wish to be crucified, wait and the cross will 
come : but if you choose to submit and to plead 
your cause as well as you can, you must do what is 
consistent with this object, provided you maintain 
what is your own (your proper character). 

TO THOSE WHO RECOMMEND PERSONS TO 
PHILOSOPHERS. 

Diogenes said well to one who asked from him 
letters of recommendation, "That you are a man," 
he said, "he will know as soon as he sees you ; and 
he will know whether you are good or bad, if he is 
by experience skillful to distinguish the good and 
the bad ; but if he is without experience, he will 
never know, if I write to him ten thousand times." 
For it is just the same as if a drachma (a piece of 
silver money) asked to be recommended to a person 
to be tested. If he is skillful in testing silver, he 
will know what you are, for you (the drachma) will 
recommend yourself. We ought then in life also 
to have some skill as in the case of silver coin that 



^2 EPICTETUS. 

a man may be able to say like the judge of silver, 
Bring me any drachma and I will test it. 

AGAINST A PERSON WHO HAD ONCE BEEN DETECTED 
IN ADULTERY. 

As Epictetus was saying that man is formed for 
fidelity, and that he who subverts fidelity subverts 
the peculiar characteristic of men, there entered 
one of those who are considered to be men of 
letters, who had once been detected in adultery in 
the city. Then Epictetus continued. But if we lay 
aside this fidelity for v/hich we are formed and make 
designs against our neighbor's wife, what are we 
doing? What else but destroying and overthrow- 
ing? Whom, the man of fidelity, the man of 
modesty, the man of sanctity. Is this all ? And 
are we not overthrowing neighborhood, and friend- 
ship, and the community ; and in what place are we 
putting ourselves ? How shall I consider you, man ? 
As a neighbor, as a friend ? What kind of one ? 
As a citizen ? Wherein shall I trust you ? But if 
being a man you are unable to fill any place which 
befits a man, w^hat shall we do with you ? For 
suppose that you cannot hold the place of a friend, 
can you hold the place of a slave ? And who will 
trust you ? 

HOW MAGNANIMITY IS CONSISTENT WITH CARE. 

To the foot I shall say that it is according to 
nature for it to be clean ; but if you take it as a foot 



DISCOURSES. 73 

and as a thing not detached (independent), it will 
befit it both to step into the mud and tread on 
thorns, and sometimes to be cut off for the good of 
the whole body ; otherwise it is no longer a foot. 
We should think in some such way about ourselves 
also. What are you ? A man. If you consider 
yourself as detached from other men, it is according 
to nature to live to old age, to be rich, to be healthy. 
But if you consider yourself as a man and a part of 
a certain whole, it is for the sake of that whole that 
at one time you should be sick, at another time take 
a voyage and run into danger, and at another time 
be in want, and in some cases die prematurely. 
Why then are you troubled ? Do you not know, that 
as a foot is no longer a foot if it is detached from 
the body, so you are no longer a man if you are 
separated from other men ? For what is a man ? 
A part of a state, of that first which consists of 
gods and of men ; then of that which is called next 
to it, which is a small image of the universal state. 
What then must I be brought to trial ; must another 
have a fever, another sail on the sea, another die, 
and another be condemned ? Yes, for it is impos- 
sible in such a body, in such a universe of things, 
among so many living together, that such things 
should not happen, some to one and others to 
others. It is your duty then since you are come 
here, to say what you ought, to arrange these things 
as it is fit. Then some one says, "I shall charge 
you with doing me wrong." Much good may it do 
you : I have done my part ; but whether you also 



74 EPICTETUS. 

have done yours, you must look to that ; for there 
is some danger of this too, that it may escape your 
notice. 

OF INDIFFERENCE. 

It is good for you to know your own preparation 
and power, that in those matters where you have 
not been prepared, you may keep quiet, and not 
be vexed, if others have the advantage over you. 

Also where there is need of any practice, seek 
not that which is acquired from the need (of such 
practice), but yield in that matter to those who have 
had practice, and be yourself content with firmness 
of mind. 

Go and salute a certain person. How ? Not 
meanly. — But I have been shut out, for I have not 
learned to make my way through the window ; and 
when I have found the door shut, I must either 
come back or enter through the window. — But still 
speak to him. — In what way ? Not meanly. But 
suppose that you have not got what you wanted. 
Was this your business, and not his ? Why then do 
you claim that which belongs to another ? Always 
remember what is your own, and what belongs to 
another ; and you will not be disturbed. Chrysippus 
therefore said well, So long as future things are 
uncertain, I always cling to those which are more 
adopted to the conservation of that which is accord- 
ing to nature ; for God himself has given me the 
faculty of such choice. But if I knew that it was 
fated (in the order of things) for me to be sick, I 



DISCOURSES. 75 

would even move towards it ; for the foot also, if it 
had intelligence, would move to go into the mud. 
For why are ears of corn produced ? Is it not that 
they may become dry .? And do they not become 
dry that they may be reaped ? for they are not 
separated from communion with other things. If 
then they had perception, ought they to wish never 
to be reaped ? But this is a curse upon ears of 
corn, to be never reaped. So we must know that 
in the case of men too it is a curse not to die, just 
the same as not to be ripened and not to be reaped. 
But since we must be reaped, and we also know that 
we are reaped, we are vexed at it ; for we neither 
know what we are nor have we studied what belongs 
to man, as those who have studied horses know 
what belongs to horses. But Chrysantas when he 
was going to strike the enemy checked himself when 
he heard the trumpet sounding a retreat : so it 
seemed better to him to obey the general's command 
than to follow his own inclination. But not one of 
us chooses, even when necessity summons, readily 
to obey it, but weeping and groaning we suffer what 
we do suffer, and we call them ' circumstances.' 
What kind of circumstances, man ? If you give the 
name of circumstances to the things which are 
around you, all things are circumstances ; but if you 
call hardships by this name, what hardship is there 
in the dying of that which has been produced ? But 
that which destroys is either a sword, or a wheel, or 
the sea, or a tile, or a tyrant. Why do you care 
about the way of going down to Hades ? All ways 



76 EPICTETUS. 

are equal. But if you will listen to the truth, the 
way which the tyrant sends you is shorter. A tyrant 
never killed a man in six months : but a fever is 
often a year about it. All these things are only 
sound and the noise of empty names. 

A tribunal and a prison are each a place, one 
high and the other low ; but the will can be main- 
tained equal, if you choose to maintain it equal in 
each. 

HOW WE OUGHT TO USE DIVINATION. 

Why don't you give your opinion on matters of 
grammar, and why do you give it here about things 
on which we are all in error and disputing with one 
another ? The woman who intended to send by a 
vessel a month's provisions to Gratilla in her banish- 
ment, made a good answer to him who said that 
Domitian would seize Avhat she sent, I would rather, 
she replied, that Domitian should seize all than that 
I should not send it. 

In the same way ought we to come to God as a 
guide ; as we use our eyes, not asking them to 
show us rather such things as we wish, but receiving 
the appearances of things such as the eyes present 
them to us. But now we trembling take the augur 
(bird interpreter) by the hand, and while we invoke 
God we entreat the augur, and say, Master have 
mercy on me ; suffer me to come safe out of this 
difficulty. Wretch, would you have then anything 
other than what is best ? Is there then anything 



DISCOURSES. JJ 

better than what pleases God ? Why do you, as far 
as is in your power, corrupt your judge and lead 
astray your adviser ? 



WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE GOOD. 

Will you not then seek the nature of good in the 
rational animal 1 for if it is not there, you will not 
choose to say that it exists in any other thing (plant 
or animal). What then ? are not plants and animals 
also the works of God 1 They are ; but they are 
not superior things, nor yet parts of the gods. But 
you are a superior thing ; you are a portion sepa- 
rated from the deity ; you have in yourself a certain 
portion of him. Why then are you ignorant of your 
own noble descent ? When you are in social inter- 
course, when you are exercising yourself, when you 
are engaged in discussion, know you not that you 
are nourishing a god, that you are exercising a god ? 
Wretch, you are carrying about a god with you, and 
you know it not. Do you think that I mean some 
god of silver or of gold, and external t You carry 
him within yourself, and you perceive not that you 
are polluting hiin by impure thoughts and dirty 
deeds. And if an image of God were present, you 
would not dare to do any of the things which you 
are doing : but when God himself is present within 
and sees all and hears all, you are not ashamed of 
thinking such things and doing such things, ignorant 
as you are of your own nature and subject to the 
anger of God. Then why do we fear when we are 



yS EPICTETUS. 

sending a young man from the school into active 
life, lest he should do anything improperly, eat 
improperly, have improper intercourse with women; 
and lest the rags in which he is wrapped should 
debase him, lest fine garments should make him 
proud ? This youth (if he acts thus) does not know 
his own God : he knows not with whom he sets out 
(into the world). But can we endure when he says 
' I wish I had you (God) with me'? Have you not 
God with you ? and do you seek for any other, when 
you have him ? or will God tell you anything else 
than this ? If you were a statue of Phidias, either 
Athena or Zeus, you would think both of yourself 
and of the artist, and if you had any understanding 
(power of perception) you would try to do nothing 
unworthy of him who made you, or of yourself, and 
try not to appear in an unbecoming dress (attitude) 
to those who look on you. But now because Zeus 
has made you, for this reason do you care not how 
you shall appear ? And yet is the artist (in the one 
case) like the artist in the other ? or the work in 
the one case like the other ? And what work of an 
artist, for instance, has in itself the faculties which 
the artist shows in making it ? It is not marble or 
bronze, or gold or ivory ? and the Athena of Phidias 
when she has once extended the hand and received 
in it the figure of Victory stands in that attitude for- 
ever. But the works of God have power of motion, 
they breathe, they have the faculty of using the 
appearances of things, and the power of examining 
them. Being the work of such an artist do you dis- 



DISCOURSES. 79 

honor him ? And what shall I say, not only that 
he made you, but also intrusted you to yourself and 
made you a deposit to yourself ? Will you not think 
of this too, but do you also dishonor your guardian- 
ship ? But if God had intrusted an orphan to you, 
would you thus neglect him ? He has delivered 
yourself to your own care, and says, I had no one 
fitter to intrust him to than yourself : keep him for 
me such as he is by nature, modest, faithful, erect, 
unterrified, free from passion and perturbation. 
And then you do not keep him such. 

But some will say, whence has this fellow got the 
arrogance which he displays and these supercilious 
looks ? — I have not yet so much gravity as befits a 
philosopher ; for I do not yet feel confident in what 
I have learned and in what I have assented to : I 
still fear my own weakness. Let me get confidence 
and then you shall see a countenance such as I 
ought to have and an attitude such as I ought to 
have : then I will show to you the statue, when it is 
perfected, when it is polished. What do you expect.? 
a supercilious countenance ? Does the Zeus at 
Olympia lift up his brow ? No, his look is fixed as 
becomes him who is ready to say 

Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail. — Iliad, i. 526. 

Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, 
noble, free from perturbation. — What, and immortal 
too, exempt from old age, and from sickness ? No, 
but dying as becomes a god, sickening as becomes 
a god. This power I possess ; this I can do. But 



80 EPICTETUS. 

the rest I do not possess, nor can I do. I will show 
the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. What nerves 
are these } A desire never disappointed, an aversion 
which never falls on that which it would avoid, a 
proper pursuit, a diligent purpose, an assent which 
is not rash. These you shall see. 

THAT WHEN WE CANNOT FULFILL THAT WHICH THE 

CHARACTER OF A MAN PROMISES, WE ASSUME 

THE CHARACTER OF A PHILOSOPHER. 

It is no common (easy) thing to do this only, to 
fulfill the promise of a man's nature. For what is a 
man ? The answer is, a rational and mortal being. 
Then by the rational faculty from whom are we 
separated? From wild beasts. And from what 
others ? From sheep and like animals. Take care 
then to do nothing like a wild beast ; but if you do, 
you have lost the character of a man ; you have not 
fulfilled your promise. See that you do nothing like 
a sheep ; but if you do, in this case also the man is 
lost. What then do we do as sheep ? When we 
act gluttonously, when we act lewdly, when we act 
rashly, filthily, inconsiderately, to what have we 
declined ? To sheep. What have we lost ? The 
rational faculty. When we act contentiously, and 
harmfully, and passionately, and violently, to what 
have we declined ? To wild beasts. Each man is 
improved and preserved by corresponding acts, the 
carpenter by acts of carpentry, the grammarian by 
acts of grammar. But if a man accustoms himself 



. . DISCOURSES. 8 1 

to write ungrammatically, of necessity his art will 
be corrupted and destroyed. Thus modest actions 
preserve the modest man, and immodest actions 
destroy him : and actions of fidelity preserve the 
faithful man, and the contrary actions destroy him. 
And on the other hand contrary actions strengthen 
contrary characters : shamelessness strengthens the 
shameless man, faithlessness the faithless man, 
abusive words the abusive man, anger the man of 
an angry temper, and unequal receiving and giving 
make the avaricious man more avaricious. 

For this reason philosophers admonish us not to 
be satisfied with learning only, but also to add study, 
and then practice. For we have long been accus- 
tomed to do contrary things, and we put in practice 
opinions which are contrary to true opinions. If 
then we shall not also put in practice right opinions, 
we shall be nothing more than the expositors of the 
opinions of others. For now who among us is not 
able to discourse according to the rules of art about 
good and evil things (in this fashion) ? That of 
things some are good, and some are bad, and some 
are indifferent : the good then are virtues, and the 
things which participate in virtues ; and the bad are 
the contrary ; and the indifferent are wealth, health, 
reputation. — Then, if in the midst of our talk there 
should happen some greater noise than usual, or 
some of those who are present should laugh at us, 
we are disturbed. Philosopher, where are the things 
which you were talking about ? Whence did you 
produce and utter them ? From the lips, and thence 



S2 EPICTETUS. 

only. Why then do you corrupt the aids provided 
by others ? Why do you treat the weightiest matters 
as if you were playing a game of dice ? For it is 
one thing to lay up bread and wine as in a store- 
house, and another thing to eat. That which has 
been eaten, is digested, distributed, and is become 
sinews, flesh, bones, blood, healthy color, healthy 
breath. Whatever is stored up, when you choose 
you can readily take and show it ; but you have no 
other advantage from it except so far as to appear 
to possess it. 

HOW WE MAY DISCOVER THE DUTIES OF LIFE 
FROM NAMES. 

You are a citizen of the world, and a part of it, 
not one of the subservient (serving), but one of the 
principal (ruling) parts, for you are capable of com- 
prehending the divine administration and of con- 
sidering the connection of things. What then does 
the character of a citizen promise (profess) } To 
hold nothing as profitable to himself ; to deliberate 
about nothing as if he were detached from the 
community, but to act as the hand or foot would 
do, if they had reason and understood the consti- 
tution of nature, for they would never put them- 
selves in motion nor desire anything otherwise than 
with reference to the whole. Therefore the phi- 
losophers say well, that if the good man had fore- 
knowledge of what would happen, he would cooper- 
ate towards his own sickness and death and 



DISCOURSES. 8^ 

mutilation, since he knows that these things are 
assigned to him according to the universal arrange- 
ment, and that the whole is superior to the part, and 
the state to the citizen. 

After this remember that you are a son. What 
does this character promise ? To consider that 
everything which is the son's belongs to the father, 
to obey him in all things, never to blame him to 
another, nor to say or do anything which does him 
injury, to yield to him in all things and give way, 
co-operating with him as far as you can. After this 
know that you are a brother also, and that to this 
character it is due to make concessions; to be easily 
persuaded, to speak good of your brother, never to 
claim in opposition to him any of the things which 
are independent of the will, but readily to give them 
up, that you may have the larger share in what is 
dependent on the will. For see what a thing it is, 
in place of a lettuce, if it should so happen, or a 
seat, to gain for yourself goodness of disposition. 
How great is the advantage. 

Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, 
remember that you are a senator : if a youth, that 
you are a youth : if an old man, that you are an old 
man ; for each of such names, if it comes to be 
examined, marks out the proper duties. But if you 
go and blame your brother, I say to you. You have 
forgotten who you are and what is your name. In 
the next place, if you were a smith and made a 
wrong use of the hammer, you would have forgotten 
the smith ; and if you have forgotten the brother 



84 EPICTETUS. 

and instead of a brother have become an enemy, 
would you appear not to have changed one thing 
for another in that case ? And if instead of a man, 
who is a tame animal and social, you are become a 
mischievous wild beast, treacherous, and biting, 
have you lost nothing ? But (I suppose), you must 
lose a bit of money that you may suffer damage ? 
And does the loss of nothing else do a man damage ? 
If you had lost the art of grammar or music, would 
you think the loss of it a damage ? and if you shall 
lose modesty, moderation, and gentleness, do you 
think the loss nothing ? And yet the things first 
mentioned are lost by some cause external and 
independent of the will, and the second by our own 
fault ; and as to the first neither to have them nor 
to lose them is shameful ; but as to the second, not 
to have them and to lose them is shameful and 
matter of reproach and a misfortune. What does 
he lose who commits adultery ? He loses the 
(character of the) modest, the temperate, the decent, 
the citizen, the neighbor. What does he lose who 
is angry ? Something else. What does the coward 
lose ? Something else. No man is bad without 
suffering some loss and damage. If then you look 
for the damage in the loss of money only, all these 
men receive no harm or damage ; it may be, they 
have even profit and gain, when they acquire a bit 
of money by any of these deeds. Have we not a 
natural modesty ? — Does he who loses this sustain 
no damage ? is he deprived of nothing, does he part 
with nothing of the things which belong to him ? 



DISCOURSES. 85 

Have we not naturally fidelity ? natural affection, a 
natural disposition to help others, a natural dis- 
position to forbearance ? The man then who allows 
himself to be damaged in these matters, can he be 
free from harm and uninjured ? What then ? shall 
I not hurt him, who has hurt me ? What then, since 
that man has hurt himself by doing an unjust act 
to me, shall I not hurt myself by doing some unjust 
act to him ? Why do we not imagine to ourselves 
(mentally think of) something of this kind ? But 
where there is any detriment to the body or to our 
possession, there is harm there ; and where the 
same thing happens to the faculty of the will, there 
is (you suppose) no harm ; for he who has been 
deceived or he who has done an unjust act neither 
suffers in the head nor in the eye nor in the hip, 
nor does he lose his estate ; and we wish for nothing 
else than (security to) these things. But whether 
we shall have the will modest and faithful or shame- 
less and faithless, we care not the least, except only 
in the school so far as a few words are concerned. 
Therefore our proficiency is limited to these few 
words ; but beyond them it does not exist even in 
the slisfhtest de2:ree. 

OF DISPUTATION OR DISCUSSION. 

Give to any of us, whom you please, an illiterate 
man to discuss with, and he can not discover how 
to deal with the man. But when he has moved the 
man a little, if he answers beside the purpose, he 



86 EPICTETUS. 

does not know how to treat him, but he then either 
abuses or ridicules him, and says, He is an ilUterate 
man ; it is not possible to do anything with him. 
Now a guide, when he has found a man out of the 
road leads him into the right way : he does not 
ridicule or abuse him and then leave him. Do you 
also show the illiterate man the truth, and you will 
see that .he follows. But so long as you do not 
show him the truth, do not ridicule him, but rather 
feel your own incapacity. 

Now this was the first and chief peculiarity of 
Socrates, never to be irritated in argument, never 
to utter anything abusive, anything insulting, but to 
bear with abusive persons and to put an end to the 
quarrel. 

ON ANXIETY (sOLICITUDE). ' 

When I see a man anxious, I say. What does this 
man want ? If he did not want something which 
is not in his power, how could he be anxious ? For 
this reason a lute player when he is singing by 
himself has no anxiety, but when he enters the 
theatre, he is anxious even if he has a good voice 
and plays well on the lute ; for he not only wishes 
to sing well, but also to obtain applause : but this 
is not in his power. Accordingly, where he has 
skill, there he has confidence. Bring any single 
person who knows nothing of music, and the musi- 
cian does not care for him. But in the matter 
wheT:e a man knows nothing and has not been 
practiced, there he is anxious. What matter is 



DISCOURSES. 8/ 

this ? He knows not what a crowd is or what the 
praise of a crowd is. However he has learned to 
strike the lowest chord and the highest ; but what 
the praise of the many is, and what power it has in 
life he neither knows nor has he thought about it. 
Hence he must of necessity tremble and grow pale. 
Is any man then afraid about things which are not 
evils ? — No. — Is he afraid about things which are 
evils, but still so far within his power that they 
may not happen ? — Certainly he is not. — If then 
the things which are independent of the will are 
neither good nor bad, and all things which do 
depend on the will are within our power, and no 
man can either take them from us or give them to 
us, if we do not choose, where is room left for 
anxiety .'' But we are anxious about our poor body, 
our little property, about the will of Caesar ; but 
not anxious about things internal. Are we anxious 
about not forming a false opinion ? — No, for this 
is in my power. — About not exerting our move- 
ments contrary to nature ? — No, not even about 
this. — When then you see a man pale, as the 
physician says, judging from the complexion, this 
man's spleen is disordered, that man's liver ; so 
also say, this man's desire and aversion are disor- 
dered, he is not in the right way, he is in a fever. 
For this reason when Zeno was going to meet 
Antigonus, he was not anxious, for Antigonus had 
no power over any of the things which Zeno ad- 
mired ; but Zeno did not care for those things over 
which Antigonus had power. But Antigonus was 



65 EPICTETUS. 

anxious when he was going to meet Zeno, for he 
wished to please Zeno ; but this was a thing exter- 
nal (out of his power). But Zeno did not want to 
please Antigonus, for no man w^ho is skilled in any- 
art washes to please one who has no such skill. 

Should I try to please you ? Why ? I suppose, 
you know the measure by which one man is estima- 
ted by another. Have you taken pains to learn 
what is a good man and what is a bad man, and 
how a man becomes one or the other ? Why then 
are you not good yourself? — How, he replies, am 
I not good ? — Because no good man laments or 
groans or weeps, no good man is pale and trembles, 
or says, How will he receive me, how will he listen 
to me? — Slave, just as it pleases him. Why do 
you care about what belongs to others ? Is it now^ 
his fault if he receives badly what proceeds from 
you ? — Certainly. Speak the truth then, unhappy 
man, and do not brag, nor claim to be a philosopher, 
nor refuse to acknowledge your masters, but so 
long as you present this handle in your body, follow 
every man who is stronger than yourself. 

As to what I have said about your ignorance of 
other matters, that may perhaps be endured, but if 
I say that you know nothing about yourself, how is 
it possible that 3-ou should endure me and bear the 
proof and stay here ? It is not possible ; but you 
immediately go off in bad humor. And yet what 
harm have I done you ? unless the mirror also 
injures the ugly man because it shows him to him- 
self such as he is ; unless the physician also is 



DISCOURSES. 89 

supposed to insult the sick man, when he says to 
him, Man, do you think that you ail nothing ? But 
you have a fever : go without food to-day ; drink 
water. And no one says, what an insult ! But 
if you say to a man. Your desires are inflamed, 
your aversions are low, your intentions are incon- 
sistent, your pursuits (movements) are not com- 
formable to nature, your opinions are rash and 
false, the man immediately goes away and says, He 
has insulted me. 

Our way of dealing is like that of a crowded 
assembly. Beasts are brought to be sold and oxen ; 
and the greater part of the men come to buy and 
sell, and there are some few who come to look at 
the market and to inquire how it is carried on, and 
why, and who fixes the meeting and for what 
purpose. So it is here also in this assembly (of 
life): some like cattle trouble themselves about 
nothing except their fodder. For to all of you who 
are busy about possessions and lands and slaves 
and magisterial offices, these are nothing except 
fodder. But there are a few who attend the assem- 
bly, men who love to look on and consider what is 
the world, who governs it. 

TO OR AGAINST THOSE WHO OBSTINATELY PERSIST 
IN WHAT THEY HAVE DETERMINED. 

When some persons have heard these words, that 
a man ought to be constant (firm), and that the will 
is naturally free and not subject to compulsion, but 



90 EPICTETUS. 

that all other things are subject to hindrance, to 
slavery, and are in the power of others, they sup- 
pose that they ought without deviation to abide by 
everything which they have determined. But in 
the first place that which has been determined 
ought to be sound (true). I require tone (sinews) 
in the body, but such as exists in a healthy body, in 
an athletic body ; but if it is plain to me that you 
have the tone of a frensied man and you boast of 
it, I shall say to you, man, seek the physician : this 
is not tone, but atony (deficiency in right tone). 
In a different way something of the same kind is 
felt by those who listen to these discourses in a 
wrong manner ; which was the case with one of my 
companions who for no reason resolved to starve 
himself to death. I heard of it when it was the 
third day of his abstinence from food and I went to 
inquire what had happened. I have resolved, he 
said. — But still tell me what it was which induced 
you to resolve ; for if you have resolved rightly, we 
shall sit with you and assist you to depart ; but if 
you have made an unreasonable resolution, change 
your mind. — We ought to keep to our determina- 
tions. — What are you doing, man } We ought to 
keep not to all our determinations, but to those 
which are right ; for if you are now persuaded that 
it is night, do not change your mind, if you think 
fit, but persist and say, we ought to abide by our 
determinations. Will you not make the beginning 
and lay the foundation in an inquiry whether the 
determination is sound or not sound, and so then 



DISCOURSES. 91 

build on it firmness and security ? But if you lay a 
rotten and ruinous foundation, will not your miser- 
able little building fall down the sooner, the more 
and the stronger are the materials which you shall 
lay on it ? Without any reason would you with- 
draw from us out of life a man who is a friend, and 
a companion, a citizen of the same city, both the 
great and the small city? Then. while you are com- 
mitting murder and destroying a man who has done 
no wrong, do you say that you ought to abide by 
your determinations. And if it ever in any way 
came into your head to kill me, ought you to abide 
by your determinations ? 

Now this man was with difficulty persuaded to 
change his mind. But it is impossible to convince 
some persons at present ; so that I seem now to 
know, what I did not know before, the meaning of 
the common saying. That you can neither persuade 
nor break a fool. May it never be my lot to have 
a wise fool for my friend : nothing is more untract- 
able. 'I am determined,' the man says. Madmen 
are also ; but the more firmly they form a judgment 
on things which do not exist, the more hellebore 
they require. Will you not act like a sick man and 
call in the physician ? — I am sick, master, help me ; 
consider what I must do : it is my duty to obey 
you. So it is here also : I know not what I ought 
to do, but I am come to learn. — Not so ; but speak 
to me about other things : upon this I have de- 
termined. — What other things ? for what is greater 
and more useful than for you to be persuaded that 



92 ' EPICTETUS. 

it is not sufficient to have made your determination 
and not to change it? This is the tone (energy) of 
madness, not of health. — I will die, if you compel 
me to this. — Why, man ? What has happened } — 
I have determined — I have had a lucky escape 
that you have not determined to kill me — I take 
no money. Why ? — I have determined — Be 
assured that with the very tone (energy) which you 
now use in refusing to take, there is nothing to 
hinder you at some time from inclining without 
reason to take money and then saying, I have 
determined. As in a distempered body, subject to 
defluxions, the humor inclines sometimes to these 
parts, and then to those, so too a sickly soul knows 
not which way to incline : but if to this inclination 
and movement there is added a tone (obstinate 
resolution), then the evil becomes past help and 
cure. 



THAT WE DO NOT STRIVE TO USE OUR OPINIONS 
ABOUT GOOD AND EVIL. 

When the rhetorician knows that he has written 
well, that he has committed to memory what he 
has written and brings an agreeable voice, why 
is he still anxious ? Because he is not satisfied 
with having studied. What then does he want ? 
To be praised by the audience ? For the purpose 
then of being able to practice declamation he has 
been disciplined ; but with respect to praise and 
blame he has not been disciplined. For when did 



DISCOURSES. 93 

he hear from any one what praise is, what blame is, 
what the nature of each is, what kind of praise 
should be sought, or what kind of blame should be 
shunned ? And when did he practice this discipline 
which follows these words (things) ? Why then do 
you still wonder, if in the matters which a man has 
learned, there he surpasses others, and in those in 
which he has not been disciplined, there he is the 
same with the many. So the lute player knows 
how to play, sings well, and has a fine dress, and 
yet he trembles when he enters on the stage ; for 
these matters he understands, but he does not 
know what a crowd is, nor the shouts of a crowd, 
nor what ridicule is. Neither does he know what 
anxiety is, whether it is our work or the work of 
another, whether it is possible to stop it or not. 
For this reason if he has been praised, he leaves 
the theatre puffed up, but if he has been ridiculed, 
the swollen bladder has been punctured and sub- 
sides. 

Give me a man who cares how he shall do any- 
thing, not f-or the obtaining of a thing, but who 
cares about his own energy. What man, when he 
is walking about, cares for his own energy? who, 
when he is deliberating, cares about his own delib- 
eration, and not about obtaining that about which 
he deliberates ? And if he succeeds, he is elated 
and says, How well we have deliberated ; did I not 
tell you, brother, that it is impossible, when we have 
thought about anything, that it should not turn out 
thus ? But if the thing should turn out otherwise. 



94 EPICTETUS. 

the wretched man is humbled ; he knows not even 
what to say about what has taken place. 

What then are the things which are heavy on us 
and disturb us ? What else than opinions ? What 
else than opinions lies heavy upon him who goes 
away and leaves his companions and friends and 
places and habits of life ? Now little children, for 
instance, when they cry on the nurse leaving them for 
a short time, forget their sorrow if they receive a small 
cake. Do you choose then that we should compare 
you to little children ? — - No, by Zeus, for I do not 
wish to be pacified by a small cake, but by right 
opinions. — And what are these ? Such as a man 
ought to study all day, and not to be affected by 
anything that is not his own, neither by companion 
nor place nor gymnasia, and not even by his own 
body, but to remember the law and to have it before 
his eyes. And what is the divine law ? To keep a 
man's own, not to claim that which belongs to 
others, but to use what is given, and when it is not 
given, not to desire it ; and when a thing is taken 
away, to give it up readily and immediately, and to 
be thankful for the time that a man has had the use 
of it, if you would not cry for your nurse and 
mamma. For what matter does it make by what 
thing a man is subdued, and on what he depends ? 
In what respect are you better than he who cries 
for a girl, if you grieve for a little gymnasium, and 
little porticoes, and young men, and such places of 
amusement ? 

My man, as the proverb says, make a desperate 



DISCOURSES. 95 

effort on behalf, of tranquillity of mind, freedom, and 
magnanimity. Lift up your head at last as released 
from slavery. Dare to look up to God and say. 
Deal with me for the future as thou wilt ; I am of 
the same mind as thou art ; I am thine : I refuse 
nothing that pleases thee : lead me where thou 
wilt : clothe me in any dress thou choosest : is it 
thy will that I should hold the office of a magistrate, 
that I should be in the condition of a private man, 
stay here or be an exile, be poor, be rich ? I will 
make thy defense to men in behalf of all these con- 
ditions : I will show the nature of each thing what 
it is. Clear away your own. From yourself, from 
your thoughts cast away sadness, fear, desire, envy, 
malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, intemperance. But 
it is not possible to eject these things otherwise than 
by looking to God only, by fixing your affections on 
him only, by being consecrated to his demands. 
But if you choose anything else, you will with sighs 
and groans be compelled to follow what is stronger 
than yourself, always seeking tranquillity and never 
able to find it : for you seek tranquillity there where 
it is not, and you neglect to seek it where it is. 

HOW WE MUST ADAPT PRECONCEPTIONS TO PAR- 
TICULAR CASES. 

What is the first business of him who philoso- 
phizes ? To throw away self-conceit. For it is 
impossible for a man to begin to learn that which 
he thinks that he knows. As to things then which 



96 EPICTETUS. 

ought to be done and ought not to be done, and 
good and bad, and beautiful and ugly, all of us talk- 
ing of them at random go to the philosophers ; and 
on these matters we praise, we censure, we accuse, 
we blame, we judge and determine about principles 
honorable and dishonorable. But why do we go to 
the philosophers ? Because we wish to learn what 
we do not think that we know. 

Do you now desire that which is possible and 
that which is possible to you ? Why then are you 
hindered ? why are you unhappy ? Do you not now 
try to avoid the unavoidable ? Why then do you 
fall in with anything which you would avoid ? Why 
are you unfortunate? Why, when you desire a 
thing, does it not happen, and, when you do not 
desire it, does it happen ? For this is the greatest 
proof of unhappiness and misery : I wish for some- 
thing, and it does not happen. And what is more 
wretched than I ? 

It was because she could not endure this that 
Medea came to murder her children : an act of a 
noble spirit in this view at least, for she had a just 
opinion what it is for a thing not to succeed which 
a person wishes. Then she says, 'Thus I shall be 
avenged on him (my husband) who has wronged 
and insulted me ; and what shall I gain if he is 
punished thus ? how then shall it be done ? I shall 
kill my children, but I shall punish myself also : 
and what do I care ? ' This is the aberration of soul 
which possesses great energy. For she did not 
know wherein lies the doing of that which we wish ; 



DISCOURSES. 9/ 

that you cannot get this from without, nor yet by 
the alteration and new adaptation of things. Do 
not desire the man (Jason, Medea's husband), and 
nothing which you desire will fail to happen : do 
not obstinately desire that he shall live with you : 
do not desire to remain in Corinth ; and in a word 
desire nothing than that which God wills. — And 
who shall hinder you ? who shall compel you ? No 
man shall compel you any more than he shall 
compel Zeus. 

When you have such a guide and your wishes and 
desires are the same as his, why do you still fear 
disappointment? Give your desire to wealth and 
your aversion to poverty, and you will be disap- 
pointed in the one, you will fall into the other. 
Well give them to health, and you will be unfor- 
tunate : give them to magistracies, honors, country, 
friends, children, in a word to any of the things 
which are not in man's power (and you will be 
unfortunate). But give them to Zeus and to the 
rest of the gods ; surrender them to the gods, let 
the gods govern, let your desire and aversion be 
ranged on the side of the gods, and wherein will 
you be any longer unhappy ? But if, lazy wretch, 
you envy, and complain, and are jealous, and fear, 
and never cease for a single day complaining both 
of yourself and of the gods, why do you still speak 
of being educated ? 

Give me one young man who has come to 
the school with this intention, who is become a 
champion for this matter and says, ' I give up every- 



9o EPICTETUS. 

thing else, and it is enough for me if it shall ever be 
in my power to pass my life free from hindrance 
and free from trouble, and to stretch out (present) 
my neck to all things like a free man, and to look 
up to heaven as a friend of God and fear nothing 
that can happen.' Let any of you point out such a 
man that I may say, ' Come, young man, into the 
possession of that which is your own, for it is your 
destiny to adorn philosophy : yours are these pos- 
sessions, yours these books, yours these discourses.' 
Let him come to me again and say, 'I desire to be 
free from passion and free from perturbation ; and 
I wish as a pious man and a philosopher and a 
diligent person to know what is my duty to the gods, 
what to my parents, what to my brothers, what to 
my country, what to strangers.' 

"Do you wish me, brother, to read to you, and 
you to me?" — You write excellently, my man; 
and you also excellently in the style of Xenophon, 
and you in the style of Plato, and you in the style 
of Antisthenes. Then having told your dreams to 
one another you return to the same things : your 
desires are the same, your aversions the same, your 
pursuits are the same, and your designs and pur- 
poses, you wish for the same things and work for 
the same. In the next place you do not even seek 
for one to give you advice, but you are vexed if you 
hear such things (as I say). Then you say, "An 
ill-natured old fellow : when I was going away, he 
did not weep nor did he say. Into what danger you 
are going: if you come off safe, my child, I will 



DISCOURSES. 



99 



burn lights. This is what a good-natured man 
would do." It will be a great thing for you if you 
do return safe, and it will be worth while to burn 
lights for such a person : for you ought to be 
immortal and exempt from disease. 

HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE AGAINST APPEARANCES. 

Every habit and faculty is maintained and 
increased by the corresponding actions : the habit 
of walking by walking, the habit of running by 
running. If you would be a good reader, read ; if 
a writer, write. But when you shall not have read 
for thirty days in succession, but have done some- 
thing else, you will know the consequence. In the 
same way, if you shall have lain down ten days, get 
up and attempt to make a long walk, and you will 
see how your legs are weakened. Generally then if 
you would make anything a habit, do it ; if you 
would not make it a habit, do not do it, but accus- 
tom yourself to do something else in place of it. 

So it is with respect to the affections of the soul : 
when you have been angry, you must know that not 
only has this evil befallen you, but that you have 
also increased the habit, and in a manner thrown 
fuel upon fire. For it is impossible for habits and 
faculties, some of them not to be produced, when 
they did not exist before, and others not be increased 
and strengthened by corresponding acts. 

In this manner certainly, as philosophers say, 
also diseases of the mind grow up. For when you 



lOO EPICTETUS. 

have once desired money, if reason be applied to 
lead to a perception of the evil, the desire is stopped, 
and the ruling faculty of our mind is restored to the 
original authority. But if you apply no means of 
cure, it no longer returns to the same state, but 
being again excited by the corresponding appear- 
ance, it is inflamed to desire quicker than before: 
and when this takes place continually, it is hence- 
forth hardened (made callous), and the disease of 
the mind confirms the love of money. For he who 
has had a fever, and has been relieved from it, is 
not in the same state that he was before, unless he 
has been completely cured. Something of the kind 
happens also in diseases of the soul. Certain traces 
and blisters are left in it, and unless a man shall 
completely efface them, when he is again lashed on 
the same places, the lash will produce not blisters 
(weals) but sores. If then you wish not to be of an 
angry temper, do not feed the habit : throw nothing 
on it which will increase it : at first keep quiet, and 
count the days on which you have not been angry. 
I used to be in passion every day ; now every 
second day ; then every third, then every fourth. 
But if you have intermitted thirty days, make a 
sacrifice to God. For the habit at first begins to 
be weakened, and then is completely destroyed. " I 
have not been vexed to-day, nor the day after, nor 
yet on any succeeding day during two or three 
months ; but I took care when some exciting things 
happened." Be assured that you are in a good way. 
To-day when I saw a handsome person, I did not 



DISCOURSES. lOI 

say to myself, I wish her, and Happy is her hus- 
band ; for he who says this says, Happy is her 
adulterer also. Nor do I picture the rest to my 
mind ; the woman present, by my side. I stroke 
my head and say, Well done, Epictetus, you have 
solved a fine little sophism, much finer than that 
which is called the master sophism. And if even 
the woman gives signs, and sends messages, and if 
she also fondle me and come close to me, and I 
should abstain and be victorious, over such a vic- 
tory as this a man may justly be proud. 

How then shall this be done? Be willing at 
length to be approved by yourself, be willing to 
appear beautiful to God, desire to be in purity with 
your own pure self and with God. Then when 
any such appearance visits you, Plato says. Have 
recourse to expiations, go a suppliant to the temples 
of the averting deities. It is even sufficient if you 
resort to the society of noble and just men, and 
compare yourself with them, whether you find one 
who is living or dead. Go to Socrates and see 
him lying down with Alcibiades, and mocking his 
beauty : consider what a victory he at last found 
that he had gained over himself ; what an Ol^Tnpian 
victory ; in what number he stood from Hercules ; 
so that, by the gods, one may justly salute him, 
Hail, wondrous man, you who have conquered not 
these sorry boxers and pancratiasts, nor yet those 
who are like them, the gladiators. By placing these 
objects on the other side you will conquer the 
appearance : you will not be drawn away by it. 



102 EPICTETUS. 

But in the first place be not hurried away by the 
rapidity of the appearance, but say, Appearances, 
wait for me a little : let me see who you are, and 
what you are about : let me put you to the test. 
And then do not allow the appearance to lead you 
on and draw lively pictures of the things which will 
follow ; for if you do, it will carry you off wherever 
it pleases. But rather bring in to oppose it some 
other beautiful and noble appearance and cast out 
this base appearance. And if you are accustomed 
to be exercised in this way, you will see what 
shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have. 
But now it is only trifling words, and nothing more. 
This is the true athlete, the man who exercises 
himself against such appearances. Stay, wretch, do 
not be carried away. Great is the combat, divine is 
the work ; it is for kingship, for freedom, for happi- 
ness, for freedom from perturbation. Remember 
God : call on him as a helper and protector, as men 
at sea call on the Dioscuri in a storm. For what is 
a greater storm than that which comes from appear- 
ances which are violent and drive away the reason ? 
For the storm itself, what else is it but an appear- 
ance ? For take away the fear of death, and sup- 
pose as many thunders and lightnings as you please, 
and you will know what calm and serenity there is 
in the ruling faculty. But if you have once been 
defeated and say that you will conquer hereafter, 
and then say the same again, be assured that you 
will at last be in so wretched a condition and so 
weak that you will not even know afterwards that 



DISCOURSES. 103 

you are doing wrong, but you will even begin to make 
apologies (defenses) for your wrong doing, and then 
you will confirm the saying of Hesiod to be true, 

With constant ills the dilatory strives. 



OF INCONSISTENCY. 

Some things men readily confess, and other things 
they do not. No one then will confess that he is a 
fool or without understanding ; but, quite the con- 
trary, you will hear all men saying, I wish that I had 
fortune equal to my understanding. But men readily 
confess that they are timid, and they say: I am 
rather timid, I confess ; but as to other respects 
you will not find me to be foolish. A man will not 
readily confess that he is intemperate ; and that he 
is unjust, he will not confess at all. He will by no 
means confess that he is envious or a busybody. 
Most men will confess that they are compassionate. 
What then is the reason .'' — The chief thing (the 
ruling thing) is inconsistency and confusion in the 
things which relate to good and evil. But different 
men have different reasons ; and generally what 
they imagine to be base, they do not confess at all. 
But they suppose timidity to be a characteristic of 
a good disposition, and compassion also ; but silli- 
ness to be the absolute characteristic of a slave. 
And they do not at all admit (confess) the things 
which are offenses against society. But in the case 
of most errors for this reason chiefly they are 
induced to confess them, because they imagine that 



I04 EPICTETUS. 

there is something involuntar}^ in them as in timidity 
and compassion ; and if a man confess that he is 
in any respect intemperate, he alleges love (or 
passion) as an excuse for what is involuntary. But 
men do not imagine injustice to be at all involun- 
tary. There is also in jealousy, as they suppose, 
something involuntar}^ ; and for this reason they 
confess to jealousy also. 

Living then among such men, who are so con- 
fused, so ignorant of what they say, and of the evils 
which they have or have not, and why they have 
them, or how they shall be relieved of th'em, I think 
it is worth the trouble for a man to watch constantly 
(and to ask) whether I also am one of them, what 
imagination I have about myself, how I conduct 
myself, whether I conduct myself as a prudent man, 
whether I conduct myself as a temperate man, 
whether I ever say this, that I have been taught 
to be prepared for ever)'1;hing that may happen. 
Have I the consciousness, which a man who knows 
nothing ought to have, that I know nothing? Do 
I go to my teacher as men go to oracles, prepared 
to obey ? or do I, like a sniveling boy, go to my 
school to learn history and understand the books 
which I did not understand before, and if it should 
happen so, to explain them also to others ? — Man, 
you have had a fight in the house with a poor slave, 
you have turned the family upside down, you have 
frightened the neighbors, and you come to me as 
if you were a wise man, and you take your seat and 
judge how I have explained some word, and how I 



DISCOURSES. 105 

have babbled whatever came into my head. You 
come full of envy, and humbled, because you bring 
nothing from home ; and you sit during the dis- 
cussion thinking of nothing else than how your 
father is disposed towards you and your brother. 
'What are they saying about me there ? now they 
think that I am improving, and are saying, He will 
return with all knowledge. I wish I could learn 
everything before I return : but much labor is 
necessary, and no one sends me anything, and the 
baths at NicopoHs are dirty ; everything is bad at 
home, and bad here.' 

ON FRIENDSHIP. 

What a man applies himself to earnestly, that he 
naturally loves. Do men then apply themselves 
earnestly to the things which are bad ? By no 
means. Well, do they apply themselves to things 
which in no way concern themselves ? not to these 
either. It remains then that they employ themselves 
earnestly only about things which are good ; and if 
they are earnestly employed about things, they love 
such things also. Whoever then understands what 
is good, can also know how to love : but he who 
cannot distinguish good from bad, and things which 
are neither good nor bad from both, how can he 
possess the power of loving ? To love then is only 
in the power of the wise. 

Did you never see little dogs caressing and play- 
ing with one another, so that you might say, there 



I06 EPICTETUS. 

is nothing more friendly ? but that you may know 
what friendship is, throw a bit of flesh among them, 
and you will learn. Throw between yourself and 
your son a little estate, and you will know how soon 
he will wish to bury you and how soon you wish 
your son to die. Then you will change your tone 
and say, what a son I have brought up ! He has 
long been wishing to bury me. Throw a smart girl 
between you ; and do you the old man love her, 
and the young one will love her too. If a little 
fame intervene or dangers, it will be just the same. 
You will utter the words of the father of Admetus ! 

Life gives you pleasure : and why not your father ? 

Were not Eteocles and Polynices from the same 
mother and from the same father ? Were they not 
brought up together, had they not lived together, 
drunk together, slept together, and often kissed one 
another? So that, if any man, I think, had seen 
them, he would have ridiculed the philosophers for 
the paradoxes which they utter about friendship. 
But when a quarrel rose between them about the 
royal power, as between dogs about a bit of meat, 
see what they say : 

Polynices. Where will you take your station 

before the towers ? 
Eteocles. Why do you ask me this ? 
Pol. I will place myself opposite and try to 

kill you. 
Et. I also wish to do the same. 

Such are the wishes that they utter. 



DISCOURSES. 107 

For universally, be not deceived, every animal is 
attached to nothing so much as to its own interest. 
Whatever then appears to it an impediment to this 
interest, whether this be a brother, or a father, or a 
child, or beloved, or lover, it hates, spurns, curses : 
for its nature is to love nothing so much as its own 
interest ; this is father, and brother and kinsman, 
and country, and God. When then the gods appear 
to us to be an impediment to this, we abuse them 
and throw down their statues and burn their 
temples, as Alexander ordered the temples of 
Aesculapius to be burned when his dear friend 
died. 

For this reason if a man put in the same place 
his interest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and 
parents, and friends, all these are secured : but if 
he puts in one place his interest, in another his 
friends, and his country, and his kinsmen, and justice 
itself, all these give way, being borne down by the 
weight of interest. For where the I and the Mine 
are placed, to that place of necessity the animal 
inclines : if in the flesh, there is the ruling power : 
if in the will, it is there : and if it is in externals, it 
is there. If then I am there where my will is, then 
only shall I be a friend such as I ought to be, and 
son, and father ; for this will be my interest, to 
maintain the character of fidelity, of modesty, of 
patience, of abstinence, of active co-operation, of 
observing my relations (towards all). But if I put 
myself in one place, and honesty in another, then 
the doctrine of Epicurus becomes strong, which 



I08 EPICTETUS. 

asserts either that there is no honesty or it is that 
which opinion holds to be honest (virtuous). 

It was through this ignorance that the Athenians 
and the Lacedaemonians quarreled, and the The- 
bans with both ; and the great king quarreled 
with Hellas, and the Macedonians with both ; and 
the Romans with the Getae. And still earlier the 
Trojan war happened for these reasons. Alexander 
was the guest of Menelaus ; and if any man had 
seen their friendly disposition, he would not have 
believed any one who said that they were not 
friends. But there was cast between them (as 
between dogs) a bit of meat, a handsome woman, 
and about her war arose. And now when you see 
brothers to be friends, appearing to have one mind, 
do not conclude from this an)^hing about their 
friendship, not even if they swear it and say that it 
is impossible for them to be separated from one 
another. For the ruling principle of a bad man 
cannot be trusted, it is insecure, has no certain rule 
by which it is directed, and is overpowered at 
different times by different appearances. But 
examine, not what other men examine, if they are 
born of the same parents and brought up together, 
and under the same pedagogue ; but examine this 
only, wherein they place their interest, whether in 
externals or in the will. If in externals, do not 
name them friends, no more than name them trust- 
worthy or constant, or brave or free : do not name 
them even men, if you have any judgment. For 
that is not a principle of human nature which, acting 



DISCOURSES. 109 

like an animal, uses the courts as wild beasts the 
mountains, as safe retreats in which to destroy 
their enemies ; nor yet that which makes them 
intemperate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that 
which makes them do whatever else men do against 
one another through this one opinion only, that of 
placing themselves and their interests in the things 
which are not within the power of their will. But 
if you hear that in truth these men think the good 
to be only there, where will is, and where there is a 
right use of appearances, no longer trouble yourself 
whether they are father or son, or brothers, or have 
associated a long time and are companions, but 
when you have ascertained this only, confidently 
declare that they are friends, as you declare that 
they are faithful, that they are just. For where else 
is friendship than where there is fidelity, and 
modesty, where there is a communion of honest 
things and of nothing else .'' 

But you may say, such a one treated me with 
regard so long ; and did he not love me ? How do 
you know, slave, if he did not regard you in the 
same way as he wipes his shoes with a sponge, or 
as he takes care of his beast ? How^ do you know, 
when you have ceased to be useful as a vessel, he 
will not throw you away like a broken platter ? But 
this woman is my wife, and we have lived together 
so long. And how long did Eriphyle live with 
Amphiaraus, and w^as the mother of children and of 
many ? But a necklace ^ came between them : and 

1 The old story about Eriphyle who betrayed her husband 
for a necklace. 



no EPICTETUS. 

what is a necklace ? It is the opinion about such 
things. That was the bestial principle, that was 
the thing which broke asunder the friendship 
between husband and wife, that which did not allow 
the woman to be a wife nor the mother to be a 
mother. And let every man among you who has 
seriously resolved either to be a friend himself or 
to have another for his friend, cut out these 
opinions, hate them, drive them from his soul. And 
thus first of all he will not reproach himself, he will 
not be at variance with himself, he will not change 
his mind, he will not torture himself. In the next 
place, to another also, who is like himself, he will 
be altogether and completely a friend. But he will 
bear with the man who is unlike himself, he will be 
kind to him, gentle, ready to pardon on account of 
his ignorance, on account of his being mistaken in 
things of the greatest importance ; but he will be 
harsh to no man, being well convinced of Plato's 
doctrine that every mind is deprived of truth unwill- 
ingly. If you cannot do this, yet you can do in all 
other respects as friends do, drink together, and 
lodge together, and sail together, and you may be 
born of the same parents ; for snakes also are : but 
neither will they be friends nor you, so long as you 
retain these bestial and cursed opinions. 

ON THE POWER OF SPEAKING. 

Every man will read a book with more pleasure 
or even with more ease, if it is written in fairer 



DISCOURSES. I I I 

characters. Therefore every man will also listen 
more readily to what is spoken, if it is signified by 
appropriate and becoming words. We must not 
say then that there is no faculty of expression : for 
this affirmation is the characteristic of an impious 
and also of a timid man. Of an impious man, 
because he undervalues the gifts which come from 
God, just as if he would take away the commodity 
of the power of vision, or of hearing, or of 
seeing. 

Man, be neither ungrateful for these gifts, nor yet 
forget the things which are superior to them. But 
indeed for the power of seeing and hearing, and 
indeed for life itself, and for the things which con- 
tribute to support it, for the fruits which are dry, 
and for wine and oil, give thanks to God : but 
remember that he has given you something else 
better than all these, I mean the power of using 
them, proving them and estimating the value of 
each. For what is that which gives information 
about each of these powers, what each of them is 
worth ? Is it each faculty itself ? Did you ever 
hear the faculty of vision saying anything about 
itself? or the faculty of hearing? or wheat, or 
barley, or a horse, or a dog ? No ; but they are 
appointed as ministers and slaves to serve the 
faculty which has the power of making use of the 
appearances of things. And if you inquire what is 
the value of each thing, of whom do you inquire ? 
who answers you ? How then can any other faculty 
be more powerful than this, which uses the rest as 



112 EPICTETUS. 

ministers and itself proves each and pronounces 
about them ? for which of them knows what itself 
is, and what is its own value ? which of them knows 
when it ought to employ itself and when not ? what 
faculty is it which opens and closes the eyes, and 
turns them away from objects to which it ought not 
to apply them and does apply them to other objects ? 
Is it the faculty of vision ? No ; but it is the faculty 
of the will. What is that faculty which closes and 
opens the ears ? what is that by which they are 
curious and inquisitive, or on the contrary unmoved 
by what is said ? is it the faculty of hearing ? It is 
no other than the faculty of the will. Will this 
faculty then, seeing that it is amidst all the other 
faculties which are blind and dumb and unable to 
see anything else except the very acts for which 
they are appointed in order to minister to this 
(faculty) and serve it, but this faculty alone sees 
sharp and sees what is the value of each of the 
rest ; will this faculty declare to us that anything 
else is the best, or that itself is ? 

Not indeed because some things are superior, 
must we undervalue the use which other things 
have. There is a certain value in the power of 
speaking, but it is not so great as the power of the 
will. When then I speak thus, let no man think 
that I ask you to neglect the power of speaking, for 
neither do I ask you to neglect the eyes, nor the 
ears, nor the hands, nor the feet, nor clothing, nor 
shoes. But if you ask me what then is the most 
excellent of all things, what must I say ? I cannot 



DISCOURSES. 113 

say the power of speaking, but the power of the 
will, when it is right. For it is this which uses the 
other (the power of speaking), and all the other 
faculties both small and great. For when this 
faculty of the will is set right, a man who is not 
good becomes good : but when it fails, a man be- 
comes bad. It is through this that we are unfortu- 
nate, that we are fortunate, that we blame one 
another, are pleased with one another. In a word, 
it is this which if we neglect it, makes unhappiness, 
and if we carefully look after it, makes happiness. 

But this is the great matter ; to leave to each 
thing the power (faculty) which it has, and leaving 
to it this power to see what is the worth of the 
power, and to learn what is the most excellent of 
all things, and to pursue this always, to be diligent 
about this, considering all other things of secondary 
value compared with this, but yet, as far as we can, 
not neglecting all those other things. For we must 
take care of the eyes also, not as if they were the 
most excellent thing, but we must take care of them 
on account of the most excellent thing, because it 
will not be in its true natural condition, if it does 
not rightly use the other faculties, and prefer some 
things to others. 

What then is usually done ? Men generally act 
as a traveler would do on his way to his own 
country, when he enters a good inn, and being 
pleased with it should remain there. Man, you 
have forgotten your purpose : you were not travel- 
ing to this inn, but you were passing through it. — 



114 EPICTETUS. 

But this is a pleasant inn. — And how many other 
inns are pleasant ? and how many meadows are 
pleasant ? yet only for passing through. But your 
purpose is this, to return to your country, to relieve 
your kinsmen of anxiety, to discharge the duties of 
a citizen, to marry, to beget children, to fill the 
usual magistracies. For you are not come to select 
more pleasant places, but to live in these where you 
were born and of which you were made a citizen. 
Something of the kind takes place in the matter 
which we are considering. Since by the aid of 
speech and such communication as you receive 
here you must advance to perfection, and purge 
your w411 and correct the faculty which makes use 
of the appearances of things ; and since it is neces- 
sary also for the teaching (delivery) of theorems 
to be effected by a certain mode of expression and 
with a certain variety and sharpness, some persons 
captivated by these very things abide in them, one 
captivated by the expression, another by syllogisms, 
another again by sophisms, and still another by 
some other inn of the kind ; and there they stay 
and waste away as if they were among Sirens. 

]\Ian, your purpose (business) was to make your- 
self capable of using conformably to nature the 
appearances presented to you, in your desires not to 
be frustrated, in your aversion from things not to 
fall into that which you would avoid, never to have 
no luck (as one may say), nor ever to have bad 
luck, to be free, not hindered, not compelled, con- 
forming vourself to the administration of Zeus, 



DISCOURSES. I I 5 

obeying it, well satisfied with this, blaming no one, 
charging no one with fault, able from your whole 
soul to utter these verses. 

Lead me, O Zeus, and thou too, Destiny. 

Then having this purpose before you, if some little 
form of expression pleases you, if some theorems 
please you, do you abide among them and choose to 
dwell there, forgetting the things at home, and do 
you say, These things are fine ? Who says that they 
are not fine ? but only as being a way home, as inns 
are. For what hinders you from being an unfortu- 
nate man, even if you speak like Demosthenes.'' 
and what prevents you, if you can resolve syllo- 
gisms like Chrysippus,^ from being wretched, from 
sorrowing, from envying, in a word, from being dis- 
turbed, from being unhappy? Nothing. You see 
then that these were inns, worth nothing ; and that 
the purpose before you was something else. When 
I speak thus to some persons, they think that I 
am rejecting care about speaking or care about 
theorems. But I am not rejecting this care, but I 
am rejecting the abiding about these things inces- 
santly and putting our hopes in them. If a man 
by this teaching does harm to those who listen to 
him, reckon me too among those who do this harm : 

1 Chrysippus wrote a book on the resolution of Syllogisms. 
Diogenes Laertius (vii.) says of Chrysippus that he was so 
famous among Dialecticians that most persons thought, if 
there was Dialectic among the gods, it would not be any 
other than that of Chrysippus, 



Il6 EPICTETUS. 

for I am not able, when I see one thing which is 
most excellent and supreme, to say that another is 
so, in order to please you. 

TO (or against) a person who was one of those 
WHO were not valued (esteemed) by him. 

A certain person said to him (Epictetus) : Fre- 
quently I desired to hear you and came to you, and 
you never gave me any answer : and now, if it is 
possible, I entreat you to say something to me. Do 
you think, said Epictetus, that as there is an art in 
anything else, so there is also an art in speaking, 
and that he who has the art will speak skillfully, 
and he who has not will speak unskillfully ? — I do 
think so. — He then who by speaking receives 
benefit himself, and is able to benefit others, will 
speak skillfully : but he w^ho is rather damaged by 
speaking and does damage to others, will he be un- 
skilled in this art of speaking ? And you may find 
that some are damaged and others benefited by 
speaking. And are all who hear benefited by what 
they hear ? Or will you find that among them also 
some are benefited and some damaged .'' — There 
are both among these also, he said. — In this case 
also then those w^ho hear skillfully are benefited, 
and those w^ho hear unskillfully are damaged .'' He 
admitted this. Is there then a skill in hearing also, 
as there is in speaking } — It seems so. — If you 
choose, consider the matter in this way also. The 
practice of music, to whom does it belong ? To a 



DISCOURSES. 117 

musician. And the proper making of a statue, to 
whom do you think that it belongs ? To a statuary. 
And the looking at a statue skillfully, does this ap- 
pear to you to require the aid of no art ? — This also 
requires the aid of art. — Then if speaking properly 
is the business of the skillful man, do you see that 
to hear also with benefit is the business of the 
skillful man ? 

Show me then what I shall accomplish by dis- 
coursing with you : excite my inclination to do this. 
As the grass which is suitable, when it is presented 
to a sheep, moves its inclination to eat, but if you 
present to it a stone or bread, it will not be moved 
to eat ; so there are in us certain natural incli- 
nations also to speak, when the hearer shall appear 
to be somebody, when he himself shall excite us : 
but when he shall sit by us like a stone or like 
grass, how can he excite a man's desire (to speak) .? 
Does the vine say to the husbandman, Take care of 
me ? No, but the vine by showing in itself that it 
will be profitable to the husbandman, if he does 
take care of it, invites him to exercise care. When 
children are attractive and lively, whom do they 
not invite to play with them, and crawl with them, 
and lisp with them ? But who is eager to play with 
an ass or to bray with it ? for though it is small, it 
is still a little ass. 

Why then do you say nothing to me ? I can only 
say this to you, that he who knows not who he is, 
and for what purpose he exists, and what is this 
world, and with whom he is associated, and what 



Il8 EPICTETUS. 

things are the good and the bad, and the beautiful 
and the ugly, and who neither understands dis- 
course nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what 
is false, and who is not able to distinguish them, 
will neither desire according to nature, nor turn 
away, nor move towards, nor intend (to act), nor 
assent, nor dissent, nor suspend his judgment : to 
say all in a few words, he will go about dumb and 
blind, thinking that he is somebody, but being no- 
body. Is this so now for the first time ? Is it not 
the fact that ever since the human race existed, all 
errors and misfortunes have arisen through this 
ignorance? Why did Agamemnon and Achilles 
quarrel with one another ? Was it not through not 
knowing what things are profitable and not profit- 
able ? Does not the one say it is profitable to 
restore Chryseis to her father, and does not the 
other say that it is not profitable ? does not the 
one say that he ought to take the prize of another, 
and does not the other say that he ought not? Did 
they not for these reasons forget, both who they 
were and for what purpose they had come there? 
Oh, man, for what purpose did you come ? to gain 
mistresses or to fight ? To fight. With whom ? the 
Trojans or the Hellenes? With the Trojans. Do 
you then leave Hector alone and draw your sword 
against your own king ? And do you, most excel- 
lent Sir, neglect the duties of the king, you who are 
the people's guardian and have such cares ; and are 
you quarreling about a little girl with the most war- 
like of your allies, whom you ought by every means 



DISCOURSES. 119 

to take care of and protect ? and do you become 
worse than (inferior to) a well behaved priest who 
treats you these fine gladiators with all respect? 
Do you see what kind of things ignorance of what 
is profitable does ? 

But I also am rich. Are you then richer than 
Agamemnon ? But I am also handsome. Are you 
then more handsome than Achilles ? But I haye 
also beautiful hair. But had not Achilles more 
beautiful hair and gold-colored ? and he did not 
comb it elegantly nor dress it. But I am also 
strong. Can you then lift so great a stone as 
Hector or Ajax? But I am also of noble birth. 
Are you the son of a goddess mother ? are you the 
son of a father sprung from Zeus ? What good then 
do these things do to him, when he sits and weeps 
for a girl } But I am an orator. And was he not ? 
Do you not see how he handled the most skillful of 
the Hellenes in oratory, Odysseus and Phoenix? 
how he stopped their mouths ? -^ 

This is all that I have to say to you ; and I say 
even this not willingly. Why? Because you have 
not roused me. For what must I look to in order 
to be roused, as men who are expert in riding are 
roused by generous horses ? Must I look to your 
body ? You treat it disgracefully. To your dress ? 
That is luxurious. To your behavior, to your look ? 
That is the same as nothing. When you would 

1 In the ninth book of the Ihad, where Achilles answers the 
messengers sent to him by Agamemnon. The reply of 
Achilles is a wonderful example of eloquence. 



I20 EPICTETUS. 

listen to a philosopher, do not say to him, You tell 
me nothing ; but only show yourself worthy of hear- 
ing or fit for hearing ; and you will see how you 
will move the speaker. 

WHAT IS THE PROPERTY OF ERROR. • 

Every error comprehends contradiction : for since 
he who errs does not wish to err, but to be right, it 
is plain that he does not do what he wishes. For 
what does the thief wish to do ? That which is for 
his own interest. If then the theft is not for his 
interest, he does not do that which he wishes. But 
every rational soul is by nature offended at contra- 
diction, and so long as it does not understand this 
contradiction, it is not hindered from doing contra- 
dictory things : but when it does understand the 
contradiction, it must of necessity avoid the contra- 
diction and avoid it as much as a man must dissent 
from the false when he sees that a thing is false ; 
but so long as this falsehood does not appear to 
him, he assents to it as to truth. 

He then is strong in argument and has the faculty 
of exhorting and confuting, who is able to show to 
each man the contradiction through which he errs 
and clearly to prove how he does not do that which 
he wishes and does that which he does not wish. 
For if an}- one shall show this, a man will himself 
withdraw from that which he does ; but so long as 
you do not show this, do not be surprised if a man 
persists in his practice ; for having the appearance 



DISCOURSES. 121 

of doing right, he does what he does. For this 
reason Socrates also trusting to this power used to 
say, I am used to call no other witness of what I 
say, but I am always satisfied with him with whom 
I am discussing, and I ask him to give his opinion 
and call him as a witness, and though he is only 
one, he is sufficient in the place of all. For Socrates 
knew by what the rational soul is moved, just like 
a pair of scales, and then it must incline, whether 
it chooses or not. Show the rational governing 
faculty a contradiction, and it will withdraw from 
it ; but if you do not show it, rather blame yourself 
than him who is not persuaded. 

OF FINERY IN DRESS. 

A certain young man, a rhetorician, came to see 
Epictetus, with his hair dressed more carefully than 
was usual and his attire in an ornamental style ; 
whereupon Epictetus said, Tell me if you do not 
think that some dogs are beautiful and some horses, 
and so of all other animals. I do think so, the 
youth replied. Are not then some men also beau- 
tiful and others ugly? Certainly. Do we then for 
the same reason call each of them in the same kind 
beautiful, or each beautiful for something peculiar? 
And you will judge of this matter thus. Since we 
see a dog naturally formed for one thing, and a 
horse for another, and for another still, as an 
example, a nightingale, we may generally, and not 
improperly, declare each of them to be beautiful. 



122 EPICTETUS. 

then, when it is most excellent according to its 
nature ; but since the nature of each is different, 
each of them seems to me to be beautiful in a 
different way. Is it not so ? He admitted that it 
was. That then which makes a dog beautiful, 
makes a horse ugly ; and that which makes a horse 
beautiful, makes a dog ugly, if it is true that their 
natures are different. It seems to be so. For I 
think that what makes a Pancratiast beautiful, 
makes a wrestler to be not good, and a runner to 
be most ridiculous ; and he who is beautiful for the 
Pentathlon, is very ugly for wrestling.^ It is so, 
said he. What then makes a man beautiful ? Is 
it that which in its kind makes both a dog and a 
horse beautiful ? It is, he said. What then makes 
a dog beautiful ? The possession of the excellence 
of a dog. And what makes a horse beautiful ? 
The possession of the excellence of a horse. What 
then makes a man beautiful } Is it not the posses- 
sion of the excellence of a man? And do you 
then if you wish to be beautiful, young man, labor 
at this, the acquisition of human excellence. But 
what is this ? Observe whom you yourself praise, 
when you praise many persons without partiality : 
do you praise the just or the unjust.-* The just. 
Whether do you praise the moderate or the immod- 
erate ? The moderate. And the temperate or the 

1 A Pancratiast is a man who is trained for the Pancratium, 
that is, both for boxing and wrestling. The Pentathlon com- 
prised five exercises, which are expressed by one Greek line, 
Leaping, running, the quoit, throwing the javelin, wrestling. 



DISCOURSES. 123 

intemperate ? The temperate. If then you make 
yourself such a person, you will know that you will 
make yourself beautiful : but so long as you neglect 
these things, you must be ugly, even though you 
contrive all you can to appear beautiful. 

Further I do not know what to say to you: for if 
I say to you what I think, I shall offend you, and 
you will perhaps leave the school and not return to 
it : and if I do not say what I think, see how I 
shall be acting, if you come to me to be improved, 
and I shall not improve you at all, and if you come 
to me as to a philosopher, and I shall say nothing 
to you as a philosopher. And how cruel it is to 
you to leave you uncorrected. If at any time after- 
wards you shall acquire sense, you will with good 
reason blame me and say. What did Epictetus ob- 
serve in me that when he saw me in such a plight, 
coming to him in such a scandalous condition, he 
neglected me and never said a word ? did he so 
much despair of me ? was I not young ? was I not 
able to listen to reason ? and how many other young 
men at this age commit many like errors ? I hear 
that a certain Polemon from being a most dissolute 
youth underwent such a great change. Well, sup- 
pose that he did not think that I should be a 
Polemon ; ^ yet he might have set my hair right, he 

1 He was a dissolute youth. As he was passing one day 
the place where Xenocrates was lecturing, he and his drunken 
companions burst into the school, but Polemon was so 
affected by the words of the excellent teacher that he came 
out quite a different man, and ultimately succeeded Xenoc- 
rates in the school of the Academy. 



124 EPICTETUS. 

might have stripped off my decorations, he might 
have stopped me from plucking the hair out of my 
body. 

Did Socrates persuade all his hearers to take care 
of themselves? Not the thousandth part. But, 
however, after he had been placed in this position 
by the deity, as he himself says, he never left it. 
But what does he say even to his judges ? " If you 
acquit me on these conditions that I no longer do 
that which I do now, I will not consent and I will 
not desist ; but I will go up both to young and to 
old, and, to speak plainly, to every man whom I 
meet, and I will ask the questions which I ask now ; 
and most particularly will I do this to you, my 
fellow-citizens, because you are more nearly related 
to me." — Are you so curious, Socrates, and such a 
busy-body? and how does it concern you how we 
act ? and what is it that you say ? Being of the 
same community and of the same kin, you neglect 
yourself, and show yourself a bad citizen to the 
state, and a bad kinsman to your kinsmen, and a 
bad neighbor to your neighbors. Who then are 
you ? — Here it is a great thing to say, " I am he 
whose duty it is to take care of men ; for it is not 
every little heifer which dares to resist a lion ; but 
if the bull comes up and resists him, say to the bull, 
if you choose, ' and who are you, and what business 
have you here ? ' " Man, in every kind there is 
produced something which excels ; in oxen, in 
dogs, in bees, in horses. Do not then say to that 
which excels, Who then are you ? If you do, it 



DISCOURSES. 125 

will find a voice in some way and say, I am such a 
thing as the purple in a garment : do not expect me 
to be like the others, or blame my nature that it has 
made me different from the rest of men. 

What then ? am I such a man ? Certainly not. 
And are you such a man as can listen to the truth ? 
I wish you were. But, however, since in a manner 
I have been condemned to wear a white beard and 
a cloak, and you come to me as to a philosopher, I 
will not treat you in a cruel way, nor yet as if I 
despaired of you, but I will say. Young man, whom 
do you wish to make beautiful ? In the first place, 
know who you are and then adorn yourself appro- 
priately. You are a human being ; and this is a 
mortal animal which has the power of using appear- 
ances rationally. What then do you possess which 
is peculiar ? Is it the animal part ? No. Is it the 
condition of mortality? No. Is it the power of 
using appearances ? No. You possess the rational 
faculty as a peculiar thing : adorn and beautify 
this ; but leave your hair to him who made it as he 
chose. 

Come then let us obey God, that we may not be 
subject to his anger. You say, No. But (I say), 
if a crow by his croaking signifies anything to you, 
it is not the crow which signifies, but God through 
the crow ; and if he signifies anything through a 
human voice, will he not cause the man to say this 
to you, that you may know the power of the 
divinity, that he signifies to some in this way, and 
to others in that way, and concerning the greatest 



126 EPICTETUS. 

things and the chief he signifies through the noblest 
messenger ? 

And now the gods say this to you and send the 
messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you not to 
pervert that which is well arranged, nor to busy 
yourself about it, but to allow a man to be a man, 
and a woman to be a woman, a beautiful man to be 
as a beautiful man, and an ugly man as an ugly 
man, for you are not flesh and hair, but you are 
will ; and if your will is beautiful, then you will be 
beautiful. But up to the present time I dare not 
tell you that you are ugly, for I think that you ara 
readier to hear anything than this. But see what 
Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming 
of men, Alcibiades : Try then to be beautiful. What 
does he say to him ? Dress your hair and pluck 
the hairs from your legs? Nothing of that kind. 
But adorn your will, take away bad opinions. How 
with the body.f* Leave it as it is by nature. 
Another has looked after these things : intrust them 
to him. What then, must a man be uncleaned ? 
Certainly not ; but what you are and are made by 
nature, cleanse this. A man should be cleanly as 
a man, a woman as a woman, a child as a child. 
You say no : but let us also pluck out the lion's 
mane, that he may not be uncleaned, and the cock's 
comb, for he also ought to be cleaned. Granted, 
but as a cock, and the lion as a lion, and the 
hunting dog as a hunting dog. 



DISCOURSES. . 127 



IN WHAT A MAN OUGHT TO BE EXERCISED WHO HAS 

MADE PROFICIENCY ; AND THAT WE NEGLECT 

THE CHIEF THINGS. 

There are three things in which a man ought to 
exercise himself who would be wise and good. The 
first concerns the desires and the aversions, that a 
man may not fail to get what he desires, and that 
he may not fall into that which he does not desire.^ 
The second concerns the movements (towards an 
object) and the movements from an object, and 
generally in doing what a man ought to do, that he 
may act according to order, to reason, and not 
carelessly. The third thing concerns freedom from 
deception and rashness in judgment, and generally 
it concerns the assents. Of these topics the chief 
and the most urgent is that which relates to the 
affects (perturbations); for an affect is produced in 
no other way than by failing to obtain that which a 
man desires or falling into that which a man would 
wish to avoid. This is that which brings in per- 
turbations, disorders, bad fortune, misfortunes, 
sorrows, lamentations, and envy ; that which makes 
men envious and jealous ; and by these causes we 
are unable even to listen to the precepts of reason. 
The second topic concerns the duties of a man ; 

1 Antoninus, xi. 37, * as to sensual desire he should altogether 
keep away from it ; and as to avoidance [aversion] he should 
not show it with respect to any of the things which are not in 
our power.' 



128 EPICTETUS. 

for I ought not to be free from affects like a statue, 
but I ought to maintain the relations natural and 
acquired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as 
a citizen. 

Are you free from deception in the matter of 
money ? If you see a beautiful girl, do you resist 
the appearance ? If your neighbor obtains an 
estate by will, are you not vexed ? Now is there 
nothing else wanting to you except unchange- 
able firmness of mind. Wretch, you hear these 
very things with fear and anxiety that some person 
may despise you, and with inquiries about what any 
person may say about you. And if a man come 
and tell you that in a certain conversation in which 
the question was, Who is the best philosopher, a 
man who was present said that a certain person was 
the chief philosopher, your little soul which was 
only a finger's length stretches out to two cubits. 
But if another who is present says. You are mis- 
taken ; it is not worth while to listen to a certain 
person, for what does he know ? he has only the 
first principles, and no more? then you are con- 
founded, you grow pale, you cry out immediately, I 
will show him who I am, that I am a great philoso- 
pher. — It is seen by these very things : why do you 
wish to show it by others ? 

Let us look at your principles also. For is it not 
plain that you value not at all your own will, but 
you look externally to things which are independent 
of your will ? For instance, what will a certain 
person say? and what will people think of you? 



DISCOURSES. 129 

will you be considered a man of learning ; have you 
read Chrysippus or Antipater ? for if you have read 
Archedemus also, you have everything [that you 
can desire]. Why are you still uneasy lest you 
should not show us who you are ? Would you let 
me tell you what manner of man you have shown 
us that you are ? You have exhibited yourself to 
us as a mean fellow, querulous, passionate, cowardly, 
finding fault with everybody, blaming everybody, 
never quiet, vain : this is what you have exhibited 
to us. 

WHAT IS THE MATTER ON .WHICH A GOOD MAN 

SHOULD BE EMPLOYED, AND IN WHAT WE 

OUGHT CHIEFLY TO PRACTICE OURSELVES. 

The material for the wise and good man is his 
own ruling faculty : and the body is the material for 
the physician and the aliptes (the man who oils 
persons); the land is the matter for the husband- 
man. The business of the wise and good man is 
to use appearances conformably to nature : and as 
it is the nature of every soul to assent to the truth, 
to dissent from the false, and to remain in suspense 
as to that which is uncertain ; so it is its nature to 
be moved towards the desire of the good, and to 
aversion from the evil ; and with respect to that 
which is neither good nor bad it feels indifferent. 
For as the money-changer (banker) is not allowed 
to reject Caesar's coin, nor the seller of herbs, but 
if you show the coin, whether he chooses or not, he 
must give up what is sold for the coin ; so it is also 



130 EPICTETUS. 

in the matter of the soul. When the good appears, 
it immediately attracts to itself; the evil repels 
from itself. But the soul will never reject the 
manifest appearance of the good, any more than 
persons will reject Caesar's coin. 

For this reason the good is preferred to every 
intimate relationship (obligation). There is no 
intimate relationship between me and my father, 
but there is between me and the good. Are you so 
hard-hearted ? Yes, for such is my nature ; and 
this is the coin which God has given me. For this 
reason if the good is something different from 
the beautiful and the just, both father is gone 
(neglected), and brother and country, and every- 
thing. But shall I overlook my own good, in order 
that you may have it, and shall I give it up to you ? 
Why.? I am your father. But you are not my 
good. I am your brother. But you are not my 
good. But if we place the good in a right deter- 
mination of the will, the very observance of the 
relations of life is good, and accordingly he who 
gives up any external things, obtains that which is 
good. Your father takes away your property. But 
he does not injure you. Your brother will have the 
greater part of the estate in land. Let him have as 
much as he chooses. Will he then have a greater 
share of modesty, of fidelity, of brotherly affection ? 
For who will eject you from this possession ? Not 
even Zeus, for neither has he chosen to do so ; but 
he has made this in my own power, and he has 
given it to me just as he possessed it himself, 



DISCOURSES. 131 

free from hindrance, compulsion, and impediment. 
When then the coin which another uses is a 
different coin, if a man presents this coin, he 
receives that which is sold for it. Suppose that 
there comes into the province a thievish proconsul, 
what coin does he use ? Silver coin. Show it to 
him, and carry off what you please. Suppose one 
comes who is an adulterer : what coin does he use ? 
Little girls. Take, a man says, the coin, and sell 
me the small thing. Give, says the seller, and buy 
[what you want]. Another is eager to possess 
boys. Give him the coin, and receive what you 
wish. Another is fond of hunting : give him a fine 
nag or a dog. Though he groans and laments, he 
will sell for it that which you want. For another 
compels him from within, he who has fixed 
(determined) this coin. 

Against (or with respect to) this kind of thing 
chiefly a man should exercise himself. As soon as 
you go out in the morning, examine every man whom 
you see, every man whom you hear ; answer as to a 
question, What have you seen ? A handsome man 
or woman ? Apply the rule. Is this independent 
of the will, or dependent ? Independent. Take it 
away. What have you seen ? A man lamenting 
over the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death 
is a thing independent of the will. Take it away. 
Has the proconsul met you } Apply the rule. 
What kind of thing is a proconsul's office ? 
Independent of the will, or dependent on it? 
Independent. Take this away also : it does 



132 EPICTETUS. 

not stand examination: cast it away: it is nothing 
to you. ' 

If we practiced this and exercised ourselves in it 
daily from morning to night, something indeed 
would be done. 'But now we are forthwith caught 
half asleep by every appearance, and it is only, if 
ever, that in the school we are roused a little. 
Then when we go out, if we see a man lamenting, 
we say, He is undone. If we see a consul, we say. 
He is happy. If we see an exiled man, we say. He 
is miserable. If we see a poor man, we say. He is 
wretched : he has nothing to eat. 

We ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, 
and to this end we should direct all our efforts. 
For what is weeping and lamenting? Opinion. 
What is bad fortune } Opinion. What is civil 
sedition, what is divided opinion, what is blame, 
what is accusation, what is impiety, what is trifling ? 
All these things are opinions, and nothing more, 
and opinions about things independent of the will, 
as if they were good and bad. Let a man transfer 
these opinions to things dependent on the will, and 
I engage for him that he will be firm and constant, 
whatever may be the state of things around him. 
Such as is a dish of water, such is the soul. Such 
as is the ray of light v/hich falls on the water, such 
are the appearances. When the water is moved, 
the ray also seems to be moved, yet it is not moved. 
And when then a man is seized with giddiness, it is 
not the arts and the virtues which are confounded, 
but the spirit (the nervous power) on which they 



DISCOURSES. 133 

are impressed ; but if the spirit be restored to its 
settled state, those things also are restored. 



AGAINST A PERSON WHO SHOWED HIS PARTISAN- 
SHIP IN AN UNSEEMLY WAY IN A THEATER. 

The governor of Epirus having shown his favor 
to an actor in an unseemly way and being pub- 
licly blamed on this account, and afterwards having 
reported to Epictetus that he was blamed and that 
he was vexed at those who blamed him, Epictetus 
said, What harm have they been doing? These 
men also were acting as partisans, as you were 
doing. The governor replied, Does then any per- 
son show his partisanship in this way? When they 
see you, said Epictetus, who are their governor, a 
friend of Caesar and his deputy, showing partisan- 
ship in this way, was it not to be expected that they 
also should show their partisanship in the same 
way? for if it is not right to show partisanship in 
this way, do not do so yourself ; and if it is right, 
why are you angry if they followed your example ? 
For whom have the many to imitate except you, 
who are their superiors ? to whose example should 
they look when they go to the theater except yours ? 
Whom then do I wish to gain the prize ? Why the 
actor who does gain the prize ; and so he will always 
gain the prize whom I wish to gain it. — But I wish 
Sophron to be crowned. — Celebrate as many games 
as you choose in your own house, Nemean, Pythian, 
Isthmian, Olympian, and proclaim him victor. But 



134 EPICTETUS. 

in public do not claim more than your due, nor 
attempt to appropriate to yourself what belongs 
to all. If you do not consent to this, bear being 
abused : for when you do the same as the many, 
you put yourself on the same level with them. 

AGAINST THOSE WHO ON ACCOUNT OF SICKNESS GO 
AWAY HOME. 

I am sick here, said one of the pupils, and I wish 
to return home. — At home, I suppose, you were 
free from sickness. Do you not consider whether 
you are doing anything here which may be useful 
to the exercise of your will, that it may be corrected? 
Do you not know that both disease and death must 
surprise us while we are doing something ? the hus- 
bandman while he is tilling the ground, the sailor 
while he is on his voyage? what would you be 
doing when death surprises you, for you must be 
surprised when you are doing something ? If you 
can be doing anything better than thi§ when you 
are surprised, do it. For I wish to be surprised by 
disease or death when I am looking after nothing 
else than my own will, that I may be free from 
perturbation, that I may be free from hindrance, 
free from compulsion, and in a state of liberty. I 
wish to be found practicing these things that I may 
be able to say to 'God, Have I in any respect 
transgressed thy commands? have I in any respect 
wrongly used the powers which thou gavest me? 
have I misused my perceptions or my preconcep- 



DISCOURSES. 135 

tions ? have I ever blamed thee ? have I ever found 
fault with thy administration ? I have been sick, 
because it was thy will, and so have others, but I 
was content to be sick. I have been poor because 
it was thy will, but I was content also. I have not 
filled a magisterial office, because it was not thy 
pleasure that I should : I have never desired it. 
Hast thou ever seen me for this reason discon- 
tented? have I not ahvays approached thee with a 
cheerful countenance, ready to do thy commands 
and to obey thy signals ? Is it now thy will that 
I should depart from the assemblage of men .'' I 
depart. I give thee all thanks that thou hast 
allowed me to join in this thy assemblage of men 
and to see thy works, and to comprehend this thy 
administration. May death surprise me while I 
am thus writing and reading. 

But my mother will not hold my head when I am 
sick. Go to your mother then; for you are a fit 
person to have your head held when you are sick. 
— But at home I used to lie down on a delicious 
bed. — Go away to your bed: indeed you are fit to 
lie on such a bed even when you are in health : do 
not then lose what you can do there (at home). 

But what does Socrates say ? ^ As one man, he 
says, is pleased with improving his land, another 

1 Antoninus (viii. 43) says, ' Different things delight different 
people. But it is my delight to keep the ruling faculty sound 
without turning away either from any man or from any of the 
things which happen to men, but looking at and receiving all 
with welcome eyes, and using everything according to its 
value.' 



136 EPICTETUS. 

with improving his horse, so I am daily pleased 
in observing that I am growing better. Better in 
what ? in using nice little words ? Man, do not 
say that. In little matters of speculation ? what 
are you saying ? — And indeed I do not see what 
else there is on which philosophers employ their 
time. — Does it seem nothing to you to have never 
found fault with any person, neither with God nor 
man ? to have blamed nobody ? to carry the same 
face always in going out and coming in ? This is 
what Socrates knew, and yet he never said that he 
knew anything or taught anything.-^ 



MISCELLANEOUS. 

It is not easy to exhort weak young men ; for 
neither is it easy to hold (soft) cheese with a hook. 
But those who have a good natural disposition, 
even if you try to turn them aside, cling still more 
to reason. Wherefore Rufus generally attempted 
to discourage (his pupils), and he used this method 
as a test of those who had a good natural dispo- 
sition and those who had not. For it was his habit 
to say, as a stone, if you cast it upwards, will be 
brought down to the earth by its own nature, so 
the man whose mind is naturally good, the more 
you repel him, the more he turns towards that to 
which he is naturally inclined. 

1 Socrates never professed to teach virtue, but by showing 
himself to be a virtuous man he expected to make his com- 
panions virtuous by imitating his example. 



DISCOURSES. 137 

But I am rich and I want nothing. — Why then 
do you pretend to be a philosopher ? Your golden 
and your silver vessels are enough for you. What 
need have you of principles (opinions) ? But I am 
also a judge of the Greeks. — Do you know how to 
judge ? Who taught you to know ? Caesar wrote 
to me a codicil.^ Let him write and give you a 
commission to judge of music ; and what will be 
the use of it to you ? I can throw into prison any 
man whom I please. — So you can do with a stone. 
— But I can beat with sticks whom I please. — So 
you may an ass. This is not a governing of men. 
Govern us as rational animals : show us what is 
unprofitable, and we will turn away from it. Make 
us imitators of yourself, as Socrates made men 
imitators of himself. For he was like a governor 
of men, who made them subject to him their desires, 
their aversion, their movements towards an object 
and their turning away from it. — Do this : do not 
do this : if you do not obey, I will throw you into 
prison. — This is not governing men like rational 
animals. But I (say) : as Zeus has ordained, so 
act : if you do not act so, you will feel the penalty, 
you will be punished. — What will be the punish- 
ment? Nothing else than not having done your 
duty : you will lose the character of fidelity, mod- 
esty, propriety. Do not look for greater penalties 
than these. 

1 Codicil, a small writing added to a ^^11 or testament. 



138 • EPICTETUS. 



TO A CERTAIN RHETORICIAN WHO WAS GOING UP 
TO ROME ON A SUIT. 

When a certain person came to him, who was 
going up to Rome on account of a suit which had 
regard to his rank, Epictetus inquired the reason of 
his going to Rome, and the man then asked what 
he thought about the matter. Epictetus replied, If 
you ask me what you will do in Rome, whether you 
will succeed or fail, I have no rule about this. But 
if you ask me how you will fare, I can tell you : if 
you have right opinions you will fare well ; if they 
are false, you will fare ill. For to every man the 
cause of his acting is opinion. What is the reason 
that you are going up to Rome ? Your opinion. 
And going in winter, and with danger and expense. 
— I must go. — What tells you this ? Your opinion. 
Then if opinions are the causes of all actions, and 
a man has bad opinions, such as the cause may be, 
such also is the effect. Have we then all sound 
opinions, both you and your adversary ? And how 
do you differ ? But have you sounder opinions than 
your adversary ? Why ? You think so. And so 
does he think that his opinions are better ; and so 
do madmen. This is a bad criterion. But show to 
me that you have made some inquiry into your opin- 
ions and have taken some pains about them. Let 
us examine one another : if I have any bad opinion, 
take it away : if you have any, show it. This is 
the meaning of meeting with a philosopher. — Not 



DISCOURSES. 139 

SO (you say) : but this is only a passing visit, and 
while we are hiring the vessel, we can also see Epic- 
tetus. Let us see what he says. Then you go 
away and say : Epictetus was nothing ; he used 
solecisms and spoke in a barbarous way. For of 
what else do you come as judges ? — Well, but a 
man may say to me, if I attend to such matters (as 
you do), I shall have no land, as you have none ; I 
shall have no silver cups as you have none, nor fine 
beasts as you have none. — In answer to this it is 
perhaps sufficient to say : I have no need of such 
things : but if you possess many things, you have 
need of others : whether you choose or not, you are 
poorer than I am. What then have I need of? Of 
that which you have not : of firmness, of a mind 
which is conformable to nature, of being free from 
perturbation. Whether I have a portion or not, 
what is that to me ? but it is something to you. I 
am richer than you : I am not anxious what Caesar 
will think of me : for this reason, I flatter no man. 
This is what I possess instead of vessels of silver 
and gold. You have utensils of gold ; but your 
discourse, your opinions, your assents, your move- 
ments (pursuits), your desires are of earthen ware. 
But when I have these things conformable to nature, 
why should I not employ my studies also upon 
reason ? for I have leisure : my mind is not dis- 
tracted. What shall I do, since I Have no distrac- 
tion ? What more suitable to a man have I than 
this ? When you have nothing to do, you are dis- 
turbed, you go to the theater or you wander about 



140 EPICTETUS. 

without a purpose. Why should not the philosopher 
labor to improve his reason ? You employ yourself 
about crystal vessels : I employ myself about the 
syllogism. To you everything appears small that 
you possess : to me all that I have appears great. 
Your desire is insatiable : mine is satisfied. To 
(children) who put their hand into a narrow-necked 
earthen vessel and bring out figs and nuts, this 
happens ; if they fill the hand, they cannot take it 
out, and then they cry. Drop a few of them and 
you will draw things out. And do you part with 
your desires : do not desire many things and you 
will have what you want. 



IN WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO BEAR SICKNESS. 

When the need of each opinion comes, we ought 
to have it in readiness : ^ on the occasion of break- 
fast, such opinions as relate to breakfast ; in the 
bath, those that concern the bath ; in bed, those 
that concern bed. 

1 M. Antoninus, iii. 13. 'As physicians have always their 
instruments and knives ready for cases which suddenly require 
their skill, so do thou have principles ready for the under- 
standing of things divine and human, and for doing every- 
thing, even the smallest, with a recollection of the bond which 
unites the divine and human to one another. For neither 
wilt thou do anything well which pertains to man without at 
the same time having a reference to things divine; nor the 
contrary.' 



DISCOURSES. 141 

Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes 
Before each daily action thou has scann'd ; 
What's done amiss, what done, what left undone ; 
From first to last examine all, and then 
Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice. ^ 

And we ought to retain these verses in such way 
that we may use them, not that we may utter them 
aloud. Again in fever we should have ready such 
opinions as concern a fever. Now is the time for 
the fever. Let it be borne well. Now is the time 
for thirst, bear it well ; now is the time for hunger, 
bear it well. Is it not in your power ? who shall 
hinder you ? The physician will hinder you from 
drinking ; but he cannot prevent you from bearing 
thirst well : and he will hinder you from eating ; 
but he cannot prevent you from bearing hunger 
well. 

For this also is a part of life, like walking, like 
sailing, like journeying by land, so also is fever. Do 
you read when you are walking .? No. Nor do you 
when you have a fever. But if you walk about 
v/ell, you have all that belongs to a man who walks. 
If you bear a fever well, you have all that belongs 
to a man in a fever. What is it to bear a fever 
well ? Not to blame God or man ; not to be 
afflicted at that which happens, to expect death well 
and nobly, to do what must be done : when the 
physician comes in, not to be frightened at what he 
says ; nor if he says, 'you are doing well,' to be 

1 These verses are from the Golden verses attributed to 
Pythagoras. See iv. 6. 32. 



142 EPICTETUS. 

overjoyed. For what is it to be ill ? is it that you 
are near the severance of the soul and the body ? 
what harm is there in this ? If you are not near 
now, will 3^ou not afterwards be near ? Is the world 
going to be turned upside down when you are dead? 
Why then do you flatter the physician ? For we 
ought to have these two principles in readiness, that 
except the will nothing is good nor bad ; and that 
we ought not to lead events, but to follow them. — 
My brother ought not to have behaved thus to me. 
— No ; but we will see to that ; and, however he 
may behave, I will conduct m^^self towards him 
as I ought. For this is my own business : that 
belongs to another ; no man can prevent this, the 
other thins: can be hindered. 



WHAT SOLITUDE IS, AND WHAT KIND OF PERSON 
A SOLITARY MAN IS. 

Solitude is a certain condition of a helpless man. 
For because a man is alone, he is not for that 
reason also solitary ; just as though a man is among 
numbers he is not therefore not solitary. When 
then we have lost either a brother, or a son or a 
friend on whom w'e were accustomed to repose, we 
say that we are left solitary, though we are often in 
Rome, though such a crowd meet us, though so 
many live in the same place. It is not the sight of 
a human creature which removes us from solitude, 
but the sight of one who is faithful and modest and 
helpful to us. A man ought to be prepared in a 



DISCOURSES.. 143 

manner for this also (being alone), to be able to be 
sufficient for himself and to be his own companion. 
For as Zeus dwells with himself, and is tranquil by 
himself, and thinks of his own administration and 
of its nature, and is employed in thoughts suitable 
to himself ; so ought we also to be able to talk with 
ourselves, not to feel the want of others also, not to 
be unprovided with the means of passing our time ; 
to observe the divine administration, and the rela- 
tion of ourselves to everything else ; to consider 
how we formerly were affected towards things that 
happen and how at present ; what are still the 
things which give us pain ; how these also can be 
cured and how removed ; if any things require 
improvement, to improve them according to reason. 

The doctrine of philosophers promises to give us 
security (peace). And what does it say? Men, if 
you will attend to me, wherever you are, whatever 
you are doing, you will not feel sorrow, nor anger, 
nor compulsion, nor hindrance, but you will pass 
your time without perturbations and free from every- 
thing. When a man has this peace, not proclaimed 
by Caesar (for how should he be able to proclaim 
it ?), but by God through reason, is he not content 
when he is alone? when he sees and reflects, Now 
no evil can happen to me ; for me there is no 
robber, no earthquake, everything is full of peace, 
full of tranquillity : every way, every city, every 
meeting, neighbor, companion, is harmless. 

What kind of solitude then remains ? what want? 
why do we make ourselves worse than children ? 



144 EPICTETUS. 

and what do children do when they are left alone ? 
They take up shells and ashes, and they build 
something, then pull it down, and build something 
else, and so they never want the means of passing 
the time. Shall I then, if you sail away, sit down 
and weep, because I have been left alone and soli- 
tary ? Shall I then have no shells, no ashes ? But 
children do what they do through want of thought 
(or deficiency in knowledge), and we through knowl- 
edge are unhappy. 

CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS. 

As bad tragic actors cannot sing alone, but in 
company with many : so some persons cannot walk 
about alone. Man, if you are anything, both walk 
alone and talk to yourself, and do not hide yourself 
in the chorus. 

When a man drinks water, or does amthing for 
the sake of practice (discipline), whenever there is 
an opportunity he tells it to all: 'I drink water.' 
Is it for this that you drink water, for the purpose 
of drinking water ? Man, if it is good for you to 
drink, drink ; but if not, you are acting ridiculously. 
But if it is good for you and you do drink, say 
nothing about it to those who are displeased with 
water-drinkers. What then, do you wish to please 
these very men ? 

You must root out of men these two things, 
arrogance (pride) and distrust. Arrogance then is 
the opinion that you want nothing (are deficient 



DISCOURSES. 145 

in nothing) : but distrust is the opinion that you 
cannot be happy when so many circumstances sur- 
round you. 

I am superior to you, for my father is a man 
of consular rank. Another says, I have been a 
tribune, but you have not. If we were horses, 
would you say, My father was swifter? I have 
much barley and fodder, or elegant neck orna- 
ments. If then while you were saying this, I said. 
Be it so : let us run then. Well, is there nothing 
in a man such as running in a horse, by w^hich it 
will be known which is superior and inferior ? Is 
there not modesty, fidelity, justice? Show yourself 
superior in these, that you may be superior as a 
man. If you tell me that you can kick violently, 
I also will say to you, that you are proud of that 
which is the act of an ass. 



THAT WE OUGHT TO PROCEED WITH CIRCUMSPEC- 
TION TO EVERYTHING. 

In every act consider what precedes and what 
follows, and then proceed to the act. If you do 
not consider, you will at first begin wdth spirit, 
since you have not thought at all of the things 
which follow ; but afterwards when some conse- 
quences have shown themselves, you will basely 
desist (from that which you have begun). 

Man, consider first what the matter is (which you 
propose to do), then your own nature also, what it 
is able to bear. If you are a wrestler, look at your 



146 EPICTETUS. 

shoulders, your thighs, your loins : for different men 
are naturally formed for different things. Do you 
think that, if you do (what you are doing daily), 
you can be a philosopher ? Do you think that you 
can eat as you do now, drink as you do now, and 
in the same way be angry and out of humor ? You 
must watch, labor, conquer certain desires, you 
must depart from your kinsmen, be despised by 
your slave, laughed at by those who meet you, in 
everything you must be in an inferior condition, as 
to magisterial office, in honors, in courts of justice. 
When you have considered all these things com- 
pletely, then, if you think proper, approach to phi- 
losophy, if you would gain in exchange for these 
things freedom from perturbations, liberty, tranquil- 
lity. If you have not considered these things, do 
not approach philosophy: do not act like children, 
at one time a philosopher, then a tax collector, then 
a rhetorician, then a procurator (officer) of Caesar. 
These things are not consistent. You must be one 
man, either good or bad : you must either labor at 
your own ruling faculty or at external things : that 
is, you must either occupy the place of a philosopher 
or that of one of the vulgar. 



THAT WE OUGHT WITH CAUTION TO ENTER INTO 
FAMILIAR INTERCOURSE W^ITH MEN. 

If a man has frequent intercourse with others, 
either for talk, or drinking together, or generally 
for social purposes, he must either become like 



DISCOURSES. 147 

them, or change them to his own fashion. For if a 
man places a piece of quenched charcoal close to a 
piece that is burning, either the quenched charcoal 
will quench the other, or the burning charcoal will 
light that which is quenched. Since then the dan- 
ger is so great, we must cautiously enter into such 
intimacies with those of the common sort, and 
remember that it is impossible that a man can keep 
company with one who is covered with soot without 
being partaker of the soot himself. For what will 
you do if a man speaks about gladiators, about 
horses, about athletes, or, what is worse, about 
men? Such a person is bad, such a person is 
good : this was well done, this was done badly. 
Further, if he scoff, or ridicule, or show an ill- 
natured disposition ? Is any man among us 
prepared like a lute-player when he takes a lute, 
so that as soon as he has touched the strings, he 
discovers which are discordant, and tunes the 
instrument ? such a power as Socrates had who in 
all his social intercourse could lead his companions 
to his own purpose? How should you have this 
power? It is therefore a necessary consequence 
that you are carried about by the common kind of 
people. 

Why then are they more powerful than you ? 
Because they utter these useless words from their 
real opinions : but you utter your elegant words 
only from your lips ; for this reason they are with- 
out strength and dead, and it is nauseous to listen 
to your exhortations and your miserable virtue, 



148 EPICTETUS. 

which is talked of everywhere (up and down). In 
this way the vulgar have the advantage over you : 
for every opinion is strong and invincible. Until 
then the good sentiments are fixed in you, and you 
shall have acquired a certain power for your 
security, I advise you to be careful in your associa- 
tion with common persons : if you are not, every 
day like wax in the sun there will be melted away 
whatever you inscribe on your minds in the school. 
Withdraw then yourselves from the sun so long as 
you have these waxen sentiments. For this reason 
also philosophers advise men to leave their native 
country, because ancient habits distract them and 
do not allow a beginning to be made of a different 
habit ; nor can we tolerate those who meet us and 
say : See such a one is now a philosopher, who was 
once so and so. Thus also physicians send those 
who have lingering diseases to a different country 
and a different air ; and they do right. Do you 
also introduce other habits than those which you 
have : fix your opinions and exercise yourselves in 
them. 

ON PROVIDENCE. 

When you make any charge against Providence, 
consider, and you will learn that the thing has 
happened according to reason. — Yes, but the 
unjust man has the advantage. — In what? — In 
money. — Yes, for he is superior to you in this, 
that he flatters, is free from shame, and is watchful. 
What is the wonder? But see if he has the 



DISCOURSES. 149 

advantage over you in being faithful, in being 
modest. Plow can you consider him happy who 
acquires those things by such means as you abomi- 
nate ; or what wrong does Providence, if he gives 
the better things to the better men? Is it not 
better to be modest than to be rich ? — He 
admitted this. — Why are you vexed then, man, 
when you possess the better thing? Remember 
then always and have in readiness the truth, that 
this is a law of nature, that the superior has an 
advantage over the inferior in that in which he is 
superior ; and you will never be vexed. 

THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE DISTURBED 

BY ANY NEWS. 

When anything shall be reported to you which is 
of a nature to disturb, have this principle in readi- 
ness, that the news is about nothing which is wdthin 
the power of your will. Can any man report to 
you that you have formed a bad opinion, or had a 
bad desire? By no means. But perhaps he will 
report that some person is dead. What then is 
that to you? Or that your father is planning 
something or other. Against whom ? Against 
your will? How can he? But is it against your 
poor body, against your little property? You are 
quite safe : it is not against you. But the judge 
declares that you have committed an act of impiety. 
And did not the judges make the same declaration 
against Socrates? Does it concern you that the 



1 50 EPICTETUS. 

judge has made this declaration? No. Why then 
do you trouble yourself any longer about it? Your 
father has a certain duty, and if he shall not fulfill 
it, he loses the character of a father, of a man of 
natural affection, of gentleness. Do not wish him 
to lose anything else on this account. For never 
does a man do wrong in one thing, and suffer in 
another. On the other side it is your duty to make 
your defense firmly, modestly, without anger : but 
if you do not, you also lose the character of a son, 
of a man of modest behavior, of generous character. 
Well, then, is the judge free from danger ? No; 
but he also is in equal danger. Why then are you 
still afraid of his decision ? What have you to do 
with that which is another man's evil ? It is your 
own evil to make a bad defense : be on your guard 
against this only. But to be condemned or not to 
be condemned, as that is the act of another person, 
so it is the evil of another person. A certain 
person threatens you. Me? No. He blames 
you. Let him see how he manages his own 
affairs. He is going to condemn you unjustly. 
He is a wretched man. 



WHAT IS THE CONDITION OF A COMMON KIND OF 
MAN AND OF A PHILOSOPHER. 

The first difference between a common person 
and a philosopher is this : the common person says. 
Woe to me for my little child, for my brother, for 
my father. The philosopher, if he shall ever be 



DISCOURSES. 151 

compelled to say, Woe to me, stops and says, ^but 
for myself.' For nothing which is independent of 
the will can hinder or damage the will, and the will 
can only hinder or damage itself. If then we our- 
selves incline in this direction, so as, when we are . 
unlucky, to blame ourselves and to remember that 
nothing else is the cause of perturbation or loss of 
tranquillity except our own opinion, I swear to you 
by all the gods that we have made progress. But 
in the present state of affairs we have gone another 
way from the beginning. For example, while we 
were still children, the nurse, if we ever stumbled 
through want of care, did not chide us, but would 
beat the stone. But what did the stone do ? 
Ought the stone to have moved on account of your 
child's folly.? Again, if we find nothing to eat 
on coming out of the bath, the pedagogue never 
checks our appetite, but he flogs the cook. Man, 
did we make you the pedagogue of the cook and 
not of the child ? Correct the child, improve 
him. In this way even when we are grown up 
we are like children. For he who is unmusical 
is a child in music ; he who is without letters is 
a child in learning ; he who is untaught, is a 
child in life. 



AGAINST THOSE WHO READILY COME TO THE PRO- 
FESSION OF SOPHISTS. 

The carpenter does not come and say, Hear me 
talk about the carpenter's art ; but having under- 



152 EPICTETUS. 

taken to build a house, he makes it, and proves 
that he knows the art. You also ought to do 
something of the kind ; eat like a man, drink like a 
man, dress, marry, beget children, do the office of 
a citizen, endure abuse, bear with an unreasonable 
brother, bear with your father, bear with your son, 
neighbor, companion. Show us these things that 
we may see that you have in truth learned some- 
thing from the philosophers. You say, No ; but 
come and hear me read (philosophical) commenta- 
ries. And indeed I will expound to you the writings 
of Chrysippus as no other man can : I will explain 
his text most clearly. 

Is it then for this that young men shall leave 
their country and their parents, that they may come 
to this place, and hear you explain words ? Ought 
they not to return with a capacity to endure, to be 
active in association with others, free from passions, 
free from perturbation, with such a provision for 
the journey of life with which they shall be able to 
bear well the things that happen and derive honor 
from them ? And how can you give them any of 
these things which you do not possess ? Have you 
done from the beginning anything else than employ 
yourself about the resolution of syllogisms, of 
sophistical arguments, and in those which work by 
questions ? But such a man has a school ; why 
should not I also have a school ? These things are 
not done, man, in a careless way, nor just as it may 
happen ; but there must be a (fit) age and life and 
God as a miide. 



DISCOURSES. 153 

Not even wisdom perhaps is enough to enable a 
man to take care of youths : a man must have also 
a certain readiness and fitness for this purpose, and 
a certain quality of body, and above all things he 
must have God to advise him to occupy this office, 
as God advised Socrates to occupy the place of one 
who confutes error, Diogenes the office of royalty 
and reproof, and the office of teaching precepts. 
But you open a doctor's shop, though you have 
nothing except physic : but where and how they 
should be applied, you know not nor have you taken 
any trouble about, it. See, that man says, I too 
have salves for the eyes. Have you also the power 
of using them ? Do you know both when and how 
they will do good, and to whom they will do good? 
Why then do you act at hazard in things of the 
greatest importance ? why are you careless ? why do 
you undertake a thing that is in no way fit for you } 
Leave it to those who are able to do it, and to do it 
well. Do not yourself bring disgrace on philosophy 
through your own acts, and be not one of those 
who load it with a bad reputation. But if theorems 
please you, sit still, and turn them over by your- 
self ; but never say that you are a philosopher, nor 
allow another to say it ; but say : He is mistaken, 
for neither are my desires different from what they 
were before, nor is my activity directed to other 
objects, nor do I assent to other things, nor in the 
use of appearances have I altered at all from' my 
former condition. This you must think and say 
about yourself, if you would think as you ought : if 



1 54 EPICTETUS. 

not act at hazard, and do what you are doing ; for it 
becomes you. 

ABOUT CYNISM. 

You must not feel anger nor resentment nor 
envy nor pity ; a girl must not appear handsome to 
you, nor must you love a little reputation, nor be 
pleased with a boy or a cake. For you ought to 
know that the rest of men throw walls around them 
and houses and darkness when they do any such 
things, and they have many means of concealment. 
A man shuts the door, he sets somebody before the 
chamber : if a person comes, say that he is out, he 
is not at leisure. But the Cynic instead of all these 
things must use modesty as his protection : if he 
does not, he will be indecent in his nakedness and 
under the open sky. This is his house, his door : 
this is the slave before his bedchamber : this is his 
darkness. For he ought not to wish to hide any- 
thing that he does : and if he does, he is gone, he 
has lost the character of a Cynic, of a man who 
lives under the open sky, of a free man : he has 
begun to fear some external thing, he has begun to 
have need of concealment, nor can he get conceal- 
ment when he chooses. For where shall he hide 
himself and how ? And if by chance this public 
instructor shall be detected, this pedagogue, what 
kind of things will he be compelled to suffer ? when 
then a man fears these things, is it possible for him 
to be bold with his whole soul to superintend men ? 
It cannot be : it is impossible. 



DISCOURSES. 155 

In the first place then you must make your ruUng 
faculty pure, and this mode of life also. Now (you 
should say), to me the matter to work on is my un- 
derstanding, as wood is to the carpenter, as hides 
to the shoemaker ; and my business is the right use 
of appearances. 

Then, if he is thus prepared, the true Cynic 
cannot be satisfied with this ; but he must know 
that he is sent a messenger from Zeus to men about 
good and bad things, to show them that they have 
wandered and are seeking the substance of good 
and evil where it is not, but where it is, they never 
think ; and that he is a spy, as Diogenes was 
carried off to Philip after the battle of Chaeroneia 
as a spy. For in fact a Cynic is a spy of the things 
which are good for men and which are evil, and it 
is his duty to examine carefully and to come and 
report truly, and not to be struck with terror so 
as to point out as enemies those who are not 
enemies. 

It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, 
if the occasion should arise, and appearing on the 
tragic stage to say like Socrates : Men, whither are 
you hurrying, what are you doing, wretches ? like 
blind people you are wandering up and down : you 
are going by another road, and have left the true 
road: you seek for prosperity and happiness 
where they are not, and if another shows you 
where they are, you do not believe him. Why 
do you seek it without? In the body? It is not 
there. If you doubt, look at Myro, look at 



156 EPICTETUS. 

Ophellius.^ In possessions ? It is not there. But 
if you do not believe me, look at Croesus : look at 
those who are now rich, with what lamentations their 
life is filled. In power ? It is not there. If it is, 
those must be happy who have been twice and thrice 
consuls ; but they are not. Whom shall* we believe 
in these matters } You who from without see their 
affairs and are dazzled by an appearance, or the 
men themselves ? What do they say ? Hear them 
when they groan, when they grieve, when on account 
of these very consulships and glory and splendor 
they think that they are more wretched and in 
greater danger. Is it in royal power ? It is not : 
if it were, Nero would have been happy, and Sar- 
danapalus. But neither was Agamemnon happy, 
though he was a better man than Sardanapalus and 
Nero. Wretch, which of your affairs goes badly .^ 
Your possessions? No. Your body? No. But 
you are rich in gold and copper. What then is the 
matter with you ? That part of you, whatever it is, 
has been neglected by you and is corrupted, the 
part with which we desire, with which we avoid, 
with which we move towards and move from things. 
How neglected ? He knows not the nature of good 
for which he is made by nature and the nature of 
evil ; and what is his own, and what belongs to 
another ; and when anything that belongs to others 
goes badly, he says, Woe to me, for the Hellenes 

1 These men are supposed to have been strong gladiators. 
Croesus is the rich king of Lydia, who was taken prisoner by 

Cyrus the Persian. 



DISCOURSES. 157 

are in danger. \\'retched is his ruling faculty, and 
alone neglected and uncared for. The Hellenes 
are going to die destroyed by the Trojans. And if 
the Trojans do not kill them, will they not die ? 
Yes ; but not all at once. What difference then 
does it make ? For if death is an evil, whether men 
die altogether, or if they die singly, it is equally an 
evil. Is anything else then going to happen than 
the separation of the soul and the body? What 
then art thou ? In truth a shepherd : for you weep 
as shepherds do, when a wolf has carried off one of 
their sheep : and these who are governed by you 
are sheep. And why did you come hither ? Was 
your desire in any danger ? was your aversion ? was 
your movement (pursuits) ? was your avoidance of 
things ? He replies. No ; but the wife of my brother 
was carried oft". Was it not then a great gain to 
be deprived of an adulterous wife ? — Shall we be 
despised then by the Trojans? — What kind of 
people are the Trojans, wise or foolish? If they 
are wise, why do you fight with them ? If they are 
fools, why do you care about them ? 

But before all the Cynic's ruling faculty must be 
purer than the sun ; and if it is not, he must neces- 
sarily be a cunning knave and a fellow of no prin- 
ciple, since while he himself is entangled in some 
vice he will reprove others.^ For see how the matter 

1 The C}Tiic is in Epictetus the mmister of reUgion. He 
must be pure, for otherwdse how can he reprove vice ? This 
is a useful lesson to those whose business it is to correct the 
vices of mankind. 



158 EPICTETUS. 

stands : to these kings and tyrants their guards and 
arms give the power of reproving some persons, and 
of being able even to punish those who do wrong 
though they are themselves bad ; but to a Cynic 
instead of arms and guards it is conscience which 
gives this power. When he knows that he has 
watched and labored for mankind, and has slept 
pure, and sleep has left him still purer, and that he 
thought whatever he has thought as a friend of the 
gods, as a minister, as a participator of the power 
of Zeus, and that on all occasions he is ready to say 

Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, O Destiny ; 

and also. If so it pleases the gods, so let it be ; why 
should he not have confidence to speak freely to his 
own brothers, to his children, in a word to his kins- 
men? For this reason he is neither over curious 
nor a busybody when he is in this state of mind ; 
for he is not a meddler with the affairs of others 
when he is superintending human affairs, but he is 
looking after his own affairs. If that is not so, you 
may also say that the general is a busybody, when 
he inspects his soldiers, and examines them and 
punishes the disorderly. But if while you have a 
cake under your arm, you rebuke others, I will say 
to you. Will you not rather go away into a corner 
and eat that which you have stolen ; what have you 
to do with the affairs of others ? 



DISCOURSES. 159 



TO THOSE WHO READ AND DISCUSS FOR THE SAKE 
OF OSTENTATION.^ 

First say to yourself Who you wish to be. Did 
you not praise a certain person contrary to your 
opinion ? and did you not flatter a certain person 
who was the son of a senator? Would you wish 
your own children to be such persons ? — I hope 
not. — Why then did you praise and flatter him ? 
He is an ingenious youth and listens well to dis- 
courses. — How is this ? — He admires me. You 
have stated your proof. Then what do you think ? 
do not these very people secretly despise you ? 
When then a man who is conscious that he has 
neither done any good nor ever thinks of it, finds 
a philosopher who says, You have a great natural 
talent, and you have a candid and good disposition, 
what else do you think that he says except this. 
This man has some need of me ? Or tell me what 
act that indicates a great mind has he shown ? 
Observe ; he has been in your company a long 
time ; he has listened to your discourses, he has 
heard you reading ; has he become more modest ? 
has he been turned to reflect on himself ? has he 

^ Epictetus in an amusing manner touches on the practice 
of Sophists, Rhetoricians, and others, who made addresses 
only to get praise. This practice of reciting prose or verse 
compositions was common in the time of Epictetus, as we 
may learn from the letters of the younger Pliny, Juvenal, 
Martial, and the author of the treatise de Causis corruptae 
eloquentiae. Upton. 



l60 EPICTETUS. 

perceived in what a bad state he is ? has he cast 
away self-conceit? Does he look for a person to 
teach him ? A man who will teach him to live ? 
No, fool, but how to talk ; for it is for this that he 
admires you also. Listen and hear what he says : 
This man writes with perfect art, much better than 
Dion.^ This is altogether another thing. Does he 
say, This man is modest, faithful, free from pertur- 
bations ? and even if he did say it, I should say to 
him. Since this man is faithful, tell me what this 
faithful man is. And if he could not tell me, I 
should add this. First understand what you say, 
and then speak. 

You then, who are in a wretched plight and 
gaping after applause and counting your auditors, 
do you intend to be useful to others ? — To-day 
many more attended my discourse. Yes, many ; 
we suppose five hundred. That is nothing ; sup- 
pose that there were a thousand. — Dion never had 
so many hearers. — How could he ? — And they 
understand what is said beautifully. What is fine, 
master, can move even a stone. — See, these are the 
words of a philosopher. 

Does a philosopher invite people to hear him ? 
As the sun himself draws men to him, or as food 
does, does not the philosopher also draw to him 

1 Dion of Prusa in Bithynia was named Chrysostomus 
(golden-mouthed) because of his eloquence. He was a rheto- 
rician and sophist, as the term was then understood, and was 
living at the same time as Epictetus. Eighty of his orations 
written in Greek are still extant, and some fragments of 
fifteen. 



DISCOURSES. l6l 

those who will receive benefit ? What physician in- 
vites a man to be treated by him ? Indeed I now 
hear that even the physicians in Rome do invite 
patients, but when I lived there, the physicians 
were invited. I invite you to come and hear that 
things are in a bad way for you, and that you are 
taking care of everything except that of which you 
ought to take care, and that you are ignorant of the 
good and the bad and are unfortunate and unhappy. 
A fine kind of invitation : and yet if the words of 
the philosopher do not produce this effect on you, 
he is dead, and so is the speaker. Rufus was used 
to say : If you have leisure to praise me, I am 
speaking to lio purpose.^ Accordingly he used to 
speak in such a way that every one of us who were 
sitting there supposed that some one had accused 
him before Rufus : he so touched on what was 
doing, he so placed before the eyes every man's 
faults. 

The philosopher's school, ye men, is a surgery : 
you ought not to go out of it with pleasure, but with 
pain. For you are not in sound health when you 
enter ; one has dislocated his shoulder, another has 
an abscess, a third a fistula, and a fourth a head- 
ache. Then do I sit and utter to you little thoughts 
and exclamations that you may praise me and go 
away, one with his shoulder in the same condition 
in which he entered, another with his head still 
aching, and a third with his fistula or his abscess 
just as they were ? Is it for this then that young 

1 Aulus Gellius v. i. Seneca, Ep. 52. Upton. 



1 62 EPICTETUS. 

men shall quit home, and leave their parents and 
their friends and kinsmen and property, that they 
may say to you. Wonderful ! when you are uttering 
your exclamations. Did Socrates do this, or Zeno, 
or Cleanthes ? 

What then ? is there not the hortatory style ? 
Who denies it ? as there is the style of refutation, 
and the didactic style. Who then ever reckoned a 
fourth style with these, the style of display? What 
is the hortatory style ? To be able to show both to 
one person and to many the struggle in which they 
are engaged, and that they think more about any- 
thing than about what they really wish. For they 
wish the things which lead to happiness, but they 
look for them in the wrong place. In order that 
this may be done, a thousand seats must be placed 
and men must be invited to listen, and you must 
ascend the pulpit in a fine robe or cloak and describe 
the death of Achilles. Cease, I intreat you by the 
gods, to spoil good words and good acts as much 
as you can. Nothing can have more power in ex- 
hortation than when the speaker shows to the 
hearers that he has need of them. But tell me who 
when he hears you reading or discoursing is anxious 
about himself or turns to reflect on himself? or 
when he has gone out says, The philosopher hit me 
well : I must no longer do these things. But does 
he not, even if you have a great reputation, say to 
some person : He spoke finely about Xerxes ; and 
another says. No, but about the battle of Ther- 
mopylae. Is this listening to a philosopher ? 



DISCOURSES. 163 



THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE MOVED BY A DESIRE OF 
THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NOT IN OUR POWER. 

Let not that which in another is contrary to 
nature be an evil to you : for you are not formed by 
nature to be depressed with others nor to be un- 
happy with others, but to be happy with them. If 
a man is unhappy, remember that his unhappiness 
is his own fault : for God has made all men to be 
happy, to be free from perturbations. For this 
purpose he has given means to them^ some things 
to each person as his own, and other things not as 
his own : and the nature of good and evil, as it was 
fit to be done by him who takes care of us and pro- 
tects us like a father, he has made our own. — But 
you say, I have parted from a certain person, and 
he is grieved. — Why did he consider as his own 
that which belongs to another? why, when he 
looked on you and was rejoiced, did he not also 
reckon that you are mortal, that it is natural for 
you to part from him. for a foreign country.? Must 
all persons be immortal and must no man go 
abroad, and must we ourselves not go abroad, but 
remain rooted like plants ; and if any of our familiar 
friends goes abroad, must we sit and weep ; and on 
the contrary, when he returns, must we dance and 
clap our hands like children ? 

All things are full of friendship, first of the gods, 
and then of men who by nature are made to be of 
one family ; and some must be with one another, 



164 EPICTETUS. 

and others must be separated, rejoicing in those 
who are with them, and not grieving for those who 
are removed from them. 

How are you desirous at the same time to live to 
old age, and at the same time not to see the death 
of any person whom you love ? Know you not that 
in the course of a long time many and various 
kinds of things must happen ; that a fever shall 
overpower one, a robber another, and a third a 
tyrant ? Such is the condition of things around us, 
such are those who live with us in the world ; cold 
and heat, and unsuitable ways of living, and journeys 
by land, and voyages by sea, and winds, and vari- 
ous circumstances which surround us, destroy one 
man, and banish another, and throw one upon an 
embassy and another into an army. Sit down then 
in a flutter at all these things, lamenting, unhappy, 
unfortunate, dependent on another, and dependent 
not on one or two, but on ten thousands upon ten 
thousands. 

Did you hear this when you were with the philoso- 
phers ? did you learn this } do you not know that 
human life is a warfare ? that one man must keep 
watch, another must go out as a spy, and a third 
must fight ? and it is not possible that all should be 
in one place, nor is it better that it should be so. 
But you neglecting to do the commands of the 
general complain when anything more hard than 
usual is imposed on you, and you do not observe 
what you make the army become as far as it is in 
your power ; that if all imitate you, no man will dig 



DISCOURSES. 165 

a trench, no man will put a rampart round, nor keep 
watch, nor expose himself to danger, but will appear 
to be useless for the purposes of an army. Again, 
in a vessel if you go as a sailor, keep to one place 
and stick to it. And if you are ordered to climb 
the mast, refuse ; and what master of a ship will 
endure you ? and will he not pitch you overboard as 
a useless thing, an impediment only and bad exam- 
ple to the other sailors ? And so it is here also ; 
every man's life is a kind of warfare, and it is long 
and diversified. 

Know you not that a good man does nothing for 
the sake of appearance, but for the sake of doing 
right? Do you seek a reward for a good man 
greater than doing what is good and just ? At 
Olympia you wish for nothing more, but it seems to 
you enough to be crowned at the games. Does it 
seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be 
good and happy? For these purposes being intro- 
duced by the gods into this city (the world), and it 
being now your duty to undertake the work of a 
man, do you still want nurses also and a mamma, 
and do foolish women by their weeping move you 
and make you effeminate ? Will you thus never 
cease to be a foolish child ? know you not that he 
who does the acts of a child, the older he is, the 
more ridiculous he is ? 

So in this matter also : if you kiss your own 
child, or your brother or friend, never give full 
license to the appearance, and allow not your 
pleasure to go as far as it chooses ; but check it, 



l66 EPICTETUS. 

and curb it as those who stand behind men in their 
triumphs and remind them that they are mortal. 
Do you also remind yourself in like manner, that 
he whom you love is mortal, and that what you love 
is nothing of your own : it has been given to you 
for the present, not that it should not be taken 
from you, nor has it been given to you for all 
time, but as a fig is given to you or a bunch of 
grapes at the appointed season of the year. But if 
you wish for these things in winter, you are a fool. 
So if you wish for your son or friend when it is not 
allowed to you, you must know that you are 
wishing for a fig in winter. For such as winter is 
to a fig, such is every event which happens from 
the universe to the things which are taken away 
according to its nature. 

Wherefore the wise and good man, remembering 
who he is and whence he came, and by whom he 
was produced, is attentive only to this, how he 
may fill his place with due regularity, and 
obediently to God. Dost thou still wish me to 
exist (live) ? I will continue to exist as free, as 
noble in nature, as thou hast wished me to exist : 
for thou hast made me free from hindrance in that 
which is my own. But hast thou no further need 
of me ? I thank thee ; and so far I have remained 
for thy sake, and for the sake of no other person, 
and now in obedience to thee I depart. How dost 
thou depart? Again, I sa}^ as thou hast pleased, 
as free, as thy servant, as one who has known thy 
commands and thy prohibitions. And so long as I 



DISCOURSES. 167 

shall stay in thy service, whom dost thou will me to 
be ? A prince or a private man, a senator or a 
common person, a soldier or a general, a teacher 
or a master of a family ? whatever place or position 
thou mayest assign to me, as Socrates says, I will 
die ten thousand times rather than desert them. 

Let these thoughts be ready to hand by night 
and by day : these you should write, these you 
should read : about these you should talk to your- 
self and others. Ask a man. Can you help me at all 
for this purpose ? and further, go to another and to 
another. . Then if anything that is said be contrary 
to your wish, this reflection first will immediately 
relieve you, that it is not unexpected. For it is a 
great thing in all cases to say, I knew that I begot 
a son who is mortal. For so you also will say, I 
knew that I am mortal, I knew that I may leave my 
home, I knew that I may be ejected from it, I 
knew that I may be led to prison. Then if you 
turn round and look to yourself, and seek the 
place from which comes that which has happened, 
you will forthwith recollect that it comes from the 
place of things which are out of the power of the 
will, and of things which are not my own. What 
then is it to me ? Then, you will ask, and this is 
the chief thing : And who is it that sent it ? The 
leader, or the general, the state, the law of the 
state. Give it me then, for I must always obey 
the law in everything. Then, when the appearance 
(of things) pains you, for it is not in your power to 
prevent this, contend against it by the aid of 



1 68 EPICTETUS. 

reason, conquer it : do not allow it to gain strength 
nor to lead you to the consequences by raising 
images such as it pleases and as it pleases. If you 
be in Gyara, do not imagine the mode of living at 
Rome, and how many there would be for him who 
returned to Rome : but fix your mind on this 
matter, how a man who lives in Gyara ought to live 
in Gyara like a man of courage. And if you be in 
Rome, do not imagine what the life in Athens is, 
but think only of the life in Rome. 

Then in the place of other delights substitute 
this, that of being conscious that you are obeying 
God, that not in word, but in deed you are 
performing the acts of a wise and good man. For 
what a thing it is for a man to be able to say to 
himself. Now whatever the rest may say in solemn 
manner in the schools and may be judged to be 
saying in a way contrary to common opinion (or in 
a strange way), this I am doing : and they are 
sitting and are discoursing of my virtues and 
inquiring about me and praising me ; and of this 
Zeus has willed that I shall receive from myself a 
demonstration, and shall myself know if he has a 
soldier such as he ought to have, a citizen such as 
he ought to have, and if he has chosen to produce 
me to the rest of mankind as a witness of the 
things which are independent of the will : See that 
you fear without reason, that you foolishly desire 
what you do desire : seek not the good in things 
external ; seek it in yourselves : if you do not, you 
will not find it. For this purpose he leads me at 



DISCOURSES, 169 

one time hither, at another time sends me thither, 
shows me to men as poor, without authority, and 
sick ; sends me to Gyara, leads me into prison, not 
because he hates me, far from him be such a 
meaning, for who hates the best of his servants ? 
nor yet because he cares not for me, for he does 
not neglect any even of the smallest things ; but he 
does this for the purpose of exercising me and 
making use of me as a witness to others. Being 
appointed to such a service, do I still care about 
the place in which I am, or with whom I am, or 
what men say about me ? and do I not entirely 
direct my thoughts to God and to his instructions 
and commands ? 

Having these things (or thoughts) always in 
hand, and exercising them by yourself, and keeping 
them in readiness, you will never be in want of one 
to comfort you and strengthen you. For it is not 
shameful to be without something to eat, but not to 
have reason sufficient for keeping away fear and 
sorrow. But if once you have gained exemption 
from sorrow and fear, will there any longer be a 
tyrant for you, or a tyrant's guard, or attendants on 
Caesar? Or shall any appointment to offices at 
court cause you pain, or shall those who sacrifice 
in the Capitol on the occasion of being named to 
certain functions, cause pain to you who have received 
so great authority from Zeus ? Only do not make a 
proud display of it, nor boast of it ; but show it by 
your acts ; and if no man perceives it, be satisfied 
that you are yourself in a healthy state and happy. 



I/O EPICTETUS. 

TO THOSE WHO FALL OFF (dESIST) FROM THEIR 
PURPOSE. 

Consider as to the things which you proposed to 
yourself at first, which you have secured, and 
which you have not ; and how you are pleased 
when you recall to memory the one, and are pained 
about the other ; and if it is possible, recover the 
things wherein you failed. For we must not shrink 
when we are engaged in the greatest combat, but 
we must even take blows. For the combat before 
us is not in wrestling and the Pancration, in which 
both the successful and the unsuccessful may have 
the greatest merit, or may have little, and in truth 
may be very fortunate or very unfortunate ; but the 
combat is for good fortune and happiness them- 
selves. Well then, even if we have renounced the 
contest in this matter (for good fortune and happi- 
ness), no man hinders us from renewing the combat 
again ; and we are not compelled to wait for another 
four years that the games at Olympia may come 
again ; but as soon as you have recovered and 
restored yourself, and employ the same zeal, you 
may renew the combat again ; and if again you 
renounce it, you may again renew it ; and if you 
once gain the victory, you are like him who has 
never renounced the combat. Only do not through 
a habit of doing the same thing (renouncing the 
combat) begin to do it with pleasure, and then like a 
bad athlete go about after being conquered in all the 
circuit of the games like quails who have run a^ay. 



DISCOURSES. 1 71 

When you see any man subject to another, or 
flattering him contrary to his own opinion, confi- 
dently affirm that this man also is not free ; and 
not only if he do this for a bit of supper, but also 
if he does it for a government (province) or a con- 
sulship : and call these men little slaves who for 
the sake of little matters do these things, and those 
who do so for the sake of great things call great 
slaves, as they deserve to be. Do you think that 
freedom is a thing independent and self-governing ? 
Whomsoever, then, it is in the power of another 
to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free. 
And do not look, I entreat you, after his grand- 
fathers and great-grandfathers, or inquire about his 
being bought or sold ; but if you hear him saying 
from his heart and with feeling, ' Master,' even if 
the twelve fasces precede him (as consul), call him 
a slave. And if you hear him say, ' Wretch that I 
am, how much I suffer ! ' call him a slave. If, 
finally, you see him lamenting, complaining, un- 
happy, call him a slave though he wears a praetexta. 
If, then, he is doing nothing of this kind, do not 
yet say that he is free, but learn his opinions, 
whether they are subject to compulsion, or may 
produce hindrance, or to bad fortune ; and if you 
find him such, call him a slave who has a holiday : 
say that his master is from home : he will return 
soon, and you will know what he suffers. Who will 
return ? Whoever has in himself the power over 
anything which is desired by the man, either to give 
it to him or to take it away ? Thus, then, have we 



1/2 EPICTETUS. 

many masters ? We have : for we have circum- 
stances as masters prior to our present m^asters ; 
and these circumstances are many. Therefore it 
must of necessity be that those who have the power 
over any of these circumstances must be our 
masters. For no man fears Caesar himself, but he 
fears death, banishment, deprivation of his property, 
prison, and disgrace. Nor does any man love 
Caesar, unless Caesar is a person of great merit, 
but he loves w^ealth, the office of tribune, praetor or 
consul. When w^e love, and hate, and fear these 
things, it must be that those who have the power 
over them must be our masters. Therefore we 
adore them even as gods. 

Then, after receiving everything from another, 
and even yourself, are you angry and do you blame 
the giver if he takes anything from you ? Who are 
you, and for what purpose did you come into the 
world? Did not he (God) introduce you here? 
did he not show you the light? did he not give you 
fellow workers, and perceptions and reason ? and 
as whom did he introduce you here? did he not 
introduce you as subject to death, and as one to 
live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe 
his administration, and to join with him in the 
spectacle and the festival for a short time? Will 
you not, then, as long as you have been permitted, 
after seeing the spectacle and the solemnity, when 
he leads you out, go with adoration of him and 
thanks for what you have heard and seen ? — No ; 
but I would still enjoy the feast. — The initiated. 



DISCOURSES. 173 

too, would wish to be longer in the initiation : and 
perhaps, also, those at Olympia to see other ath- 
letes ; but the solemnity is ended : go away like a 
grateful and modest man ; make room for others : 
others also must be born, as you were, and being 
born, they must have a place, and houses and 
necessary things. And if the first do not retire, 
what remains ? Why are you insatiable ? Why are 
you not content ? why do you contract the world ? 
— Yes, but I would have my little children with 
me and my wife. — What, are they yours ? do they 
not belong to the giver, and to him who made you? 
then will you not give up what belongs to others ? 
will you not give way to him who is superior ? — 
Why, then, did he introduce me into the world on 
these conditions ? — And if the conditions do not 
suit you, depart. He has no need of a spectator 
who is not satisfied. He wants those who join in 
the festival, those who take part in the chorus, that 
they may rather applaud, admire, and celebrate 
with hymns the solemnity. But those who can bear 
no trouble, and the cowardly, he will not unwillingly 
see absent from the great assembly ; for they did 
not, when they were present, behave as they ought 
to do at a festival, nor fill up their place properly, 
but they lamented, found fault with the deity, 
fortune, their companions ; not seeing both what 
they had, and their own powers, which they received 
for contrary purposes, the powers of magnanimity, 
of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are 
now inquiring about, freedom. — For what purpose. 



174 EPICTETUS. 

then, have I received these things ? — To use them. 
— How long ? — So long as he who has lent them, 
chooses. — What if they are necessary to me? — Do 
not attach yourself to them and they will not be 
necessary: do not say to yourself that they are 
necessary, and then they are not necessary. 

And so in every matter, it is absolutely necessary 
that he v/ho has skill must be the superior of him 
who has not. Whoever, then, generally possesses 
the science of life, what else must he be than 
master .? For who is master in a ship ? The man 
who governs the helm ? Why ? Because he who 
will not obey him suffers for it. But a master can 
give me stripes. Can he do it, then, without suffer- 
ing for it. So I also used to think. But because 
he cannot do it without suffering for it, for this 
reason it is not in his power : and no man can do 
what is unjust without suffering for it. And what 
is the penalty for him who puts his own slave in 
chains ? what do you think that is .'' The fact of 
putting the slave in chains : — and you also will 
admit this, if you choose to maintain the truth, that 
man is not a wild beast, but a tame animal. For 
when is a vine doing badly? When it is in a con- 
dition contrary to its nature. When is a cock? 
Just the same. Therefore a man also is so. What, 
then, is a man's nature ? To bite, to kick, and to 
throw into prison and to behead ? No ; but to do 
good, to cooperate with others, to wish them well. 

Socrates then did not fare badly? — No; but his 
judges and his accusers did. — Nor did Helvidius 



DISCOURSES. 175 

at Rome fare badly ? — No ; but his murderer did. 
— How do you mean? — The same as you do when 
you say that a cock has not fared badly when he 
has gained the victory and been severely wounded; 
but that the cock has fared badly when he has been 
defeated and is unhurt : nor do you call a dog 
fortunate who neither pursues game nor labors, but 
when you see him sweating ; when you see him in 
pain and panting violently after running. What 
paradox (unusual thing) do we utter if we say that 
the evil in everything is that which is contrary to 
the nature of the thing? Is this a paradox? for do 
you not say this in the case of all other things? 
Why then in the case of man only do you think 
differently? But because we say that the nature 
of man is tame (gentle) and social and faithful, you 
will not say that this is a paradox? It is not. — 
What then is it a paradox to say that a man is 
not hurt when he is whipped, or put in chains, or 
beheaded? does he not, if he suffers nobly, come 
off even with increased advantage and profit? But 
is he not hurt, who suffers in a most pitiful and 
disgraceful way, who in place of a man becomes a 
wolf, or viper, or wasp ? 

The man who is not under restraint is free, to 
whom things are exactly in that state in which he 
wishes them to be ; but he who can be restrained, 
or compelled, or hindered, or thrown into any cir- 
cumstances against his will, is a slave. But who is 
free from restraint? He who desires nothing that 
belongs to (is in the power of) others. And what 



1/6 EPICTETUS. 

are the things which belong to others ? Those which 
are not in our power either to have or not to have, 
or to have of a certain kind or in a certain manner. 
Therefore the body belongs to another, the parts of 
the body belong to another, possession (property) 
belongs to another. If then you are attached to 
any of these things as your own, you will pay the 
penalty which it is proper for him to pay who 
desires what belongs to another. This road leads 
to freedom, this is the only way of escaping from 
slavery, to be able to say at last with all your soul 

Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O destiny. 
The way that I am bid by you to go. 

Tell the truth then, slave, and do not run away 
from your masters, nor deny, nor venture to pro- 
duce any one to assert your freedom when you have 
so many evidences of your slavery. And indeed 
when a man is compelled by love to do something 
contrary to his opinion (judgment), and at the 
same time sees the better, but has not the strength 
to follow it, one might consider him still more 
worthy of excuse as being held by a certain violent 
and in a manner a divine power. And again, when 
in order to obtain these great and much admired 
magistracies and honors, you kiss the hands of 
these slaves of others, and so you are not the slave 
even of free men. Then you walk about before me 
in stately fashion a praetor or a consul. Do I not 
know how you became a praetor, by what means 
you got your consulship, who gave it to you.'' I 



DISCOURSES. 177 

would not even choose to live, if I must live by 
help of Felicion and endure his arrogance and 
servile insolence : for I know what a slave is, 
who is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by 
pride. 

You then, a man may say, are you free ? I wish, 
by the gods, and pray to be free ; but I am not yet 
able to face my masters, I still value my poor body, 
I value greatly the preservation of it entire, though 
I do not possess it entire. But I can point out to 
you a free man, that you may no longer seek an 
example. Diogenes was free. How was he free? 
— not because he was born of free parents, but 
because he was himself free ; because he had cast 
off all the handles of slavery, and it was not pos- 
sible for any man to approach him, nor had any 
man the means of laying hold of him to enslave 
him. He had everything easily loosed, everything 
only hanging to him. If you laid hold of his prop- 
erty, he would have rather let it go and be yours, 
than he would have followed you for it ; if you had 
laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg ; 
if of all his body, all his poor body ; his intimates, 
friends, country, just the same. For he knew from 
whence he had them, and from whom, and on what 
conditions. His true parents indeed, the gods, and 
his real country he would never have deserted, nor 
would he have yielded to any man in obedience to 
them and to their orders, nor would any man have 
died for his country more readily. For he was not 
used to inquire when he should be considered to 



1/8 EPICTETUS. 

have done anything on behalf of the whole of things 
(the universe, or all the world), but he remembered 
that everything which is done comes from thence 
and is done on behalf of that country and is com- 
manded by him who administers it. Therefore see 
what Diogenes himself says and writes: — "For this 
reason, he says, Diogenes, it is in your power to 
speak both with the king of the Persians and with 
Archidamus, the king of the Lacedaemonians, as 
you please." Was it because he was born of free 
parents? I suppose all the Athenians and all the 
Lacedaemonians, because they were born of slaves, 
could not talk with them (these kings) as they 
wished, but feared and paid court to them. Why 
then does he say that it is in his power? Because 
I do not consider the poor body to be my own; 
because I want nothing ; because law is everything 
to me, and nothing else is. These were the things 
which permitted him to be free. 

Take Socrates and observe that he had a wife 
and children, but he did not consider them as his 
own ; that he had a country, so long as it was fit to 
have one, and in such a manner as was fit ; friends 
and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to 
law and to the obedience due to it. For this reason 
he was the first to go out as a soldier, when it was 
necessary, and in war he exposed himself to danger 
most unsparingly ; and when he was sent by the 
tyrants to seize Leon, he did not even deliberate 
about the matter, because he thought that it was a 
base action, and he knew that he must die (for his 



DISCOURSES. 179 

refusal) if it so happened.-^ And what difference 
did that make to him? for he intended to preserve 
something else, not his poor flesh, but his fidelity, 
his honorable character. These are things which 
could not be assailed nor brought into subjection. 
Then when he was obliged to speak in defense of 
his life, did he behave like a man who had children, 
who had a wife? No, but he behaved like a man 
who has neither. And what did he do when he was 
(ordered) to drink the poison, and when he had the 
power of escaping from prison, and when Crito said 
to him, Escape for the sake of your children, what 
did Socrates say? did he consider the power of 
escape as an unexpected gain ? By no means : he 
considered what was fit and proper ; but the rest 
he did not even look at or take into the reckoning. 
For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor 
body, but to save that which is increased and saved 
by doing what is just, and is impaired and de- 
stroyed by doing what is unjust. Socrates will 
not save his life by a base act ; he who would not 
put the Athenians to the vote when they clamored 
that he should do so ; he who refused to obey the 
tyrants ; he who discoursed in such a manner about 
virtue and right behavior. It is not possible to 
save such a man's life by base acts, but he is saved 

1 Socrates with others was ordered by the Thirty tyrants, 
who at that time governed Athens, to arrest Leon in the 
island of Salamis and to bring him to be put to death. But 
Socrates refused to obey the order. Few men would have 
done what he did under the circumstances. 



l80 . EPICTETUS. 

by dying, not by running away. For the good actor 
also preserves his character by stopping when he 
ought to stop, better than when he goes on acting 
beyond the proper time. What then shall the chil- 
dren of Socrates do? "If," said Socrates, "I had 
gone off to Thessaly, would you have taken care of 
them ; and if I depart to the world below, will there 
be no man to take care of them?" See how he 
gives to death a gentle name and mocks it. But if 
you and I had been in his place, we should have 
immediately answered as philosophers that those 
who act unjustly must be repaid in the same way, 
and we should have added, "I shall be useful to 
many, if my life is saved, and if I die, I shall be 
useful to no man." For, if it had been neces- 
sary, we should have made our escape by slipping 
through a small hole. And how in that case should 
we have been useful to any man? for where would 
they have been then staying? or if we were useful 
to men while we were alive, should we not have 
been much more useful to them by dying when we 
ought to die, and as we ought? And now Socrates 
being dead, no less useful to men, and even more 
useful, is the remembrance of that which he did or 
said when he was alive. 

Think of these things, these opinions, these 
words : look to these examples, if you would be free, 
if you desire the thing according to its worth. And 
what is the wonder if you buy so great a thing at 
the price of things so many and so great ? For the 
sake of this which is called liberty, some hang them- 



DISCOURSES. I8l 

selves, others throw themselves down precipices, 
and sometimes even whole cities have perished: 
and will you not for the sake of the true and unas- 
sailable and secure liberty give back to God when 
he demands them the things which he has given ? 
Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, 
but also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging 
and in a word to give up all which is not your own ? 
If you will not, you will be a slave among slaves, 
even if you be ten thousand times a consul; freedom 
is acquired, not by the full possession of the things 
which are desired, but by removing the desire. 
And that you may know that this is true, as you 
have labored for those things, so transfer your labor 
to these; be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring 
an opinion which will make you free. 

ON FAMILIAR INTIMACY. 

To this matter before all you must attend, that 
you be never so closely connected with any of your 
former intimates or friends as to come down to the 
same acts as he does. If you do not observe this 
rule, you will ruin yourself. But if the thought 
arises in your mind, '^ I shall seem disobliging to 
him and he will not have the same feeling towards 
me," remember that nothing is done without cost, 
nor is it possible for a man if he does not do the 
same things to be the same man that he was. 
Choose then which of the two you will have, to be 
equally loved by those by whom you were formerly 



1 82 EPICTETUS. 

loved, being the same with your former self ; or 
being superior, not to obtain from your friends the 
same that you did before. For if this is better, 
immediately turn away to it, and let not other con- 
siderations draw you in a different direction. For 
no man is able to make progress (improvement), 
when he is wavering between opposite things ; but 
if you have preferred this (one thing) to all things, 
if you choose to attend to this only, to work out 
this only, give up everything else. But if you will 
not do this, your wavering will produce both these 
results: you will neither improve as you ought, nor 
T\dll you obtain what you formerly obtained. For 
before by plainly desiring the things which were 
worth nothing, you pleased your associates. But 
you cannot excel in both kinds, and it is necessary 
that so far as you share in the one, you must fall 
short in the other. You cannot, when you do not 
drink with those with whom you used to drink, be 
agreeable to them as you were before. Choose 
then whether you will be a hard drinker and 
pleasant to your former associates, or a sober man 
and disagreeable to them. You cannot, when you 
do not sing with those with whom you used to sing, 
be equally loved by them. Choose then in this 
matter also which of the two you will have. For if 
it is better to be modest and orderly, than for a man 
to say. He is a jolly fellow, give up the rest, 
renounce it, turn away from it, have nothing to do 
with such men. 



DISCOURSES. 183 

WHAT THINGS WE SHOULD EXCHANGE FOR OTHER 
THINGS. 

Keep this thought in readiness, when you lose 
anything external what you acquire in place of it ; 
and if it be worth more, never say, I have had a 
loss; neither if you have got a horse in place of an 
ass, or an ox in place of a sheep, nor a good action 
in place of a bit of money, nor in place of idle talk 
such tranquillity as befits a man, nor in place of 
lewd talk if you have acquired modesty. If you 
remember this, you will always maintain your char- 
acter such as it ought to be. But if you do not, 
consider that the times of opportunity are perishing, 
and that whatever pains you take about yourself, 
you are going to Waste them all and overturn them. 
And it needs only a few things for the loss and 
overturning of all, namely, a small deviation from 
reason. For the steerer of a ship to upset it, he 
has no need of the same means as he has need of 
for saving it: but if he turns it a little to the wind, 
it is lost; and if he does not do this purposely, but 
has been neglecting his duty a little, the ship is 
lost. Something of the kind happens in this case 
also : if you only fall a-nodding a little, all that you 
have up to this time collected, is gone. Attend 
therefore to the appearances of things, and watch 
over them; for that which you have to preserve is 
no small matter, but it is modesty and fidelity and 
constancy, freedom from the affects, a state of mind 
undisturbed, freedom from fear, tranquillity, in a 



184 EPICTETUS. 

word, liberty. For what will you sell these things ? 
See what is the value of the things which you will 
obtain in exchange for these. — But shall I not 
obtain any such thing for it .'' — See, and if you do 
in return get that, see what you receive in place of 
it. I possess decency, he possesses a tribuneship : 
he possesses a praetorship, I possess modesty. But 
I do not make acclamations where it is not becom- 
ing: I will not stand up where I ought not; for 1 
am free, and a friend of God, and so I obey him 
willingly. But I must not claim (seek) anything 
else, neither body nor possession, nor magistracy, 
nor good report, nor in fact anything. For he 
(God) does not allow me to claim (seek) them: for 
if he had chosen, he would have made them good 
for me; but he has not done so, and for this reason 
I cannot transgress his commands. Preserve that 
which is your own good in everything; and as to 
every other thing, as it is permitted, and so far as 
to behave consistently with reason in respect to 
them, content with this only. 

TO THOSE WHO ARE DESIROUS OF PASSING LIFE 
IN TRANQUILLITY. 

Remember that not only the desire of power and 
of riches makes us mean and subject to others, but 
even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure, and 
of traveling abroad, and of learning. For to speak 
plainly, whatever the external thing may be, the 
value which we set upon it places us in subjection 



DISCOURSES. 185 

to Others. What then is the difference between 
desiring to be a senator or not desiring to be one ; 
what is the difference between desiring power or 
being content with a private station ; what is the 
difference between saying, I am unhappy, I have 
nothing to do, but I am bound to my books as a 
corpse; or saying, I am unhappy, I have no leisure 
for reading.? For as salutations and power are 
things external and independent of the will, so is a 
book. For what purpose do you choose to read ? 
Tell me. For if you only direct your purpose to 
being amused or learning something, you are a silly 
fellow and incapable of enduring labor. But if you 
refer reading to the proper end, what else is this 
than a tranquil and happy life ? But if reading 
does not secure for you a happy and tranquil life, 
what is the use of it ? But it does secure this, the 
man replies, and for this reason I am vexed that I 
am deprived of it. — And what is this tranquil and 
happy life, which any man can impede, I do not say 
Caesar or Caesar's friend, but a crow, a piper, a 
fever, and thirty thousand other things ? But a 
tranquil and happy life contains nothing so sure as 
continuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I am 
called to do something: I will go then with the 
purpose of observing the measures (rules) which I 
must keep, of acting with modesty, steadiness, with- 
out desire and aversion to things external; and then 
that I may attend to men, what they say, how they 
are moved; and this not with any bad disposition, 
or that I may have something to blame or to 



1 86 EPICTETUS. 

ridicule; but I turn to myself, and ask if I also 
commit the same faults. How then shall I cease 
to commit them ? Formerly, I also acted wrong, 
but now I do not : thanks to God. 

Come, when you have done these things and 
have attended to them, have you done a worse 
act than when you have read a thousand verses 
or written as many? For when you eat, are you 
grieved because you are not reading? are you not 
satisfied with eating according to what you have 
learned by reading, and so with bathing and with 
exercise? Why then do you not act consistently 
in all things, both when you approach Caesar, and 
when you approach any person? If you maintain 
yourself free from perturbation, free from alarm, 
and steady ; if you look rather at the things which 
are done and happen than are looked at yourself ; 
if you do not envy those who are preferred before 
you ; if surrounding circumstances do not strike 
you with fear or admiration, what do you want? 
Books? How or for what purpose? for is not this 
(the reading of books) a preparation for life? and 
is not life itself (living) made up of certain other 
things than this? This is just as if an athlete 
should weep when he enters the stadium, because 
he is not being exercised outside of it. It was for 
this purpose that you used to practice exercise ; for 
this purpose were used the halte'res (weights), the 
dust, the young men as antagonists ; and do you 
seek for those things now when it is the time of 
action? This is just as if in the topic (matter) of 



DISCOURSES. 187 

assent when appearances present themselves, some 
of which can be comprehended, and some cannot 
be comprehended, we should not choose to distin- 
guish them, but should choose to read what has 
been written about comprehension. 

What then is the reason of this? The reason is 
that we have never read for this purpose, we have 
never written for this purpose, so that we may in 
our actions use in a way conformable to nature the 
appearances presented to us ; but we terminate in 
this, in learning what is said, and in being able to 
expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism, and 
in handling the hypothetical syllogism. For this 
reason where our study (purpose) is, there alone is 
the impediment. Would you have by all means the 
things which are not in your power? Be prevented 
then ; be hindered ; fail in your purpose. But if 
we read what is written about action, not that we 
may see what is said about action, but that we may 
act well ; if we read what is said about desire and 
aversion (avoiding things), in order that we may 
neither fail in our desires nor fall into that which 
we try to avoid ; if we read what is said about duty 
in order that remembering the relations (of things 
to one another) we may do nothing irrationally nor 
contrary to these relations; we should not be vexed 
in being hindered as to our readings, but we should 
be satisfied with doing the acts which are conform- 
able (to the relations), and we should be reckoning 
not what so far we have been accustomed to reckon : 
To-day I have read so many verses, I have written 



lS8 EPICTETUS. 

SO many; but (we should say), To-day I have 
employed my action as it is taught by the philoso- 
phers; I have not employed my desire; I have used 
avoidance only with respect to things which are 
within the power of my will; I have not been afraid 
of such a person, I have not been prevailed upon 
by the entreaties of another; I have exercised my 
patience, my abstinence, my cooperation with 
others; and so we should thank God for what we 
ought to thank him. 

Athens is a good place. — But happiness is much 
better; and to be free from passions, free from dis- 
turbance, for your affairs not to depend on any 
man. There is tumult at Rome and visits of salu- 
tation. But happiness is an equivalent for all 
troublesome things. If then the time comes for 
these things, why do you not take away the wish to 
avoid them ? what necessity is there to carry a 
burden like an ass, and to be beaten with a stick } 
But if you do not so, consider that you must always 
be a slave to him who has it in his power to effect 
your release, and also to impede you, and you must 
serve him as an evil genius. 

There is only one way to happiness, and let this 
rule be ready both in the morning and during the 
day and by night : the rule is not to look towards 
things which are out of the power of our will, to 
think that nothing is our own, to give up all things 
to the Divinity, to Fortune ; to make them the 
superintendents of these things, whom Zeus also 
has made so; for a man to observe that only which 



DISCOURSES. 189 

is his own, that which cannot be hindered ; and 
when we read, to refer our reading to this only, and 
our writing and our listening. For this reason I 
cannot call the man industrious, if I hear this only, 
that he reads and writes; and even if a man adds 
that he reads all night, I cannot say so, if he knows 
not to what he should refer his reading. For 
neither do you say that a man is industrious if he 
keeps awake for a girl ; nor do I. But if he does it 
(reads and writes) for reputation, I say that he is a 
lover of reputation. And if he does it for money, I 
say that he is a lover of money, not a lover of labor; 
and if he does it through love of learning, I say 
that he is a lover of learning. But if he refers his 
labor to his own ruling power, that he may keep it 
in a state conformable to nature and pass his life 
in that state, then only do I say that he is industri- 
ous. For never commend a man on account of 
these things which are common to all, but on 
account of his opinions (principles); for these are 
the things which belong to each man, which make 
his actions bad or good. Remembering these rules, 
rejoice in that which is present, and be content 
with the things which come in season.-^ If you see 
anything which you, have learned and inquired 
about occurring to you in your course of life (or 
opportunely applied by you to the acts of life), be 

1 See Antoninus, vi. 2 ; and ix. 6 ' Thy present opinion 
founded on understanding, and thy present conduct directed 
to social good, and thy present disposition of contentment 
with everything which happens — that is enough.' 



190 EPICTETUS. 

delighted at it. If you have laid aside or have 
lessened bad disposition and a habit of reviling ; if 
you have done so with rash temper, obscene words, 
hastiness, sluggishness ; if you are not moved by 
what you formerly were, and not in the same way 
as you once were, you can celebrate a festival daily, 
to-day because you have behaved well in one act, 
and to-morrow because you have behaved well in 
another. How much greater is this a reason for 
making sacrifices than a consulship or the govern- 
ment of a province ? These things come to you 
from yourself and from the gods. Remember this, 
who gives these things and to whom, and for what 
purpose. If you cherish yourself in these thoughts, 
do you still think that it makes any difference 
where you shall be happy, where you shall please 
God ? Are not the gods equally distant from all 
places ? Do they not see from all places alike that 
which is going on ? 



AGAINST THE QUARRELSOME AND FEROCIOUS. 

The wise and good man neither himself fights 
with any person, nor does he allow another, so far 
as he can prevent it. And an example of this, as 
well as of all other things, is proposed to us in the 
life of Socrates, who not only himself on all occa- 
sions avoided fights (quarrels), but would not allow 
even others to quarrel. See how he tolerated his 
wife, and how he tolerated his son. For he remem- 
bered well that no man has in his power another 



DISCOURSES. 191 

man's ruling principle. He wished, therefore, for 
nothing else than that which was his own. And 
what is this ? Not that this or that man may act 
according to nature ; for that is a thing which 
belongs to another ; but that while others are doing 
their own acts, as they choose, he may nevertheless 
be in a condition conformable to nature and live in 
it, only doing what is his own to the end that others 
also may be in a state conformable to nature. For 
this is the object always set before him by the wise 
and good man. Is it to be commander (a praetor) 
of an army? No ; but if it is permitted him, his 
object is in this matter to maintain his own ruling 
principle. Is it to marry ? No ; but if marriage is 
allowed to him, in this matter his object is to main- 
tain himself in a condition conformable to nature. 
But if he would have his son not to do wrong, or 
his wife, he would have what belongs to another 
not to belong to another : and to be instructed is 
this, to learn what things are a man's own and what 
belongs to another. 

How, then, is there left any place for fighting 
(quarreling) to a man who has this opinion (which 
he ought to have) ? Is he surprised at anything 
which happens, and does it appear new to him ? 
Does he not expect that which comes from the bad 
to be worse and more grievous than what actually 
befalls him ? And does he not reckon as pure gain 
whatever they (the bad) may do which falls short 
of extreme wickedness ? Such a person has reviled 
you. Great thanks to him for not having struck 



192 EPICTETUS. 

you. But he has struck me also. Great thanks 
that he did not wound you. But he wounded me 
also. Great thanks that he did not kill you. For 
when did he learn, or in what school, that man is a 
tame animal, that men love one another, that an 
act of injustice is a great harm to him who does it? 
Since, then, he has not learned this, and is not 
convinced of it, why shall he not follow that which 
seems to be for his own interest? Your neighbor 
has thrown stones. Have you, then, done anything 
wrong? But the things* in the house have been 
broken. Are you, then, a utensil ? No ; but a free 
power of will. What, then, is given to you (to do) 
in answer to this ? If you are like a wolf, you must 
bite in return, and throw more stones. But if you 
consider what is proper for a man, examine your 
storehouse, see with what faculties you came into 
the world. Have you the disposition of a wild 
beast? Have you the disposition of revenge for 
an injury? When is a horse wretched? When he 
is deprived of his natural faculties, not when he 
cannot crow like a cock, but when he cannot run. 
When is a dog wretched ? Not when he cannot fly, 
but when he cannot track his game. Is, then, a 
man also unhappy in this way, not because he 
cannot strangle lions or embrace statues, for he did 
not come into the world in the possession of certain 
powers from nature for this purpose, but because 
he has lost his probity and his fidelity? People 
ought to meet and lament such a man for the mis- 
fortunes into which he has fallen ; not, indeed, to 



DISCOURSES. 193 

lament because a man has been born or has died, 
but because it has happened to him in his Hfetime 
to have lost the things which are his own, not that 
which he received from his father, not his land and 
house, and his inn, and his slaves ; for not one of 
these things is a man's own, but all belong to 
others, are servile, and subject to account, at differ- 
ent times given to different persons by those who 
have them in their power : but I mean the things 
which belong to him as a man, the marks (stamps) 
in his mind with which he came into the world, 
such as we seek also on coins, and if we find them, 
we approve of the coins, and if we do not find the 
marks, we reject them. What is the stamp on this 
Sestertius ? The stamp of Trajan. Present it. It 
is the stamp of Nero. Throw it away : it cannot 
be accepted, it is counterfeit. So also in this case : 
What is the stamp of his opinions ? It is gentle- 
ness, a sociable disposition, a tolerant temper, a 
disposition to mutual affection. Produce these 
qualities. I accept them : I consider this man a 
citizen, I accept him as a neighbor, a companion in 
my voyages. Only see that he has not Nero's 
stamp. Is he passionate, is he full of resentment, 
is he fault-finding ? If the whim seizes him, does 
he break the heads of those who come in his way ? 
(If so) why then did you say that he is a man ? 
Is everything judged (determined) by the bare 
form ? If that is so, say that the form in wax is an 
apple and has the smell and the taste of an apple. 
But the external figure is not enough ; neither then 



194 EPICTETUS. 

is the nose enough and the eyes to make the man, 
but he must have the opinions of a man. Here is 
a man who does not listen to reason, who does not 
know when he is refuted : he is an ass : in another 
man the sense of shame is become dead : he is 
good for nothing, he is anything rather than a man. 
This man seeks whom he may meet or kick or bite, 
so that he is not even a sheep or an ass, but a kind 
of wild beast. 

What then ? would you have me to be despised ? 
— By whom ? by those who know you ? and how 
shall those who know you despise a man who is 
gentle and modest ? Perhaps you mean by those 
who do not know you ? What is that to you ? For 
no other artisan cares for the opinion of those who 
know not his art. — But they will be more hostile 
to me for this reason. — Why do you say ' me ' ? 
Can any man injure your will, or prevent you from 
using in a natural way the appearances which are 
presented to you ? In no way can he. Why then 
are you still disturbed and why do you choose to 
show yourself afraid ? And why do you not come 
forth and proclaim that you are at peace with all 
men whatever they may do, and laugh at those 
chiefly who think that they can harm you .'' These 
slaves, you can say, know not either who I am, nor 
where lies my good or my evil, because they have 
no access to the things which are mine. 

In this way also those who occupy a strong city 
mock the besiegers, (and say) : What trouble these 
men are now taking for nothing : our wall is secure. 



DISCOURSES. 195 

we have food for a very long time, and all other 
resources. These are the things which make a city 
strong and impregnable : but nothing else than his 
opinions makes a man's soul impregnable. For 
what wall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or 
what possession is so safe, or what honor (rank, 
character) so free from assault (as a man's opin- 
ions) ? All (other) things everywhere are perishable, 
easily taken by assault, and if any man in any way 
is attached to them, he must be disturbed, expect 
what is bad, he must fear, lament, find his desires 
disappointed, and fall into things which he would 
avoid. Then do we not choose to make secure the 
only means of safety which are offered to us, and 
do we not choose to withdraw ourselves from that 
which is perishable and servile and to labor at the 
things which are imperishable and by nature free ; 
and do we not remember that no man either hurts 
another or does good to another, but that a man's 
opinion about each thing, is that which hurts him, 
is that which overturns him ; this is fighting, this 
is civil discord, this is war ? That which made 
Eteocles and Polynices ^ enemies was nothing else 
than this opinion which they had about royal power, 
their opinion about exile, that the one is the extreme 
of evils, the other the greatest good. Now this is 

1 Eteocles and Polynices were the sons of the unfortunate 
Oedipus, who quarreled about the kingship of Thebes and 
killed one another. This quarrel is the subject of the Seven 
against Thebes of Aeschylus and the Phoenissae of Euripides. 
See ii. 22, note 3. 



196 EPICTETUS. 

the nature of every man to seek the good, to avoid 
the bad ; to consider him ^vho deprives us of the 
one and involves us in the other an enemy and 
treacherous, even if he be a brother, or a son or a 
father. For nothing is more akin to us than the 
good : therefore if these things (externals) are 
good and evil, neither is a father a friend to sons, 
nor a brother to a brother, but all the world is 
everwhere full of enemies, treacherous men, and 
sycophants. But if the will (the purpose, the 
intention) being what it ought to be, is the only 
good ; and if the will being such as it ought not to 
be, is the only evil, where is there any strife, where 
is there reviling ? about what ? about the things 
which do not concern us ? and strife with whom ? 
with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those who are 
deceived about the chief things ? 

Remembering this, Socrates managed his own 
house and endured a verv' ill-tempered wife and a 
foolish (ungrateful ?) son.-^ For in v«'hat did she 

1 Socrates' wife Xanthippe is charged by her eldest son 
Lamprocles with being so ill-tempered as to be past all endur- 
ance (Xenophon, Memorab, ii. 2, 7). Xenophon in this chap- 
ter has reported the conversation of Socrates with his son on 
this matter. 

Diogenes Laertius (ii.) tells the story of Xanthippe pouring 
water on the head of Socrates, and dirty water, as Seneca 
says (De Constantia, c. 18). Aelian (xi. 12) reports that 
Alcibiades sent Socrates a large and good cake, which Xan- 
thippe trampled under her feet. Socrates only laughed and 
said, \Yell then, you will not have your share of it. The 
philosopher showed that his philosophy was practical by 



DISCOURSES. 197 

show her bad temper ? In pouring water on his 
head as much as she liked, and in trampling on the 
cake (sent to Socrates). And what is this to me, if 
I think that these things are nothing to me ? But 
this is my business ; and neither tyrant shall check 
my will nor a master ; nor shall the many check me 
who am only one, nor shall the stronger check 
me who am the weaker ; for this power of being 
free from check (hindrance) is given by God to 
every man. For these opinions make love in a 
house (family), concord in a state, among nations 
peace, and gratitude to God ; they make a man in 
all things cheerful (confident) in externals as about 
things which belong to others, as about things which 
are of no value. We indeed are able to write and 
to read these things, and to praise them when they 
are read, but we do not even come near to being 
convinced of them. Therefore what is said of the 
Lacedaemonians, " Lions at home, but in Ephesus 
foxes," will fit in our case also, "Lions in the 
school, but out of it foxes." 

AGAINST THOSE WHO LAMENT OVER BEING PITIED. 

I am grieved, a man says, at being pitied. 
Whether then is the fact of your being pitied a 
thing which concerns you or those who pity you? 
Well, is it in your power to stop this pity ? — It is 

enduring the torment of a very ill-tempered wife, one of the 
greatest calamities that can happen to a man, and the trouble 
of an undutiful son. 



IQo EPICTETUS. 

in my power, if I show them that I do not require 
pity. — And whether then are you in the condition 
of not deserving (requiring) pity, or are you not in 
that condition ? — I think that I am not : but these 
persons do not pity me, for the things for which, if 
they ought to pity me, it would be proper, I mean, 
for m}^ faults ; but they pity me for my poverty, for 
not possessing honorable offices, for diseases and 
deaths and other such things — Whether then are 
you prepared to convince the man}^, that not one of 
these things is an evil, but that it is possible for a 
man who is poor and has no office and enjoys no 
honor to be happy : or to show yourself to them 
as rich and in power ? For the second of these 
things belong to a man who is boastful, silly and 
good for nothing. And consider by what means 
the pretense must be supported. It will be neces- 
s3.Ty for you to hire slaves and to possess a few 
silver vessels, and to exhibit them in public, if it is 
possible, though they are often the same, and to 
attempt to conceal the fact that they are the same, 
and to have splendid garments, and all other things 
for display, and to show that you are a man hon- 
ored by the great, and to try to sup at their houses, 
or to be supposed to sup there, and as to your 
person to employ some mean arts, that you may 
appear to be more handsome and nobler than you 
are. These things you must contrive, if you choose 
to go by the second path in order not to be pitied. 
But the first way is both impracticable and long, to 
attempt the very thing which Zeus has not been 



. DISCOURSES. 199 

able to do, to convince all men what things are 
good and bad. Is this power given to you ? This 
only is given to you, to convince yourself ; and you 
have not convinced yourself. Then I ask you, do 
you attempt to persuade other men ? and who has 
lived so long with you as you with yourself ? and 
who has so much power of convincing you as you 
have of convincing yourself ; and who is better 
disposed and nearer to you than you are to yourself ? 
How then have you not yet convinced yourself in 
order to learn ? At present are not things upside 
down ? Is this what you have been earnest about 
doing, to learn to be free from grief and free from 
disturbance, and not to be humbled, and to be free ? 
Have you not heard then that there is only one way 
which leads to this end, to give up the things which 
do not depend on the will, to withdraw from them, 
and to admit that they belong to others ? For 
another man then to have an opinion about you, of 
what kind is it ? — It is a thing independent of the 
will — Then is it nothing to you ? — It is nothing — 
When then you are still vexed at this and disturbed, 
do you think that you are convinced about good and 
evil ? 

Will you not then letting others alone be to your- 
self both scholar and teacher ? — The rest of 
mankind will look after this, whether it is to their 
interest to be and to pass their lives in a state 
contrary to nature : but to me no man is nearer 
than myself. 

By the very act that you feel (suffer) about being 



200 EPICTETUS. 

pitied, you make yourself deserving of pity. What 
then says Antisthenes ? Have you not heard ? 
' It is a royal thing, O Cyrus, to do right (well) and 
to be ill spoken of/ My head is sound, and all 
think that I have the headache. What do I care 
for that ? I am free from fever, and people sympa- 
thize with me as if I had a fever, (and say) Poor 
man, for so long a time you have not ceased to have 
fever. I also say with a sorrowful countenance. In 
truth it is now a long time that I have been ill. 
What will happen then ? As God may please : and 
at the same time I secretly laugh at those who are 
pitying me. What then hinders the same being 
done in this case also ? I am poor, but I have a 
right opinion about poverty. Why then do I care 
if they pity me for my poverty ? I am not in power 
(not a magistrate) ; but others are : and I have the 
opinion which I ought to have about having and 
not having power. Let them look to it who pity 
me ; but I am neither hungry nor thirsty nor do I 
suffer cold ; but because they are hungry or thirsty 
they think that I too am. What then shall I do 
for them ? Shall I go about and proclaim and say. 
Be not mistaken, men, I am very well, I do not 
trouble myself about poverty, nor want of power, nor 
in a word about anything else than right opinions. 
These I have free from restraint, I care for nothing 
at all. — What foolish talk is this? How do I 
possess right opinions when I am not content with 
being what I am, but am uneasy about what I am 
supposed to be ? 



DISCOURSES. 201 

But you say, others will get more and be preferred 
to me. — What then is more reasonable than for 
those who have labored about anything to have 
more in that thing in which they have labored ? 
They have labored for power, you have labored 
about opinions ; and they have labored for wealth, 
you for the proper use of appearances. See if 
they have more than you in this about which you 
have labored, and which they neglect ; if they 
assent better than you with respect to the natural 
rules (measures) of things ; if they are less disap- 
pointed than you in their desires ; if they fall less 
into things which they would avoid than you do ; 
if in their intentions, if in the things which they 
propose to themselves, if in their purposes, if in 
their motions towards an object they take a better 
aim ; if they better observe a proper behavior, as 
men, as sons, as parents, and so on as to the other 
names by which we express the relations of life. 
But if they exercise power, and you do not, will 
you not choose to tell yourself the truth, that you 
do nothing for the sake of this (power), and they 
do all ? But it is most unreasonable that he who 
looks after anything should obtain less than he who 
does not look after it. 

OF FREEDOM FROM FEAR. 

What hinders a man who has clearly separated 
(comprehended) these things from living with a 
light heart and bearing easily the reins, quietly 



202 EPICTETUS. 

expecting everything which can happen, and endur- 
ing that which has already happened ? Would you 
have me to bear poverty? Come, and you will 
know what poverty is when it has found one who 
can act well the part of a poor man. Would you 
have me to possess power ? Let me have power, 
and also the trouble of it. Well, banishment ? 
Wherever I shall go, there it will be well with me ; 
for here also where I am, it was not because of the 
place that it was well with me, but because of my 
opinions, which I shall carry off with me : for 
neither can any man deprive me of them ; but my 
opinions alone are mine, and they cannot be taken 
from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, 
wherever I may be and whatever I am doing. 

Why do I still strive to enter (Caesar's chamber) ? 
A man scatters dry figs and nuts : the children 
seize them, and fight with one another; men do 
not, for they think them to be a small matter. But 
if a man should throw about shells, even the 
children do not seize them. Provinces are dis- 
tributed: let children look to that. Money is dis- 
tributed : let children look to that. Praetorships, 
consulships are distributed: let children scramble 
for them, let them be shut out, beaten, kiss the 
hands of the giver, of the slaves : but to me these 
are only dried figs and nuts. What then .'* If you 
fail to get them, while Caesar is scattering them 
about, do not be troubled : if a dried fig come into 
your lap, take it and eat it ; for so far you may 
value even a fig. But if I shall stoop down and 



DISCOURSES. 203 

turn another over, or be turned over by another, 
and shall flatter those who have got into (Caesar's) 
chamber, neither is a dried fig worth the trouble, 
nor anything else of the things which are not good, 
which the philosophers have persuaded me not to 
think good. 

It is your study to live in houses with floors 
formed of various stones, how your slaves and de- 
pendents shall serve you, how you shall wear fine 
clothing, have many hunting men, lute players, and 
tragic actors. Do I claim any of these ? have you 
made any study of opinions, and of your own 
rational faculty? Do you know of what parts it is 
composed, how they are brought together, how they 
are connected, what powers it has, and of what 
kind ? Why, then, are you vexed if another who 
has made it his study has the advantage over you 
in these things ? But these things are the greatest. 
And who hinders you from being employed about 
these things and looking after them.? And who 
has a better stock of books, of leisure, of persons 
to aid you ? Only turn your mind at last to these 
things, attend, if it be only a short time, to your 
own ruling faculty : consider what this is that you 
possess, and whence it came, this which uses all 
other (faculties), and tries them, and selects and 
rejects. But so long as you employ yourself about 
externals, you will possess them as no man else 
does ; but you will have this (the ruling faculty) 
such as you choose to have it, sordid and neglected. 



204 EPICTETUS. 

AGAINST THOSE WHO HASTILY RUSH INTO THE USE 
OF THE PHILOSOPHIC DRESS. 

But no man will say, I am a musician, if he has 
bought a plectrum (fiddlestick) and a lute : nor will 
he say, I am a smith, if he has put on a cap and 
apron. But the dress is fitted to the art ; and they 
take their name from the art, and not from the 
dress. For this reason Euphrates used to say well, 
A long time I strove to be a philosopher without 
people knowing it ; and this, he said, was useful to 
me : for first I knew that when I did anything well, 
I did not do it for the sake of the spectators, but 
for the sake of myself : I ate well for the sake of 
myself ; I had my countenance well composed and 
my walk : all for myself and for God. Then, as I 
struggled alone, so I alone also was in danger : in 
no respect through me, if I did anything base or 
unbecoming, was philosophy endangered ; nor did 
I injure the many by doing anything wrong as a 
philosopher. For this reason, those who did not 
know my purpose used to wonder how it was that 
while I conversed and lived altogether with all 
philosophers, I was not a philosopher myself. And 
what was the harm for me to be known to be a 
philosopher by my acts and not by outward marks? 
See how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep, how I 
bear and forbear, how I cooperate, how I employ 
desire, how I employ aversion (turning from things), 
how I maintain the relations (to things) those which 



DISCOURSES. 205 

are natural or those which are acquired, how free 
from confusion, how free from hindrance. Judge 
of me from this, if you can. But if you are so deaf 
and blind that you cannot conceive even Hephaes- 
tus to be a good smith unless you see the cap on 
his head, what is the harm in not being recognized 
by so foolish a judge ? 

So Socrates was not known to be a philosopher 
by most persons ; and they used to come to him 
and ask to be introduced to philosophers. Was he 
vexed, then, as we are, and did he say, And do you 
not think that I am a philosopher ? No, but he 
would take them and introduce them, being satis- 
fied with one thing, with being a philosopher ; and 
being pleased also with not being thought to be a 
philosopher, he was not annoyed : for he thought 
of his own occupation. What is the work of an 
honorable and good man ? To have many pupils ? 
By no means. They will look to this matter who 
are earnest about it. But was it his business to 
examine carefully difficult theorems ? Others will 
look after these matters also. In what, then, was 
he, and who was he, and whom did he wish to be ? 
He was in that (employed in that) wherein there 
was hurt and advantage. If any man can damage 
me, he says, I am doing nothing : if I am waiting 
for another man to do me good, I am nothing. If 
I wish for anything, and it does not happen, I am 
unfortunate. To such a contest he invited every 
man, and I do not think that he would have de- 
clined the contest with any one. What do you sup- 



206 EPICTETUS. 

pose ? was it by proclaiming and saying, I am such 
a man ? Far from it, but by being such a man. 
For, further, this is the character of a fool and a 
boaster to say, I am free from passions and dis- 
turbance : do not be ignorant, my friends, that 
while you are uneasy and disturbed about things of 
no value, I alone am free fiom all perturbation. So 
is it not enough for you to feel no pain, unless you 
make this proclamation : Come together, all who 
are suffering gout, pains in the head, fever, ye who 
are lame, blind, and observe that I am sound (free) 
from every ailment. — This is empty and disagree- 
able to hear, unless, like Aesculapius, you are able 
to show immediately by what kind of treatment 
they also shall be immediately free from disease, 
and unless you show your own health as an example. 
Fruit grows thus : the seed must be buried for 
some time, hid, grow slowly in order that it may 
come to perfection. But if it produces the ear 
before the jointed stem, it is imperfect, a product 
of the garden of Adonis.-^ Such a poor plant are 
you also : you have blossomed too soon ; the cold 
weather will scorch you up. See what the husband- 
men say about seeds when there is warm weather 
too early. They are afraid lest the seeds should be 
too luxuriant, and then a single frost should lay 

1 * The gardens of Adonis ' are things growing in earthen 
vessels, carried about for show only, not for use. ' The gar- 
dens of Adonis ' is a proverbial expression applied to things 
of no value, to plants, for instance, which last only a short 
time, have no roots, and soon wither. 



DISCOURSES. 207 

hold of them and show that they are too forward. 
Do you also consider, my man : you have shot out 
too soon, you have hurried towards a little fame 
before the proper season : you think that you are 
something, a fool among fools : you will be caught 
by the frost, and rather you have been frost-bitten 
in the root below, but your upper parts still blossom 
a little, and for this reason you think that you are 
still alive and flourishing. Allow us to ripen in the 
natural way : why do you bare (expose) us ? why do 
you force us.^ we are not yet able to bear the air. 
Let the root grow, then acquire the first joint, then 
the second, and then the third : in this way then the 
fruit will naturally force itself out, even if I do not 
choose. 



TO A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN CHANGED TO A CHAR- 
ACTER OF SHAMELESSNESS. 

When you see another man in possession of power 
(magistracy), set against this the fact that you have 
not the want (desire) of power ; when you see 
another rich, see what you possess in place of 
riches : for if you possess nothing in place of them, 
you are miserable ; but if you have not the want of 
riches, know that you possess more than this man 
possesses and what is worth much more. Another 
man possesses a handsome woman (wife) : you have 
the satisfaction of not desiring a handsome wife. 
Do these things appear to you to be small? And 
how much would these persons give, these very men 



208 EPICTETUS. 

who are rich, and in possession of power, and live 
with handsome women, to be able to despise riches, 
and power and these very women whom they love 
and enjoy ? Do you not know then what is the 
thirst of a man who has a fever? He possesses 
that which is in no degree like the thirst of a man 
who is in health : for the man who is in health 
ceases to be thirsty after he has drunk ; but the 
sick man being pleased for a short time has a 
nausea, he converts the drink into bile, is griped, 
and more thirsty. It is such a thing to have desire 
of riches and to possess riches, desire of power and 
to possess power, desire of a beautiful woman ; to 
this is added jealousy, fear of being deprived of the 
thing which you love, indecent words, indecent 
thoughts, unseemly acts. 

And what do I lose ? you will say. My man, you 
were modest, and you are so no longer. Have you 
lost nothing? You wish to appear handsome and 
try to make yourself so, though you are not. You 
like to display splendid clothes that you m.ay attract 
women ; and if you find any fine oil (for the hair), 
you imagine that you are happy. But formerly you 
did not think of any such thing, but only where 
there should be decent talk, a worthy man, and a 
generous conception. Therefore you slept like a 
man, walked forth like a man, wore a manly dress, 
and used to talk in a way becoming a good man ; 
then do you say to me, I have lost nothing ? So do 
men lose nothing more than coin? Is not modesty 
lost? Is not decent behavior lost? is it that he 



DISCOURSES. 209 

who has lost these things has sustained no loss? 
Perhaps you think that not one of these things is a 
loss. But there was a time when you reckoned 
this the only loss and damage, and you were anxious 
that no man should disturb you from these (good) 
words and actions. 

Observe, you are disturbed from these good words 
and actions by nobody, but by yourself. Fight with 
yourself, restore yourself to decency, to modesty, to 
liberty. If any man ever told you this about me, 
that a person forces me to be an adulterer, to wear 
such a dress as yours, to perfume myself with oils, 
would you not have gone and with your own hand 
have killed the man who thus calumniated me? 
Now will you not help yourself? and how much 
easier is this help ? There is no need to kill any 
man, nor to put him in chains, nor to treat him with 
contumely, nor to enter the Forum (go to the courts 
of law), but it is only necessary for you to speak to 
yourself who will be most easily persuaded, with 
whom no man has more power of persuasion than 
yourself. First of all, condemn what you are doing, 
and then when you have condemned it, do not 
despair of yourself, and be not in the condition of 
those men of mean spirit, who, when they have once 
given in, surrender themselves completely and are 
carried away as if by a torrent. But see what the 
trainers of boys do. Has the boy fallen ? Rise, 
they say, wrestle again till you are made strong. 
Do you also do something of the same kind : for be 
well assured that nothing is more tractable than the 



210 EPICTETUS. 

human soul. You must exercise the Will,^ and the 
thing is done, it is set right : as on the other hand, 
only fall a nodding (be careless), and the thing is 
lost : for from within comes ruin and from within 
comes help. Then (you say) what good do I gain ? 
And what greater good do you seek than this ? 
From a shameless man you will become a modest 
man, from a disorderly you will become an orderly 
man, from a faithless you will become a faithful 
man, from a man of unbridled habits a sober man. 
If you seek anything more than this, go on doing 
what you are doing : not even a God can now help 
you. 

WHAT THINGS WE OUGHT TO DESPISE AND WHAT 
THINGS WE OUGHT TO VALUE. 

What would Hercules have been if he said. How 
shall a great lion not appear to me, or a great boar, 
or savage men ? And what do you care for that ? 
If a great boar appear, you will fight a greater fight : 
if bad men appear, you will relieve the earth of the 
bad. Suppose then that I lose my life in this way. 
You will die a good man, doing a noble act. What 
then do you wish to be doing when you are found 
by death? I for my part would wish to be found 
doing something which belongs to a man, benef- 

1 The power of the Will is a fundamental principle Ayith 
Epictetus. The will is strong in some, but very feeble in 
others ; and sometimes, as experience seems to show, it is 
incapable of resisting the power of old habits. 



DISCOURSES. 211 

icent, suitable to the general interest, noble. But 
if I cannot be found doing things so great, I would 
be found doing at least that which I cannot be 
hindered from doing, that which is permitted me to 
do, correcting myself, cultivating the faculty which 
makes use of appearances, laboring at freedom from 
the affects (laboring at tranquillity of mind), render- 
ing to the relations of life their due. If death sur- 
prises me when I am busy about these things, it is 
enough for me if I can stretch out my hands to God 
and say: The means which I have received from 
thee for seeing thy administration (of the world) 
and following it, I have not neglected: I have not 
dishonored thee by my acts: have I ever blamed 
thee ? have I been discontented with anything that 
happens, or wished it to be otherwise? have I 
wished to transgress the (established) relations (of 
things) ? That thou hast given me life, I thank 
thee: so long as I have used the things which are 
thine I am content; take them back and place them 
wherever thou mayest choose ; for thine were all 
things, thou gavest them to me. — Is it not enough 
to depart in this state of mind, and what life is 
better and more becoming than that of a man who 
is in this state of mind ? and what end is more 
happy ? 

But that this may be done (that such a declaration 
may be made), a man must receive (bear) no small 
things, nor are the things small which he must lose 
(go without). You cannot both wish to be a consul 
and to have these things (the power of making such 



212 EPICTETUS. 

a dying speech), and to be eager to have lands, and 
these things also; and to be solicitous about slaves 
and about yourself. But if you wish for anything 
which belongs to another, that which is your own is 
lost. This is the nature of the thing: nothing is 
given or had for nothing. And where is the 
wonder ? If you wish to be a consul, you must 
keep awake, run about, kiss hands, waste yourself 
with exhaustion at other men's doors, say and do 
many things unworthy of a free man, send gifts to 
many, daily presents to some. And what is the 
thing that is got ? Twelve bundles of rods (the 
consular fasces), to sit three or four times on the 
tribunal, to exhibit the games in the Circus and to 
give suppers in small baskets. In order then to 
secure freedom from passions, tranquillity, to sleep 
well when you do sleep, to be really awake when 
you are awake, to fear nothing, to be anxious about 
nothing, will you spend nothing and give no labor ? 
But if anything belonging to you be lost while you 
are thus busied, or be wasted badly, or another 
obtains what you ought to have obtained, will you 
immediately be vexed at what has happened } Will 
you not take into the account on the other side 
what you receive and for what, how much for how 
much ? Do you expect to have for nothing things 
so great ? And how can you ? One work (thing) 
has no community with another. You cannot have 
both external things after bestowing care on them 
and your own ruling faculty: but if you would have 
those, give up this. 



DISCOURSES. 213 

ABOUT PURITY (CLEANLINESS). 

Some persons raise a question whether the social 
feeling is contained in the nature of man ; and yet 
I think that these same persons would have no 
doubt that love of purity is certainly contained in 
it, and that if man is distinguished from other 
animals by anything, he is distinguished by this. 
We suppose that there is something superior in 
man, and that we first receive it from the Gods. 
For since the gods by their nature are pure and 
free from corruption, so far as *men approach them 
by reason, so far do they cling to purity and to a 
love of purity. But since it is impossible that 
man's nature can be altogether pure being mixed of 
such materials, reason is applied, as far as it is 
possible, and reason endeavors to make human 
nature love purity.-^ 

The first, then, and highest purity, is that which 
is in the soul ; and we say the same of impurity. 
Now, you could not discover the impurity of the 
soul as you could discover that of the body : but as 
to the soul, what else could you find in it than that 
which makes it filthy in respect to the acts which 
are her own ? Now, the acts of the soul are move- 
ment towards an object or movement from it, desire, 
aversion, preparation, design, assent. What, then, 
is it, which in these acts makes the soul filthy and 

1 In the text there are two \Yords, KaOaphs which means 
'pure,' and Kaddptos which means 'of a pure nature,' 'loving 
purity.' 



214 EPICTETUS. 

impure? Nothing else than her own bad judg- 
ments. Consequently, the impurity of the soul is 
the soul's bad opinions ; and the purification of the 
soul is the planting of it in proper opinions ; and 
the soul is pure which has proper opinions, for the 
soul alone in her own acts is free from perturbation 
and pollution. 

We ought not even by the appearance of the 
body to deter the multitude from philosophy ; but, 
as in other things, a philosopher should show him- 
self cheerful and tranquil, so also he should in the 
things that relate to the body : See, ye men, that I 
have nothing, that I want nothing: see how I am 
without a house, and without a city, and an exile, 
if it happens to be so,-^ and without a hearth I live 
more free from trouble and more happily than all 
of noble birth and than the rich. But look at m,y 
poor body, also, and observe that it is not injured 
by my hard way of living. — But if a man says this 
to me, who has the appearance (dress) and face of 
a condemned man, what God shall persuade me 
to approach philosophy, if^ it makes men such 
persons ? "Far from it ; I would not choose to do 
so, even if I were going to become a wise man. I, 
indeed, would rather that a young man, who is 
making his first movements toward philosophy, 
should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed 

1 Diogenes, it is said, was driven from his native to^^^l 
Sinope in Asia on a charge of having debased or counter- 
feited the coinage. Upton. It is probable that this is false. 

2 On the word uare see Schweig's note. 



DISCOURSES. 215 

than with it dirty and rough, for there is seen in 
him a certain notion (appearance) of beauty and a 
desire of (attempt at) that which is becoming ; and 
where he supposes it to be, there, also, he strives 
that it shall be. It is only necessary to show him 
(what it is), and to say : Young man, you seek 
beauty, and you do well : you must know, then, that 
it (is produced) grows in that part of you where 
you have the rational faculty: seek it there where 
you have the movements towards and the move- 
ments from things, where you have the desires 
towards, and the aversion from things : for this is 
what you have in yourself of a superior kind. 

ON ATTENTION. 

When you have remitted your attention for a 
short time, do not imagine this, that you will 
recover it when you choose ; but let this thought 
be present to you, that in consequence of the fault 
committed to-day your affairs must be in a worse 
condition for all that follows. For first, and what 
causes most trouble, a habit of not attending is 
formed in you ; then a habit of deferring your 
attention. Do you not see that when you have 
let your mind loose, it is no longer in your power 
to recall it, either to propriety, or to modesty, or to 
moderation ? but you do everything that comes into 
your mind in obedience to your inclinations. 

To what things then ought I to attend ? First, 
to those general (principles) and to have them in 



2l6 EPICTETUS. 

readiness, and without them not to sleep, not to 
rise, not to drink, not to eat, not to converse with 
men ; that no man is master of another man's 
will, but that in the will alone is the good and the 
bad. No man, then, has the power either to pro- 
cure for me any good or to involve me in any evil, 
but I alone, myself over myself, have power in these 
things. 

What then ? is it possible to be free from faults, 
(if you do all this) ? It is not possible ; but this is 
possible, to direct your efforts incessantly to being 
faultless. For we must be content if by never 
remitting this attention we shall escape at least a 
few errors. But now when you have said, To- 
morrow I will begin to attend, you must be told 
that you are saying this. To-day I will be shameless, 
disregardful of time and place, mean ; it will be in 
the power of others to give me pain ; to-day I will 
be passionate and envious. See how many evil 
things you are permitting yourselves to do. If it is 
good to use attention to-morrow, how much better 
is it to do so to-day? If to-morrow it is in your 
interest to attend, how much more is it to-day, that 
you may be able to do so to-morrow also, and may 
not defer it again to the third day. 

AGAINST OR TO THOSE W^HO READILY TELL THEIR 
OWN AFFAIRS. 

When a man has seemed to us to have talked 
with simplicity (candor) about his own affairs, how 
is it that at last we are ourselves also induced to 



DISCOURSES. 217 

discover to him our own secrets and we think this 
to be candid behavior ? In the first place, because 
it seems unfair for a man to have listened to the 
affairs of his neighbor, and not to communicate to 
him also in turn our own affairs : next, because we 
think that we shall not present to them the appear- 
ance of candid men when we are silent about our 
own affairs. Indeed, men are often accustomed to 
say, I have told you all my affairs, will you tell me 
nothing of your own ? Where is this done ? — 
Besides, w^e have also this opinion that we can 
safely trust him who has already told us his own 
affairs ; for the notion rises in our mind that this 
man could never divulge our affairs, because he 
would be cautious that w^e also should not divulge 
his. In this way also the incautious are caught by 
the soldiers at Rome. A soldier sits by you in a 
common dress and begins to speak ill of Caesar ; 
then you, as if you had received a pledge of his 
fidelity by his having begun the abuse, utter your- 
self also what you think, and then you are carried 
off in chains. 

Something of this kind happens to us also gener- 
ally. Now as this man has confidently intrusted 
his affairs to me, shall I also do so to any man 
whom I meet ? (No) for when I have heard, I 
keep silence, if I am of such a disposition ; but he 
goes forth and tells all men what he has heard. 
Then, if I hear what has been done, if I be a man 
like him, I resolve to be revenged ; I divulge what 
he has told me ; I both disturb others and am 



2l8 EPICTETUS. 

disturbed myself. But if I remember that one man 
does not injure another, and that every man's acts 
injure and profit him, I secure this, that I do not 
anything hke him, but still I suffer what I do suffer 
through my own silly talk. 

True : but it is unfair, when you have heard the 
secrets of your neighbor, for you in your turn to 
communicate nothing to him. — Did I ask you for 
your secrets, my man ? Did you communicate your 
affairs on certain terms, that you should in return 
hear mine also .'' If you are a babbler and think 
that all who meet you are friends, do you wish 
me also to be like you ? But why, if you did well 
in intrusting your affairs to me, and it is not well 
for me to intrust mine to you, do you wish me to be 
so rash } It is just the same as if I had a cask 
which is water-tight, and you one with a hole in it, 
and you should come and deposit with me your 
wine that I might put it into my cask, and then 
should complain that I also did not intrust my wine 
to you, for you have a cask with a hole in it. How, 
then, is there any equality here ? You intrusted 
your affairs to a man who is faithful and modest, to 
a man who thinks that his own actions alone are 
injurious and (or) useful, and that nothing external 
is. Would you have me intrust mine to you, a man 
who has dishonored his own faculty of will, and 
who wishes to gain some small bit of money or 
some office or promotion in the court (emperor's 
palace), even if you should be going to murder 
your own children, like Medea ? Where (in what) 



DISCOURSES. 219 

is this equality (fairness) ? But show yourself to 
me to be faithful, modest, and steady : show me 
that you have friendly opinions ; show that your 
cask has no hole in it ; and you will see how I shall 
not wait for you to trust me with your affairs, but I 
myself shall come to you and ask you to hear mine. 
For who does not choose to make use of a good 
vessel ? Who does not value a benevolent and 
faithful adviser .? Who will not willingly receive a 
man who is ready to bear a share, as we may say, 
of the difficulty of his circumstances, and, by this 
very act, to ease the burden by taking a part of it. 



THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. 



I. 

/^F things, some are in our power, and others are 
^-^ not. In our power are opinion, movement 
towards a thing, desire, aversion (turning from a 
thing), and, in a w^ord, whatever are our own acts. 
Not in our power are the body, property, reputation, 
offices, and, in a word, whatever are not our own 
acts. And the things in our power are by nature 
free, not subject to restraint nor hindrance : but the 
things not in our power are weak, slavish, subject 
to restraint, in the power of others. Remember, 
then, that if you think the things, which are by 
nature slavish to be free, and the things which are 
in the power of others to be your own, you will be 
hindered, you will lament, you will be disturbed, 
you will blame both gods and men : but if you 
think that only which is your own to be your own, 
and if you think that what is another's, as it really 
is, belongs to another, no man will ever compel you, 
no man will hinder you, you will never blame any 
man, you will accuse no man, you will do nothing 
involuntarily (against your will), no man will harm 



THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. 221 

you, you will have no enemy, for you will not suffer 
any harm. 

If, then, you desire such great things, remember 
that you must not lay hold of them with a small 
eifort ; but you must leave alone some things en- 
tirely, and postpone others for the present. But if 
you wish for these things also, and power and 
wealth, perhaps you will not gain even these very 
things (power and wealth), because you aim also at 
those former things (such great things). Certainly 
you will fail in those things through which alone 
happiness and freedom are secured, 

II. 

Remember that desire contains in it the pro- 
fession (hope) of obtaining that which you desire ; 
and the profession (hope) in aversion (turning from 
a thing) is that you will not fall into that which you 
attempt to avoid : and he who fails in his desire is 
unfortunate ; and he who falls into that which he 
would avoid is unhappy. If, then, you attempt to 
avoid only the things contrary to nature which are 
within your power, you will not be involved in any 
of the things which you would avoid. 

III. 

Men are disturbed not by the things which 
happen, but by the opinions about the things : for 
example, death is nothing terrible, for if it were, it 
would have seemed so to Socrates ; for the opinion 



222 EPICTETUS. 

about death, that it is terrible, is the terrible thing. 
When, then, we are impeded or disturbed or grieved, 
let us never blame others, but ourselves, that is, our 
opinions. It is the act of an ill-instructed man to 
blame others for his own bad condition ; it is the 
act' of one who has begun to be instructed, to lay 
the blame on himself ; and of one whose instruc- 
tion is completed, neither to blame another, nor 
himself. 

IV. 

Be not elated at any advantage (excellence) 
which belongs to another. If a horse when he is 
elated should say, I am beautiful, one might endure 
it. But when you are elated, and say, I have a 
beautiful horse, you must know that you are elated 
at having a good horse. What, then, is your own ? 
The use of appearances. Consequently, when in the 
use of appearances you are conformable to nature, 
then be elated, for then you will be elated at some- 
thing good which is your own. 

V. 

As on a voyage when the vessel has reached a 
port, if you go out to get water, it is an amusement, 
by the way, to pick up a shell-fish or some bulb, 
but your thoughts ought to be directed to the ship, 
and you ought to be constantly watching if the 
captain should call, and then you must throw away 
all those things, that you may not be bound and 
pitched into the ship like sheep : so in life, also, if 



THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. 223 

there be given to you instead of a little bulb and a 
shell, a wife and child, there will be nothing to 
prevent (you from taking them). But if the captain 
should call, run to the ship, and leave all those 
things without regard to them. But if you are old, 
do not even go far from the ship, lest when you are 
called you make default. 

VI. 

Seek not that the things which happen should 
happen as you wish ; but wish the things which 
happen to be as they are, and you will have a 
tranquil flow of life. 

VII. . 

Disease is an impediment to the body, but not 
to the will, unless the will itself chooses. Lame- 
ness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the 
will. And add this reflection on the occasion of 
everything that happens ; for you will find it an 
impediment to something else, but not to yourself. 

VIII. 

On the occasion of every accident (event) that 
befalls you, remember to turn to yourself and in- 
quire what power you have for turning it to use. 
If you see a fair man or a fair woman, you will find 
that the power to resist is temperance (continence). 
If labor (pain) be presented to you, you will find 
that it is endurance. If it be abusive words, you 



224 EPICTETUS. 

will find it to be patience. And if you have been 
thus formed to the (proper) habit, the appearances 
will not carry you along with them. 

IX. 

Remember that in life you ought to behave as 
at a banquet. Suppose that something is carried 
round and is opposite to you. Stretch out your 
hand and take a portion with decency. Suppose 
that it passes by you. Do not detain it. Suppose 
that it is not yet come to you. Do not send your 
desire forward to it, but wait till it is opposite to 
you. Do so with respect to children, so with 
respect to a wife, so with respect to magisterial 
offices, so with respect to wealth, and you will be 
some time a worthy partner of the banquets of the 
gods. But if you take none of the things which are 
set before you, and even despise them, then you 
will be not only a fellow banqueter with the gods, 
but also a partner with them in power. 

X. 

When you see a person weeping in sorrow, either 
when a child goes abroad or when he is dead, or 
when the man has lost his property, take care that 
the appearance do not hurry you away with it, as if 
he were suffering in external things. But straight- 
way make a distinction in your own mind, and 
be in readiness to say, it is not that which has 
happened that afflicts this man, for it does not 



THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. 22 5 

afflict another, but it is the opinion about this 
thing which afflicts the man. So far as words 
then do not be unwilling to show him sympathy, 
and even if it happens so, to lament with him. 
But take care that you do not lament internally, 
also. 

XI. 

You can be invincible, if you enter into no con- 
test in which it is not in your power to conquer. 
Take care then when you observe a man honored 
before others or possessed of great power or highly 
esteemed for any reason, not to suppose him happy, 
and be not carried away by the appearance. For 
if the nature of the good is in our power, neither 
envy nor jealousy will have a place in us. But you, 
yourself, will not wish to be a general or senator or 
consul, but a free man : and there is only one way 
to this, to despise the things which are not in our 
power. 

XII. 

Remember that it is not he who reviles you or 
strikes you, who insults you, but it is your opinion 
about these things as being insulting. When then 
a man irritates you, you must know that it is your 
own opinion which has irritated you. Therefore, 
especially try not to be carried away by the appear- 
ance. For if you once gain time and delay, you 
will more easily master yourself. 



226 EPICTETUS. 



XIII. 

If it should ever happen to you to be turned to 
externals in order to please some person, you must 
know that you have lost your purpose in life. Be 
satisfied then in everything with being a philosopher; 
and if you wish to seem also to any person to be a 
philosopher, appear so to yourself, and you will be 
able to do this. 

XIV. 

Let not these thoughts afflict you, I shall live 
unhonored and be nobody nowhere. For if want 
of honor is an evil, you cannot be in evil through 
the means (fault) of another any more than you 
can be involved in anything base. Is it then your 
business to obtain the rank of a magistrate, or to 
be received at a banquet ? By no means. How 
then can this be want of honor ? And how will you 
be nobody nowhere, when you ought to be some- 
body in those things only which are in your power, 
in which indeed it is permitted to you to be a man 
of the greatest worth ? But your friends will be 
without assistance ! What do you mean by being 
without assistance ? They will not receive money 
from you, nor will you make them Roman citizens. 
Who then told you that these are among the things 
which are in our power, and not in the power of 
others ? And who can give to another what he has 
not himself.-* Acquire money then, your friends 
say, that we also may have something. If I can 



THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. 22/ 

acquire money and also keep myself modest, and 
faithful and magnanimous, point out the way, and 
I will acquire it. But if you ask me to lose the 
things which are good and my own, in order that 
you may gain the things which are not good, see 
how unfair and silly you are. Besides, which 
would you rather have, money, or a faithful and 
modest friend ? For this end then rather help me 
to be such a man, and do not ask me to do this by 
which I shall lose that character. But my country, 
you say, as far as it depends on me, will be without 
my help. I ask again, what help do you mean .'* It 
will not have porticoes or baths through you.-^ And 
what does this mean ? For it is not furnished with 
shoes by means of a smith, nor with arms by means 
of a shoemaker. But it is enough if every man 
fully discharges the work that is his own : and if 
you provided it with another citizen faithful and 
modest, would you not be useful to it ? Yes. Then 
you also cannot be useless to it. What place then, 
you say, shall I hold in the city? Whatever you 
can, if you maintain at the same time your fidelity 
and modesty. But if when you wish to be useful 
to the state, you shall lose these qualities, what 
profit could you be to it, if you were made shame- 
less and faithless ? 

1 See the text. 



228 EPICTETUS. 



XV. 



Has any man been preferred before you at a 
banquet, or in being saluted, or in being invited to 
a consultation ? If these things are good, you 
ought to rejoice that he has obtained them: but if 
bad, be not grieved because you have not obtained 
them ; and remember that you cannot, if you do 
not the same things in order to obtain what is not 
in our own power, be considered worthy of the 
same (equal) things. For how can a man obtain 
an equal share with another when he does not visit 
a man's doors as that other man does, when he 
does not attend him when he goes abroad, as the 
other man does; when he does not praise (flatter) 
him as another does ? You will be unjust then and 
insatiable, if you do not part with the price, in 
return for which those things are sold, and if you 
wish to obtain them for nothing. Well, what is the 
price of lettuces ? An obolus perhaps. If then a 
man gives up the obolus, and receives the lettuces, 
and if you do not give up the obolus and do not 
obtain the lettuces, do not suppose that you receive 
less than he who has got the lettuces ; for as he has 
the lettuces, so you have the obolus which you did 
not give. In the same way then in the other matter 
also you have not been invited to a man's feast, for 
you did not give to the host the price at which the 
supper is sold ; he sells it for praise (flattery), for 
personal attention. Give then the price, for which 
it is sold, if it is for your interest. 



THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. 229 



XVI. 

As a mark is not set up for the purpose of miss- 
ing the aim, so neither does the nature of evil 
exist in the world. -^ 

XVII. 

If any person was intending to put your body in 
the power of any man whom you fell in with on the 
way, you would be vexed: but that you put your 
understanding in the power of any man whom you 
meet, so that if he should revile you, it is disturbed 
and troubled, are you not ashamed at this ? 

XVIII. 

In every act observe the things which come first, 
and those which follow it ; and so proceed to the 
act. If you do not, at first you will approach it 
with alacrity, without having thought of the things 
which will follow ; but afterwards, when certain 
base (ugly) things have shown themselves, you will 
be ashamed. A man wishes to conquer at the 
Olympic games. I also wish indeed, for it is a fine 

1 Nothing in the world (universe) can exist or be done 
(happen) which in its proper sense, in itself and in its nature, 
is bad ; for everything is and is done by the wisdom and will 
of God and for the purpose which he intended : but to miss a 
mark is to fail in an intention ; and as a man does not set up 
a mark, or does not form a purpose for the purpose of missing 
the mark or the purpose, so it is absurd (inconsistent) to say 
that God has a purpose or design, and that he purposed or 
designed anything which in itself and in its nature is bad. 



230 EPICTETUS. 

thing. But observe both the things which come 
first, and the things which follow; and then begin 
the act. You must do everything according to rule, 
eat according to strict orders, abstain from delica- 
cies, exercise yourself as you are bid at appointed 
times, in heat, in cold, you must not drink cold 
water, nor wine as you choose ; in a word, you must 
deliver yourself up to the exercise master as you do 
to the physician, and then proceed to the contest. 
And sometimes you will strain the hand, put the 
ankle out of joint, swallow much dust, sometimes 
be flogged, and after all this be defeated. When 
you have considered all this, if you still choose, go 
to the contest: if you do not, you will behave like 
children, who at one time play as wrestlers, another 
time as flute players, again as gladiators, then as 
trumpeters, then as tragic actors: so you also will 
be at one time an athlete, at another a gladiator, 
then a rhetorician, then a philosopher, but with 
your whole soul you will be nothing at all ; but like 
an ape you imitate everything that you see, and one 
thing after another pleases you. For you have not 
undertaken anything with consideration, nor have 
you surveyed it well ; but carelessly and with cold 
desire. Thus some who have seen a philosopher 
and having heard one speak, as Euphrates speaks, 
— and who can speak as he does.'*- — they wish to 
be philosophers themselves also. My man, first of 
all consider what kind of thing it is : and then 
examine your own nature, if you are able to sustain 
the character. Do you think that if you do these 



THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. 23 1 

things, you can eat in the same manner, drink in 
the same manner, and in the same manner loathe 
certain things ? You must pass sleepless nights, 
endure toil, go away from your kinsmen, be despised 
by a slave, in everything have the inferior part, in 
honor, in office, in the courts of justice, in every 
little matter. Consider these things, if you would 
exchange for them, freedom from passions, liberty, 
tranquillity. If not, take care that, like little 
children, you be not now a philosopher, then a 
servant of the publicani, then a rhetorician, then a 
procurator (manager) for Caesar. These things are 
not consistent. You must be one man, either good 
or bad. You must either cultivate your own ruling 
faculty, or external things; you must either exercise 
your skill on internal things or on external things ; 
that is you must either maintain the, position of a 
philosopher or that of a common person. 

XIX. 

Duties are universally measured by relations. Is 
a man a father ? The precept is to take care of 
him, to yield to him in all things, to submit when 
he is reproachful, when he inflicts blows. But sup- 
pose that he is a bad father. Were you then by 
nature made akin to a good father ? No ; but to a 
father. Does a brother wrong you ? Maintain 
then your own position towards him, and do not 
examine what he is doing, but what you must do 
that your will shall be conformable to nature. For 



232 EPICTETUS. 

another will not damage you unless you choose, 
but you will be damaged then when you shall think 
that you are damaged. In this way then you will 
discover your duty from the relation of a neighbor, 
from that of a citizen, from that of a general, if you 
are accustomed to contemplate the relations. 



XX. 

As to piety towards the gods, you must know 
that this is the chief thing, to have right opinions 
about them, to think that they exist, and that they 
administer the All well and justly ; and you must 
fix yourself in this principle (duty), to obey them, 
and to yield to them in everything which happens, 
and voluntarily to follow it as being accomplished 
by the wisest intelligence. For if you do so, you 
will never either blame the Gods, nor will you 
accuse them of neglecting you. And it is not 
possible for this to be done in any other way than 
by withdrawing from the things which are not in 
our power, and by placing the good and the evil 
only in those things w^iich are in our power. For 
if you think that any of the things which are not in 
our power is good or bad, it is absolutely necessary 
that, when you do not obtain what you wish, and 
when you fall into those things which you do not 
wish, you will find fault and hate those who are the 
cause of them ; for every animal is formed by 
nature to this, to fly from and to turn from the 
things which appear harmful and the things which 



THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. 233 

are the cause of the harm, but to follow and admire 
the things which are useful and the causes of the 
useful. It is impossible then for a person who 
thinks that he is harmed to be delighted with that 
which he thinks to be the cause of the harm, as it 
is also impossible to be pleased with the harm 
itself. For this reason also a father is reviled by 
his son, when he gives no part to his son of the 
things which are considered to be good. And it 
was this which made Polynices and Eteocles ene- 
mies, the opinion that royal power was a good. It 
is for this reason that the cultivator of the earth 
reviles the gods, for this reason the sailor does, 
and the merchant, and for this reason those who 
lose their wives and their children. For where the 
useful (your interest) is, there also piety is. Con- 
sequently, he who takes care to desire as he ought 
and to avoid as he ought, at the same time also 
cares after piety. 

XXI. 

Immediately prescribe some character and some 
form to yourself, which you shall observe, both 
when you are alone and when you meet with men. 

And let silence be the general rule, or let only 
what is necessary be said, and in few words. And 
rarely and when the occasion calls we shall say 
something; but about none of the common sub- 
jects, not about gladiators, nor horse races, nor 
about athletes, nor about eating or drinking, which 
are the usual subjects ; and especially not about 



234 EPICTETUS. 

men, as blaming them or praising them, or compar- 
ing them. If then you are able, bring over by 
your conversation the conversation of your asso- 
ciates to that which is proper ; but if you should 
happen to be confined to the company of strangers, 
be silent. 

Let not your laughter be much, nor on many 
occasions, nor excessive. 

Refuse altogether to take an oath, if it is possible : 
if it is not, refuse as far as you are able. 

Avoid banquets which are given by strangers and 
by ignorant persons. But if ever there is occasion 
to join in them, let your attention be carefully fixed, 
that you slip not into the manners of the vulgar 
(the un instructed). For you must know that, if 
your companion be impure, he also who keeps 
company wdth him must become impure, though 
he should happen to be pure. 

Take the things which relate to the body as far 
as the bare use, as food, drink, clothing, house, and 
slaves : but exclude everything which is for show 
or luxury. 

If a man has reported to you that a certain 
person speaks ill of you, do not make any defense 
to what has been told 3^ou : but reply, The man did 
not know the rest of my faults, for he would not 
have mentioned these only. 

It is not necessary to go to the theaters often : 
but if there is ever a proper occasion for going, do 
not show yourself as being a partisan of any man 
except yourself, that is, desire only that to be done 



THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. 235 

which is done, and for him only to gain the prize 
who gains the prize ; for in this way you will meet 
with no hindrance. But abstain entirely from 
shouts and laughter at any (thing or person), or 
violent emotions. And when you are come away, 
do not talk much about what has passed on the 
stage, except about that which may lead to your 
own improvement. For it is plain, if you do talk 
much, that you admired the spectacle (more than 
you ought). 

Do not go to the hearing of certain persons' 
recitations, nor visit them readily. But if you do 
attend, observe gravity and sedateness, and also 
avoid making yourself disagreeable. 

In company take care not to speak much and 
excessively about your own acts or dangers : for as 
it is pleasant to you to make mention of your own 
dangers, it is not so pleasant to others to hear what 
has happened to you. Take care also not to pro- 
voke laughter, for this is a slippery way towards 
vulgar habits, and is also adapted to diminish the 
respect of your neighbors. It is a dangerous habit 
also to approach obscene talk. When then any- 
thing of this kind happens, if there is a good oppor- 
tunity, rebuke the man who has proceeded to this 
talk : but if there is not an opportunity, by your 
silence at least, and blushing and expression of 
dissatisfaction by your countenance, show plainly 
that you are displeased at such talk. 



236 EPICTETUS. 

XXII. 

If you have received the impression of any 
pleasure, guard yourself against being carried away 
by it ; but let the thing wait for you, and allow 
yourself a certain delay on your own part. Then 
think of both times, of the time when you will 
enjoy the pleasure, and of the time after the enjoy- 
ment of the pleasure when you will repent and will 
reproach yourself. And set against these things 
how you will rejoice if you have abstained from the 
pleasure, and how you will commend yourself. But 
if it seem to you seasonable to undertake the thing, 
take care that the charm of it, and the pleasure, 
and the attraction of it shall not conquer you : but 
set on the other side the consideration how much 
better it is to be conscious that you have gained 
this victory 

XXIIL 

When you have decided that a thing ought to be 
done, and are doing it, never avoid being seen 
doing it, though the many shall form an unfavor- 
able opinion about it. For if it is not right to do 
it, avoid doing the thing ; but if it is right, why are 
you afraid of those who shall find fault wrongly ? 

XXIV. 

If you have assumed a character above your 
strength, you have both acted in this matter in an 
unbecoming way and you have neglected that which 
you might have fulfilled. 



THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. 23/ 



XXV. 

In walking about, as you take care not to step on 
a nail or to sprain your foot, so take care not to 
damage your own ruling faculty : and if we observe 
this rule in every act, we shall undertake the act 
with more security. 

XXVI. 

When any person treats you ill or speaks ill of 
you, remember that he does this or says this because 
he thinks that it is his duty. It is not possible then 
for him to follow that which seems right to you, but 
that which seems right to himself. Accordingly if 
he is wrong in his opinion, he is the person who is 
hurt, for he is the person who has been deceived. 

XXVII. 

Everything has two handles, the one by which it 
may be borne, the other by which it may not. If 
your brother acts unjustly, do not lay hold of the 
act by that handle wherein he acts unjustly, for this 
is the handle which cannot be borne: but lay hold 
of the other, that he is your brother, that he was 
nurtured with you, and you will lay hold of the 
thing by that handle by which it can be borne. 

XXVIII. 

On no occasion call yourself a philosopher, and 
do not speak much among the uninstructed about 



238 EPICTETUS. 

theorems (philosophical rules, precepts): but do 
that which follows from them. For example, at a 
banquet do not say how a man ought to eat, but 
eat as you ought to eat. For remember that in this 
way Socrates also altogether avoided ostentation : 
persons used to come to him and ask to be recom- 
mended by him to philosophers, and he used to 
take them to philosophers. Arid when a man shall 
say to you, that you know nothing, and you are not 
vexed, then be sure that you have begun the work 
(of philosophy). 

XXIX. 

When at a small cost you are supplied with every- 
thing for the body, do not be proud of this ; nor, if 
you drink water, say on every occasion, I drink 
water. But consider first how much more frugal 
the poor are than we, and how much more enduring 
of labor. 

XXX. 

The condition and characteristic of an unin- 
structed person is this: he never expects from 
himself profit nor harm, but from externals. The 
condition and characteristic of a philosopher is 
this: he expects all advantage and all harm from 
himself. The signs of one who is making progress 
are these: he censures no man, he praises no man, 
he blames no man, he accuses no man, he says 
nothing about himself as if he were somebody or 
knew something ; when he is impeded at all or 



THE ENCHEIRIDION, OR MANUAL. 239 

hindered, he blames himself: if a man praises him, 
he ridicules the praiser to himself: if a man cen- 
sures him, he makes no defense : he goes about like 
weak persons, being careful not to move any of the 
things which are placed, before they are firmly 
fixed: he removes all desire from himself, and he 
transfers aversion to those things only of the things 
within our power which are contrary to nature : he 
employs a moderate movement towards everything: 
whether he is considered foolish or ignorant, he 
cares not: and in a word he watches himself as if 
he were an enemy and lying in ambush. 

XXXI. 

And whatever any man shall say about you, do 
not attend to it: for this is no affair of yours. How 
long will you then still defer thinking yourself 
worthy of the best things, and in no matter trans- 
gressing the distinctive reason ? Have you accepted 
the theorems (rules), which it was your duty to 
agree to, and have you agreed to them? what 
teacher then do you still expect that you defer to 
him the correction of yourself ? You are no longer 
a youth, but already a full-grown man. If then 
you are negligent and slothful, and are continually 
making procrastination after procrastination, and 
proposal (intention) after proposal, and fixing day 
after day, after which you will attend to yourself, 
you will not know that you are not making improve- 
ment, but you will continue ignorant both while 



240 EPICTETUS. 

you live and till you die. Immediately then think 
it right to live as a full-grown man, and one who 
is making proficiency, and let everything which 
appears to you to be the best be to you a law 
which must not be transgressed. And if anything 
laborious, or pleasant or glorious or inglorious be 
presented to you, remember that now is the contest, 
now are the Olympic games, and they cannot be 
deferred ; and that it depends on one defeat and 
one giving way that progress is either lost or main- 
tained. Socrates in this way became perfect, in 
all things improving himself, attending to nothing 
except to reason. But you, though you are not yet 
a Socrates, ought to live as one who wishes to be a 
Socrates 



WENTWORTH'S ARITHMETICS. 



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TARBBLL'S 

LESSONS IN LANGUAGE. 

By H. S. TARBELL, Superintendent of Schools, Providence, R.I. 

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